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 That Americans have become cynical about politics is often taken for granted in 
both popular and scholarly discourse. But what does it mean to be cynical? The answer to 
this question is far from simple and requires an investigation into the concept‟s origins, 
which reside in the ancient Greek philosophy known as classical Cynicism. Diogenes of 
Sinope, who remains the paradigmatic Cynic, was an abrasive figure in ancient Athens 
whose sneers and sarcasm where essential to his commitment to „living according to 
nature.‟ And for Diogenes, this meant living in accordance with the truth. He distrusted 
the social and political motivations of his fellow Athenians, and he called them out on 
their hypocrisy in ways that both amused and aggravated them. But what Diogenes did, 
above all, was demand room for honesty and the truth in the public sphere. I propose that 
his example is valuable in the context of contemporary American political culture, where 
honesty is rare and the truth is regularly disregarded. 
 This dissertation presents an analysis of what cynicism can do for American 
political culture. I first address the question of what it means to be cynical and assess how 
much cynicism has changed since the days of Diogenes. While it may not mirror the 
original in all of its aspects, I argue that at root what it means to be cynical has not 
changed significantly, and that we can still identify cynics in our midst through their 
commitment to seeking and sarcastically speaking the truth. The early 20th century 
journalist H.L. Mencken is a case in point. Like Diogenes, Mencken aimed to be 
provocative and to initiate a response from his readers. And while he is not a cynic, 
Stanley Cavell‟s work on Ralph Waldo Emerson‟s non-conformism compliments the 
cynics‟ commitment to truth seeking and speaking. Contrary to contemporary popular 
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and scholarly assumptions, cynicism has not morphed into a pervasive political ideology 
or mood in America. Rather, it constitutes a valuable critical practice that provokes us to 
investigate our assumptions and to develop the capacity to care for our selves, others and 
the world. 
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Introduction: Cynicism and American Political 
Culture 
 
“I do not propose to write an ode to dejection, but to brag as lustily as chanticleer in the 
morning, standing on his roost, if only to wake my neighbors up.”—Henry David 
Thoreau, 1854 
 
It was little surprise that the 2012 presidential race ended with a frenzied blitz of 
advertising and campaigning on behalf of both President Barack Obama and his rival, 
Mitt Romney. Yet what was, perhaps, surprising was that as each candidate struggled to 
convince voters that he was the right man for the job and that he (and his party) had 
solutions for America‟s most pressing problems, the truth was conspicuously absent from 
many of the claims that were offered up as proof. Neither campaign made much of an 
effort to deny this, shrugging off inaccuracies as well as blatant distortions of the truth as 
„politics as usual.‟ When alarms were raised, for example, regarding the veracity of a 
number of vice-presidential candidate Paul Ryan‟s statements at the Republican National 
Convention, no one rushed to qualify or even explain his claims.1 Indeed, the Romney 
team was defiant in the face of its questioners, and the campaign‟s lead pollster Neil 
Newhouse went so far as to announce that they were “not going to let [their] campaign be 
dictated by fact-checkers.”2 While dishonesty is often taken as a given in American 
politics, the 2012 election cycle saw the truth not only altered and abused but also 
brazenly disregarded. This raises important questions about the relationship between 
                                                        
1 For examples, see: Madison, Lucy, Paula Reid and Stephanie Condon, “Fact Checking 6 Claims in Paul 
Ryan‟s Convention Speech,” CBS News, August 30, 2012; and Kohn, Sally, “Paul Ryan‟s Speech in 3 
Words,‟ Fox News, August 30, 2012. 
2 Bennet, James, “We‟re Not Going to Let Out Campaign be Dictated by Fact-Checkers,” The Atlantic, 
August 28, 2012 
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truth-claims and American political behavior. When a purported „fact‟ is revealed to be 
an outright lie, does the public care? Is political mendacity taken into account and 
punished on Election Day? 
 The answers depend, in part, on whether voters can agree upon what constitutes 
an outright lie, and the line separating fact from fiction is particularly difficult to draw in 
a political atmosphere characterized by intense ideological division. But they also depend 
on the extent to which American political culture places a premium on the truth itself. 
Andrew Norris and Jeremy Elkins argue that “we live in a political culture that is deeply 
ambivalent about truth,” where the principles of individualism and political plurality are 
in constant tension with competing truth claims (coming from both the left and the right) 
that all present an image of the truth as something definitive and unitary.3 Yet is the 
American stance towards truth best described as „ambivalent‟? In a New York Times 
editorial published on the tenth anniversary of 9/11 and titled “The Whole Truth and 
Nothing But,” Thomas Friedman presents a different take on the stance towards truth in 
American political culture, one that suggests not ambivalence but avoidance. Friedman 
argues that democracy in America is failing, and that our leaders have been telling us 
lies.4 But he also claims that the American people share the responsibility for this state of 
affairs, and not only because they fail to hold politicians accountable for lying by voting 
them out of office. It is also, Friedman states, because we, the people, have not been 
willing to face hard truths about the state of our nation. Rather, we actually expect our 
                                                        
3 Andrew Norris and Jeremy Elkins, “Politics, Political Theory, and the Question of Truth,” in Truth and 
Democracy, eds. Andrew Norris and Jeremy Elkins (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 
1. 
4 Thomas L. Friedman, “The Whole Truth and Nothing But,” The New York Times, September 9, 2011. 
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leaders, and particularly our presidents, to tell us what we want to hear: that solutions to 
our problems, economic and otherwise, can be had without sacrifice on our part.  
 My intention in commenting on this editorial is not to weigh in on the specifics of 
Friedman‟s arguments about American decline, but I would like to draw attention to the 
request he makes of Obama: “For once, Mr. President, let‟s start a debate with the truth.”5 
What Americans need, Friedman concludes, is the “cold, hard truth,” and we need it 
despite the fact that we have come to assume that “honesty is suicidal in politics” and that 
therefore politicians do not (even cannot) „tell it like it is.‟ And while he asks Obama to 
begin a “debate with the truth,” Friedman also implores us, as members of the American 
public, to engage the President in such a debate. To do so would first require setting aside 
the assumption that political honesty is an oxymoron. And it would also require the 
public to listen and respond to what Obama has to say. Can we make room for honesty in 
contemporary American political culture? Friedman is hardly trying to paint a rosy 
picture of transforming politics into a virtuous practice, nor is he defending Obama and 
others from charges of political mendacity. But his discussion of the need for truth in 
American politics is noteworthy because of his attention to why politicians lie. One of the 
primary reasons, Friedman proposes, is that the truth is not what the public wants to hear; 
politicians know that telling the cold, hard truth does not translate easily into political 
currency and consequently they have see little incentive to seek it or to speak it. Is the 
American public willing to engage our leaders in a debate with the truth by taking a real 
interest in it and actively considering the validity of their truth-claims? If the answer is 
no, then it seems that any truths that Obama might utter, „hard‟ or otherwise, will largely 
fall upon deaf ears. 
                                                        
5 Ibid. 
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 And if all of the questions above seek to ask not just whether the American public 
thinks there can even be such a thing as truth in politics, but also whether we care about 
the truth itself, then the role that cynicism plays in the political sphere and its influence 
on public perceptions of American politics must be assessed. Indeed, one of the central 
claims of this dissertation is that American political culture is not cynical enough. This is 
a claim that challenges contemporary representations of the concept of cynicism that are 
frequently tossed around by politicians, political pundits, and the press. Take, for 
example, Obama‟s rhetoric on cynicism. He frequently presents it as a road-block to 
progress and as an emblem of political negativity, and he proposes that it‟s a sentiment 
that needs to be fought if we, the people, want America to get „back on track.‟ In a speech 
delivered on the Democratic campaign trail in Kansas in July 2014, the President had the 
following to say on the subject: 
Cynicism is fashionable sometimes. You see it all over our culture, all 
over TV; everybody likes just putting stuff down and being cynical and 
negative, and that shows somehow that you are sophisticated and you are 
cool. You know what-- cynicism didn‟t put a man on the moon. Cynicism 
didn‟t earn women the right to vote. Cynicism didn‟t get a Civil Rights 
Act signed. Cynicism has never won a war. Cynicism has never cured a 
disease. Cynicism has never started a business. Cynicism has never 
inspired a young mind. I do not believe in a cynical America. I believe in 
an optimistic America.6 
 
Obama goes on to suggest that cynicism fosters the status quo, and he argues that if 
Americans want real change we had better start thinking more positively. Yet as I aim to 
demonstrate, this portrayal of cynicism is unfounded, and in attacking cynicism Obama is 
fighting the wrong fight. Historically, cynics have always been out-spoken enemies of the 
                                                        
6 James Dornbrook, “Obama Speech Fights Cynicism, Presses for Optimism,” The Kansas City Business 
Journal, July 30, 2014.  
   
 
 5 
status quo, and it is my contention that their provocative practices of political and cultural 
criticism can inspire not only „young minds,‟ but also wider political engagement.  
 To understand why Obama‟s characterization of cynicism is off the mark we must 
first take a closer look at what he means by it. Jon Favreau, formerly Obama‟s chief 
speechwriter at the White House, describes the President‟s understanding of the concept 
as follows: “Cynicism is the idea that the game is rigged, everyone is in it for himself, 
and there‟s no point in trying to make a difference.”7 Obama‟s use of the term makes 
allusions to pessimism, to a general distrustfulness of others, and to disbelief in the 
possibility of political sincerity. Cynicism, he says, is something that we should “never 
give in to”—it is something that, like an addiction, we should resist.8 And if we could 
resist or even eradicate it, Obama maintains, the American people might once again 
believe in our democracy and our leaders, reviving our hope and our material prospects 
for the future. (Incidentally, „believe‟ and „hope‟ have been two of his signature 
campaign slogans, so given his weak understanding of cynicism as a condition of 
negativity, distrust and disbelief it is no wonder its influence on American political 
culture concerns him. While I do not aim to endorse or discount the honesty or 
truthfulness of his campaign rhetoric, I do think that he honestly does not understand the 
meaning of the concept.) For Obama, cynicism seems to be something of a malicious and 
malignant mood, a spreading affliction that is eroding the American public‟s confidence 
in government, elected officials and the political process.  
 David Axelrod, one of Obama‟s longtime political advisers, offers a slightly 
different take on the concept, though one that is compatible with Obama‟s 
                                                        
7 Amy Parnes, “Obama: Don‟t Be So Cynical,” The Hill, August 8, 2014. 
8 Katie Zezima, “President Obama Brought Back „Hope and Change‟ This Summer — And Exported it to 
Estonia,” The Washington Post, September 3, 2014.  
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characterization. For Axelrod, cynicism has become a profitable tool in the hands of the 
media as well as politicians—he likens it to a „marketable asset,‟ stating, “There‟s an 
impetus to create fear and then market it, exploit it. And that‟s true on the part of the 
media, and that‟s true on the part of the politicians.”9 Axelrod implies that cynicism, as a 
mood of public distrust in government and politics, is tied to fears about the state of the 
nation and the world, and he complains that both politicians and the press capitalize on 
these fears and use them to manipulate the public. In this description of cynicism, 
Axelrod blames political leaders, political hopefuls and the media for generating a public 
mood of distrust in government and then exploiting it to their own advantage. Similarly, 
Jon Stewart, the political satirist and host of The Daily Show (himself a member of the 
media) accused Congress members of being “childish and cynical” in a September 30, 
2014 clip, stating that they have learned to turn legislative bills into campaign ads. For 
Stewart, rather than working to create actual laws, Congress members have taken to using 
proposed bills as fodder with which to attack one another in an effort to gain votes in the 
next election cycle, and he attributes this behavior to childishness and cynicism. The 
term, it seems, holds a decidedly pejorative air in contemporary political discourse. 
Stewart‟s fellow satirist Stephen Colbert offers the following description of cynicism, 
which, like Obama, he proposes is the antithesis of optimism: “Cynicism masquerades as 
wisdom, but it is the farthest thing from it…Because cynicism is a self-imposed 
blindness, a rejection of the world because we are afraid it will hurt us or disappoint us.” 
 But is this really a proper assessment of what it means to be cynical? I argue that 
it is not, and that cynicism can in fact provide an antidote to the self-imposed blindness 
bemoaned by Colbert, as well as the negativity, fear-mongering and brazen selfishness 
                                                        
9 Peter Baker, “Nation‟s Confidence Ebbs at a Steady Drip,” The New York Times, October 21, 2014. 
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that concern Obama, Axelrod and Stewart. Cynicism constitutes not a malignant mood of 
distrust and doubt but a practice of loud and courageous truth-telling whose roots lie in 
the ancient Greek philosophy of classical Cynicism. The cynic, to be fair, does distrust 
and doubt the sincerity and the motivations of most human beings, but he or she hardly 
shrinks from others and from the world on account such feelings. Rather, a cynic 
responds to such feelings. Cynics take iconoclasm and irreverence to the extreme—they 
challenge the establishment in the name of freedom and the truth, and they always act 
alone. So, it is inaccurate to attribute cynicism to a widespread mood, a marketing device, 
or a grab for power. And indeed, it is precisely because the practicing cynic is 
disappointed with the social and political worlds that he or she assumes the position of an 
outspoken (and often outrageous) critic. As William D. Desmond notes,  
For all the gloom attached to the word, wits of many periods have 
delighted in fashioning their own definitions of the cynic—sometimes as 
an exercise in self-analysis. Oscar Wilde‟s often-quoted quip is that a 
cynic is „a man who knows the price of everything and the value of 
nothing.‟ H.L. Mencken sees the cynic as a person „who, when he smells 
flowers, looks around for a coffin,‟ and (Mencken adds mischievously), „a 
cynic is right nine times out of ten.‟10 
 
Cynics are mischievous. They are also always highly controversial, and when it comes to 
society and politics their criticism does not adhere to ideological lines. Stewart and 
Colbert could both be categorized as contemporary „wits,‟ and they both may, in fact, be 
more cynical than they recognize or acknowledge. But neither is controversial enough to 
be described as actual cynics, who are few and far between. 
 For Diogenes of Sinope, widely considered the father of classical Cynicism, 
sneers, sarcasm and an irreverent non-conformism were essential to his commitment to 
                                                        
10 William D. Desmond, The Greek Praise of Poverty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2006), 
vii-viii. 
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„living according to nature,‟ which ultimately meant living honestly and in accordance 
with the truth. Why is free-spokenness required of the ancient cynic? Because when 
Diogenes was asked what the most beautiful thing in the world was, his response was 
“freedom of speech.”11 Diogenes noisily challenged the status quo and asserted his 
disdain for and independence from the norms and customs of ancient Athenian society as 
a means of manifesting his freedom. And like Diogenes, cynics today are still identified 
by their sarcasm and their sneers, but what is rarely acknowledged is their commitment to 
seeking and speaking the truth (and in particular cold, hard and unwanted truths). Cynics 
may sometimes be the bearers of „bad‟ news. But I argue that the ancient cynics‟ 
commitment to the pursuit of a „truly human‟ life of virtue through a rejection of the 
status quo was not only courageous and is still worthy of emulation, but that we also 
should not be too quick to assume that contemporary cynics‟ do not share some of the 
same commitments as Diogenes. To be sure, there is a tendency in the scholarly literature 
on so-called „modern‟ cynicism to posit a decisive break between the past and present 
meanings of the concept, where modern cynicism lacks the affirmative elements of its 
ancient counterpart. Yet I do not find any more evidence in said literature that we 
Americans are cynical and that the concept‟s meaning has changed significantly than I do 
in the accounts of Obama, Axelrod, Stewart or Colbert.  
 This dissertation, then, is not so much an investigation into the effects of cynicism 
in contemporary American political culture as an assessment of what it can do for it. 
Cynicism gets a bad rap, I argue, because it is misunderstood, and what it can deliver is a 
cry like that of Thoreau‟s chanticleer in Walden: a wake-up call that demands attention 
                                                        
11 Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volume II, trans. Robert Drew Hicks 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925): VI.69. 
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from the American public, and that can generate a response to and engagement with 
pressing political issues. Friedrich Nietzsche describes the concept as follows: 
Cynicism is the only form in which common souls come close to honesty; 
and the higher man must prick up his ears at every cynicism, whether 
coarse or refined, and congratulate himself whenever a buffoon without 
shame or a scientific satyr speaks out in his presence.12 
 
Diogenes was one such „buffoon without shame,‟ and Mencken serves as a more recent 
example. They both spoke the „rude‟ truth to an audience that for the most part did not 
want to hear it, but they did so out of respect for the truth and out of a commitment to 
preserving (by example) the freedom to tell it. Cynics did not and do not believe that 
there is such a thing as truth in politics, but they did and do believe in truth. And it is 
precisely because the relationship between truth and politics is tenuous that cynicism has 
a valuable role to play in democratic processes. 
Rethinking cynicism 
  
In Chapter One, I provide an assessment of the degree to which the meaning of 
the concept of cynicism (and its contemporary implications for American politics) differs 
from that of Diogenes, and a consideration of what the legacy of the ancient Cynics can 
do for politics today. Heartily embracing his most common nickname, „the dog,‟ 
Diogenes was an abrasive figure in ancient Athens who was famous (and infamous) for 
his sneers, his sarcasm and his earnest commitment to „living life according to nature.‟ 
Yet what did the living of such a life entail? Why did he consider his sneers and his 
sarcasm to be demonstrative of his capacity to live naturally, and on what principles or 
                                                        
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, cited in Robert Bracht Branham, “Defacing the Currency: Diogenes' Rhetoric and 
the Invention of Cynicism,” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy, eds. Robert 
Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 81. 
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precepts did Diogenes base his practices and philosophy? Luis E. Navia includes 
“rationality, lucidity, disciplined asceticism, freedom of speech, shamelessness, 
indifference, cosmopolitanism, [and] philanthropy” as key elements within the “Cynic 
Weltanschauung.”13 While all of these elements play a part in Cynic philosophy, I will 
focus on two: freedom of speech (or parrhesia, the practice of truth-telling and free-
spokenness) and „disciplined asceticism‟ (or autarkeia, as self-sufficiency). For 
Diogenes, to live virtuously „according to nature‟ was to live a happy life, and as he 
claimed that courage is “the hue of virtue,”14 the key to virtue in cynic philosophy is to be 
brave enough to become the „master of oneself.‟ Put another way, in order to live one‟s 
life in accordance with nature, which according to Cynic philosophy is to live a truly 
human life, one needs to have the qualities or characteristics Navia lists above and the 
courage to conduct oneself accordingly—regardless of the hardships and risks that doing 
so might entail.  
 In Chapter Two, I consider the life and work of H.L. Mencken, the journalist and 
writer whose fame (and infamy) reached their height in the 1920s, and whose cynical 
observations of American life caused quite a public stir throughout the entirety of his 
career. Mencken‟s social and political commentary was received with a mixture of 
reverence and disdain (and his reputation is still mixed today), but it is my contention that 
this cements rather than challenges his reputation as a cynic. Insisting that “very few 
human beings really esteem or crave freedom,” Mencken made a point of expressing his 
commitment to exercising his civil liberties, and primarily his right to freedom of 
                                                        
13 Luis E. Navia, Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), ix. 
14 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers II, VI.54 
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speech.15 Like Diogenes, Mencken was not looking for followers, and what he set out to 
do was to provoke his fellow citizens into responding to his criticism of American 
political and social culture. This he did quite effectively, and it is my contention that he 
offers a worthy example of political and civic engagement because of his commitment to 
haranguing both public leaders and members of the public for failing to uphold and to 
practice the principles that they preached. Freedom of speech was a key virtue in 
Diogenes‟ practical philosophy, and exercising it required finding the courage to confront 
one‟s peers with the rude truth, with truths that they do not want to hear. And Mencken 
wrote and spoke freely and frequently because, while he believed that “no normal being 
wants to hear the truth,” he took it upon himself as his duty to his society to tell it.16 In 
doing so, he called attention to important issues that were impacting the social and 
political landscape of the nation during a tumultuous time in American history. 
 I argue that one of cynicism‟s most compelling qualities is its capacity (indeed, its 
demand) for engagement. Like Thoreau‟s depiction of himself as chanticleer, one of the 
aims of the cynicism of both Diogenes and Mencken was to „shake up‟ their fellows by 
harassing them into responding to their criticism. This brings me, in Chapter Three, to 
Ralph Waldo Emerson‟s essay Self-Reliance, and to the reading of Emerson offered by 
the American philosopher Stanley Cavell. Cavell is not a cynic, but his reading of 
Emerson‟s work and his vision of Emersonian Perfectionism share affinities with 
cynicism that are worth exploring. As Emily Miller Budick argues, “Cavell tries to 
discover how and why Emerson, while affirming his total freedom to turn away from 
                                                        
15 H.L. Mencken, Minority Report: H.L. Mencken’s Notebooks (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2006), 211. 
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society, chooses nonetheless to return to society and to re-engage it.”17 In this effort, 
Emerson is quite a bit like not only Thoreau but also Diogenes and Mencken. And Cavell 
is quite curious as to what motivates this move to re-engage; it is a move that hinges, I 
think, on what Cavell reminds us is the human need to convene (a need that does not 
entail conceding one‟s freedom). For the purposes of the present study, Cavell‟s work on 
skepticism and on Emersonian Perfectionism ultimately offer a discussion of why we and 
not just I matter—a discussion that the cynics tend to bypass. Diogenes and Mencken 
were not selfish per se. But they did tend to dismiss the interdependencies between the 
self and the community, a subject that Cavell takes on at length.  
 Cavell proposes that on the subject of individualism, Emerson is widely misread. 
“The endlessly repeated idea,” he states, “that Emerson was only interested in finding the 
individual should give way to or make way for the idea that this quest was his way of 
founding a nation, writing a constitution, constituting its citizens.”18 Emerson, Cavell 
argues, sees the founding or constituting of a nation as imbricated in the processes by 
which its citizens search for what constitutes their own selves. For Cavell, Emerson‟s 
response to the question of what it means to be an American pushes us to re-consider and 
respond to this question as we think about what it could (or should) mean. Cavell 
proposes that this process of questioning and responding is not only philosophical but 
also political. Indeed, he suggests that philosophy‟s great task is responsiveness, meaning 
that the practice of philosophizing requires engagement with one‟s self, one‟s society and 
one‟s world, and such engagements are essential to any consideration of politics. 
                                                        
17 Emily Miller Budick, “Sacvan Bercovitch, Stanley Cavell, and the Romance of American Fiction,” in 
Cohesion and Dissent in America, eds. Carol Colatrella and Joseph Alkana (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1994), 58 
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Emerson, Cavell argues, is unduly denied the designation of an American philosopher, 
and he states that there is nothing that “could be more significant of his prose than its 
despair of and hope for philosophy.”19 And Cavell also refuses to accept that 
philosophy‟s task is not coupled with some of the same tasks that human beings grapple 
with in the practice of politics. As James Conant notes, “philosophy for Cavell (its claim 
to be philosophy depending on its capacity to speak in the universal voice not 
withstanding) must not shrink from the recognition that whoever seeks to speak for 
everyone must first speak as the particular person he or she is—rooted in the 
particularities of his or her time.”20  
 To return to the themes of truth, lies and responsibility in contemporary political 
discourse, I argue that cynicism is not the detriment to democracy that Obama and others 
contend. Rather, its critical capacities can offer a healthy and hearty response to political 
mendacity, as well as the problem of popular ignorance in American political culture. 
Throwing up our hands in disgust at the disregard for truth in politics does not absolve us 
of the responsibility to weigh in on political issues, and perhaps political leaders would 
be more willing to engage in „debates with the truth‟ if the public showed an interest in 
hearing it. Diogenes and Mencken, and, I think, Emerson and Thoreau, assumed this 
responsibility by confronting conformism and conventionality. And, when we add Cavell 
into this mix, what they all offer—albeit in somewhat different ways—is a sense of care 
and concern for the individual‟s relation to a community, as well as a care and concern 
for the nature of communities and the politics that impact them.  
                                                        
19 Ibid. 78. 
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Chapter 1: Can We Learn New Tricks from an Old 
Dog? The Cynicism of Diogenes 
 
“Cynicism is an unpleasant way of saying the truth.”—Lillian Hellman, 1939 
 
The most common contemporary definition of a cynic, according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, is “a person who shows a disposition to disbelieve in the sincerity or 
goodness of human motives and actions, and is wont to express this by sneers and 
sarcasm.”21 This definition is not inaccurate but it still needs fleshing out, and doing so is 
no simple task. A deeper understanding of cynicism must not only acknowledge the 
history of classical Cynicism but also assess the extent to which the meaning of the 
concept has changed since Diogenes of Sinope first pledged to „deface the currency‟ of 
ancient Athens in the fourth century BC. Diogenes‟s provocative behavior “aimed to 
shock his interlocutors out of their complacency,” and classical Cynicism has a rich 
historical and literary legacy.22 Though he maintained that the human individual could 
find freedom and redemption from the trappings of the social and political worlds, 
Diogenes insisted that this could only be done in open and explicit opposition to society, 
and never by means of attempts to create a better one. The ancient Cynics, therefore, had 
no faith in „the sincerity or goodness of human actions or motives‟ when it came to 
society and politics, and the norms and conventions that dictated these actions were the 
principle targets of their relentless criticism. Furthermore, if, as the OED says, a cynic 
can also be described as “a sneering fault-finder,” or “a person disposed to rail and find 
                                                        
21 The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
22 Robert Brach Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, “Introduction,” in Branham and Goulet-Cazé, The 
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fault,” then it is my contention that the contemporary definition of a cynic still 
characterizes the figure of Diogenes and those who followed him.23  
 David Mazella, however, argues that these definitions are inadequate when it 
comes to assessing cynicism today, and that the concept‟s meaning has changed 
considerably. For Mazella, the OED‟s definitions reduce the cynic to a character type, 
which he feels is insufficient because „modern‟ cynicism “does not simply refer to an 
individual‟s psychological state.” Cynicism, Mazella suggests, is “a social concept, a 
term that describes interactions, not individuals or their states of conscience.”24 While I 
agree with Mazella that cynicism‟s sneering and fault-finding are interactive, I think it is 
an overstatement to say that cynicism does not refer to a character type. The classical 
Cynics were most definitely characters, and their philosophy was highly individualistic in 
its approaches to criticism. They were decidedly anti-social rather than asocial—though 
ardent individualists, their sneering, fault-finding and outrageous behavior was meant to 
provoke interactions with others instead of avoiding them. Indeed, the Cynics were 
known in ancient Greece for their “most stigmatized traits, including misanthropy, 
personal satire and railing,” and these are traits that we continue to use to identify the 
cynics in our midst despite claims that we all reside in a wider cynical culture.25 This 
underscores the importance of honing in on what “cynicism” and being cynical actually 
means if the goal is to assess whether or not it can be considered the dominant ethos in 
American political culture.   
 Diogenes was a controversial figure in ancient Athens, celebrated by some, 
despised by others, but recognized (it seems) by most of the Athenian public. So on what 
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25 Ibid. 67. 
   
 
 16 
grounds does Mazella case his claim that cynicism has morphed into a new phenomenon. 
He argues as follows:  
the notorious difficulty of defining cynicism, or of coordinating its various 
conflicting meanings, stems from the fact that it refers to an ensemble of mutually 
reinforcing attitudes rather than a single attitude uniformly held within the 
ensemble. Its power and persistence reside in its ability to sustain itself as an 
ensemble even while absorbing various attempts to change the dynamic.26  
 
But could it be that because we have assumed it to represent „an ensemble of mutually 
enforcing attitudes‟ the concept of cynicism has taken on the aura of an ideology? We 
hear and say that politicians are cynical, that the public is cynical, that one should or 
should not be cynical, that everyone is cynical, and so forth and so on. Indeed, some 
might argue that the frequency with which these words are bandied about in political 
discussions and contests is proof in itself that we currently live in a cynical age. In many 
cases, however, the term „cynical‟ is used incorrectly as a synonym for other concepts. 
Corruption, disbelief, disillusionment and apathy, for example, are almost automatically 
summoned to mind at the suggestion of cynicism (the first as the cause of the latter 
three), but so are anger and frustration, and these are not necessarily correlated with the 
first four (or with cynicism, for that matter). Cynicism has come to be used to describe a 
diverse selection of sentiments relating to politics, society and human nature, and the fact 
that cynicism and its grammatical variants is taken to mean different things in similar 
political and social contexts is significant if we consider corruption, disbelief, apathy, 
anger and frustration to have real political effects. The use of the term “cynical” and the 
concept of “cynicism” to signify all of these sentiments clouds our capacity to assess and 
mitigate the political impact of each sentiment individually.  
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 Rethinking cynicism and its critical practices offers us tools to grapple with the 
political effects of the sentiments listed above, and the tendency to present ancient and 
„modern‟ cynicism as opposites bars us from the still-useful lessons of Diogenes and later 
Cynics who embraced his spirit of rebellion against convention. Cynicism did (and still 
does) describe individuals, individuals who were (and still are) constituted through their 
acts of disclosure in the public sphere, and its practices were (and still are) active and 
relentless in their criticism. This is a far cry from the weary and resentful picture of the 
ideology of „modern‟ cynicism that is often invoked today. While I propose that what it 
means to be „cynical‟ has changed much less than contemporary popular and scholarly 
discourse would suggest, my aim is not to equate a „modern‟ version of cynicism with the 
ancient one. However, I do think that we limit cynicism‟s critical potential if we ignore 
the similarities. At root, Diogenes‟ sneering, sarcastic and outrageous mission to „deface 
the currency‟ in order to live in accordance with the truth remains the central tenet of 
cynicism today.   
Misidentifying cynicism 
 
Peter Sloterdijk‟s The Critique of Cynical Reason is often credited with starting 
the discussion of the effects of cynicism in contemporary politics, so it is worth offering a 
brief description of his treatment of the subject here. First published in Germany in 1983, 
Sloterdijk‟s book defines „modern‟ cynicism as an „enlightened false consciousness‟ 
characterized by two related aspects: an awareness that we are all living within a lie with 
regard to the professed ideals and principles of politicians, and widespread tolerance for 
this state of affairs. While Sloterdijk‟s work focuses on cynicism in the European context, 
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his claims imply that modern citizens in general are so wearied by their knowledge of the 
rampant corruption and deception in political and social relations that they lack the 
strength or motivation for real critique; instead of speaking out against corruption and 
deception, he argues, we „moderns‟ choose to simply buy into (or submit to) the practices 
that perpetuate them. In essence, Sloterdijk suggests that we are too exhausted to even 
care about truth. And Slavov Zizek‟s discussion of cynicism and ideology makes 
comparable claims: Zizek argues that in today‟s “era of cynicism, ideology can afford to 
reveal the secret of its functioning (its constitutive idiocy, which traditional pre-cynical 
ideology had to keep a secret) without in the least affecting its efficiency.”27 For 
Sloterdijk and Zizek, „modern‟ cynicism is qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from 
the ancient practices, and the break between the two is posited as both a symptom and a 
source of high levels of political disaffection. The political system, they suggest, has 
learned not only to cope with public disillusionment but also to take advantage of it: if 
nobody cares, then politicians will not be held accountable for their actions or inaction. 
 Focusing on the American context, William Chaloupka calls „modern‟ cynicism 
„the condition of lost belief,‟ a condition characterized by an angry and frustrated 
citizenry that not only distrusts government but has also given up on changing the politics 
that shape it.28 (In this respect his portrayal of cynicism is similar to Obama‟s.) In 
Everybody Knows, Chaloupka argues that Americans have become cynics par 
excellence, and that if cynicism is measured by anger, frustration and disillusionment 
then one could cite ample evidence to support this claim. It certainly does seem to be the 
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case that the vitriolic character of political partisanship in Washington, the proliferation 
of media outlets vying to report the next political scandal, and the real fears of American 
citizens about the material effects of their leaders‟ decisions on themselves, the society, 
and the planet have led many to not only distrust but also to disdain the political system. 
Chaloupka argues that in many ways, Americans do not even recognize or understand 
their own cynicism, but he states that it is now so deeply entrenched in the political 
system that attempts to challenge it often just reinforce the cynical mindset. In this vein, 
he claims that because calls for civility in politics are not considered trustworthy, the 
more we hear them the more disillusioned with the system we become. We do not know 
what to believe so we do not know what, specifically, we should fight against, and 
consequently “the confusions produced by our thin understanding of cynicism only make 
matters worse” when we try to generate hope for a better future.29 Similarly, Jeffrey 
Goldfarb‟s The Cynical Society defines modern cynicism as “a form of legitimation 
through disbelief,” and claims that “the single most pressing challenge facing American 
democracy right now is widespread public cynicism.”30 He ties the problem to the rise of 
mass society and the accompanying growth of the media and advertising, but his 
conclusion is similar to Chaloupka‟s: the more we see and hear, the less we believe. It is 
hard to argue against many aspects of this picture of contemporary political and social 
culture. Sadly, it does often seem that the only things we can affirm together as a public 
are (a) that the professed ideals of our political leaders are empty, and (b) that this is „how 
the system works‟ and there is nothing to be done about it. What options do we or could 
we have in such a state of affairs, other than simply learning to cope with lies and 
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corruption? We do in fact have other options, but recognizing them requires a better 
understanding of what cynicism is and how it operates, as well as a debunking of the 
ideology that cynicism has purportedly become. While I agree with Chaloupka and 
Goldfarb that we often don‟t know who or what to blame for the troubled state of 
American politics, our „thin understanding‟ of cynicism is not the issue at hand. Rather, 
the reification of the concept itself hobbles attempts to change the political culture. Even 
Sloterdijk‟s suggestion that the remedy for the melancholy of an exhausted critical 
consciousness lies in adopting a „cheeky subversiveness‟ to the status quo is more a 
coping mechanism than a strategic challenge to the problems of dishonesty and disbelief.   
 Mazella suggests that contemporary cynicism erodes our capacity to find hope for 
the future, blinding us, as members of the American public, to possibilities for social and 
political change. Following the work of Alan Keenan, he proposes that there are three 
„ideal‟ cynical types in contemporary American political culture: 
(1) the “master-cynic,” who wields power within the political system; (2) 
the cynical (though disempowered) insiders, whose publicity helps sustain 
the political system; and (3) the powerless, „outsider-cynics,‟ who operate 
as the passive, excluded “public” of the political system.31 
 
For Keenan and Mazella, „master-cynics‟ are the ruthless, manipulative and self-serving 
political leaders (those who, following the OED‟s description of cynicism, disbelieve „in 
the sincerity or goodness of human motives or actions‟ and aim to exploit and capitalize 
upon this insincerity), and the cynical insiders serve the masters to gain what advantages 
they can through their associations with power. The „outsider-cynics,‟ by contrast, are 
members of the disempowered „public,‟ who are sometimes angry, sometimes apathetic 
but always distrustful of politics and government. Yet other than a general distrust in 
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human sincerity and goodness, I do not see the connection between these three ideal 
types and cynicism. The Cynics were only ruthless in their commitment to ranting and 
railing, they would never have acknowledged (much less served) a „master,‟ and they 
most certainly were not disempowered. Keenan and Mazella may be accurately 
describing three hierarchical political categories—masters, insiders, and the public—but 
they are not describing cynics, and cynicism in America is not the pervasive political 
problem that it is branded as today.  
 Indeed, according to Benjamin Ginsberg‟s theory of cynical realism, American 
political culture could do with more cynicism, and in fact we have too much faith in the 
sincerity of politicians and the democratic system of representation. For Ginsberg, one of 
the hard truths that any politically savvy individual must accept is that politics, like 
power, corrupts, and that therefore it would be absurd to trust in the words of an elected 
official (or, for that matter, those of a political candidate). His theory is based on three 
related notions: (a) that politics revolves around self-interest, (b) that its goals are to 
secure and/or increase wealth, status or power, and (c) that ideals or „issues‟ are used as 
weapons in political contests.32 This certainly fits with the „realist‟ aspect of the theory, 
but how does the concept of cynicism fit with it? For Ginsberg, what cynicism adds to the 
theory is a call to question and to confront political leaders rather than simply taking their 
self-interested motives and behavior for granted (or worse, buying into their claims). 
Ginsburg‟s theory is based on a different conception of cynicism than those offered 
above, one that fits closely with that of the late nineteenth-century journalist Ambrose 
Bierce who described it as follows: “Cynicism is that blackguard defect of vision which 
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compels us to see the world as it is, instead of as it should be.”33 The cynical realist, then, 
says that it is necessary to accept that politicians and truth are incompatible in order to 
see (and live in) the „real‟ world. And “when it comes to understanding politics,” 
Ginsberg writes, “one cannot be too cynical.”34 
 Ginsberg‟s theory, then, adheres to the idea of cynicism as an active and 
outspoken practice of political and social critique, and thus his understanding of the 
concept and practices of cynicism suggests that their meaning has not undergone a 
substantial change from the original. Indeed, he presents cynicism as not only a healthy 
but also a necessary response to the reality of political corruption and mendacity; we 
should distrust the system, but we should also stand up to it when it becomes oppressive. 
According to this theory, then, we actually need more cynics to see through the lies of our 
political leaders and to (presumably) identify and speak out against what it is that they are 
trying to hide from us. For the cynical realist, cynicism is not a danger to democracy—
indeed, it is a rare but essential critical attitude that must be cultivated rather than 
combated. Following in this vein, it is worth considering Lillian Hellmann‟s assertion 
that “Cynicism is an unpleasant way of saying the truth.” Her definition suggests not an 
exhausted awareness of lies and deception but rather an unsolicited act of truth-telling. 
Hellmann‟s statement is ambiguous as to whether the announcement is unwelcome 
because of the specifics of the message (the truth) or the „unpleasantness‟ of the delivery, 
but, as will be shown, this ambiguity actually aligns her definition closely with the 
concept‟s foundations.  
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 Mazella notes that one factor that has fostered Cynicism‟s attraction throughout 
the centuries is “its programmatic hostility to political power, conventional values, and 
rival philosophies.”35 While this is true, I also want to point out that Diogenes was neither 
a political dissident nor a rabble-rouser—his contempt for the ideals and practices of his 
day was dispersed quite equally: he was as quick to criticize the poor for coveting the 
wealth and privilege of the rich and powerful as he was the rich and powerful for valuing 
their money and privilege above the „true‟ sources of happiness in life. According to 
Diogenes, anyone and everyone who did not realize the error of such thinking paid for it 
with their freedom. Desmond discusses one of the classic Cynic paradoxes, „poverty is 
wealth,‟ as follows: for the Cynics, “What is truly important cannot be bought or sold like 
a commodity. Health, human friendship, self-regard, the various virtues that distinguish 
one as an excellent human being and that enable one to face life‟s contingencies—such 
goods depend more on individual disposition than on riches.”36 Diogenes took it upon 
himself to illuminate this fact and to show people that they needed to look beyond not 
only material wealth but also the socially fabricated lies that dictated their conduct as 
well as their desires, effectively depriving them of the true virtues and values they should 
honor as natural beings.  
 Navia, who has written extensively on the ancient Cynics, argues that “modern 
cynicism is in reality, all appearances notwithstanding, the antithesis of classical 
cynicism,” and he places the modern variety of cynicism at the root of the present 
maladies afflicting American society and political culture.37 Indeed, it seems that for 
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Navia there is a „good‟ cynicism (ancient Cynicism) and a „bad‟ cynicism (the modern 
variety), and on the topic of the latter he concludes: 
The present crisis in human values, the emergence of irrationalism so 
evident in certain types of popular music and entertainment, the 
contemptuous attitude towards traditions and established norms, the 
brutality exhibited by the behavior of nations toward one another, the 
dehumanization of human relations brought about by a blind and unbridled 
reliance on technology—all these and other characteristics of our times 
reflect the advent of universal cynicism that, as an offspring of nihilism, 
threatens to plunge the human species into a long era of barbarism and 
primitivism.38 
 
Navia‟s strong condemnation of modern (indeed, „universal‟) cynicism for its 
iconoclastic tendencies is curious, given the typical antics of the ancient Cynics. They too 
were often charged with posing a similar threat to society; they certainly showed great 
contempt for traditions and established norms, and associations were, and sometimes still 
are, made between their ways of life and both barbarism and primitivism (though these 
are misreadings). Navia himself seems to share the ancient philosophy‟s fatalistic take on 
social and political reform, and the above rant could be construed as cynical in what he 
wants to portray as the classical (and hence „good‟) sense. What is not clear is why a 
„universal,‟ „bad‟ cynicism is to blame for the concerns that he raises. 
 As it is functions today, cynicism is in some respects at odds with the spirit of the 
ancient philosophy from which it derived. Nevertheless, there are residual similarities 
between the ancient and modern conceptions that complicate attempts to divide them 
conclusively, and these similarities are often glossed over in studies seeking to assess the 
impact of cynicism as a modern phenomenon. One of the reasons for this, it seems to me, 
is that in both popular and scholarly discourse there is a tendency to assume that someone 
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who believes that most human beings are self-serving and dishonest is him- or herself 
self-serving and dishonest. Louisa Shea claims that “cynicism has come to signify, in the 
words of the [OED], „a person who believes that people are motivated purely by self-
interest rather than acting for honorable or unselfish reasons.‟ But cynic did not always 
denote a self-seeking and ruthless individual.”39 (She also cites the OED‟s 2nd edition, 
though I have not been able to locate this particular definition.) While Shea, Chaloupka, 
Goldfarb, Navia, Sloterdijk and Mazella, are all attentive to the legacy of Diogenes‟s 
cynicism, they all claim that the meaning of the concept has morphed into something 
destructive to the democratic process. On this point, I disagree. What I am arguing is that 
a cynic is not a ruthless, self-seeking individual (such as the „master-cynic‟), but rather an 
outspoken critic of such individuals and of society‟s tolerance for such behavior. 
Cynicism also remains a far cry from the weary and resigned awareness of corruption or 
the pessimistic renunciation of the possibilities of communal life invoked by Sloterdijk 
and seen in Keenan‟s „outsider-cynic.‟ A deeper investigation into ancient Cynicism, 
then, is in order. 
Troubling the ancient/modern dichotomy 
 
Interestingly, the drive to distinguish between an ancient and modern, or a „good‟ 
and a „bad‟ cynicism is found not only in modern studies of cynicism, but has historical 
roots that can be traced back through the history of ancient philosophy. As Heinrich 
Niehues-Probsting emphasizes,   
[to] anyone who knows the history of Cynicism‟s effects and reception, the 
separation of cynicism and Cynicism seems like a continuation of the attempt to 
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distinguish an authentic and original cynicism from a false and degenerate one, a 
Cynicism worthy of respect from one worthy of rejection, a good Cynicism from 
a bad one. This attempt is coextensive with the history of cynicism itself.40  
 
The Cynics of ancient Greece were equally controversial among their proponents and 
detractors, and what, precisely, constituted authentic Cynicism was a matter of debate 
over the centuries. Indeed, the historical and literary sources chronicling Diogenes‟ life 
and philosophy were, rather ironically, protective of his image and his legacy to the 
extent that they sometimes outright avoided addressing certain elements. As Margarethe 
Billerbeck has argued, “in the history of ancient Cynicism the portrayal of Diogenes and 
his successors is far from being uniform,” and she notes that among some of his more 
famous „successors‟ there was a “tendency to idealize the founder of the movement and 
to purge his portrait of any features that might shock off potential followers.”41 Dio 
Chrysostom, Epictetus, Lucian and the Emperor Julian serve as examples of sources 
guilty of such idealization, and their accounts of Cynicism and of Diogenes are often 
challenged for presenting a „sanitized‟ cynic type that does not fit Diogenes‟ life and 
practices. They all celebrated Diogenes‟ commitment to autarkeia and parrhesia but 
tended to downplay his shamelessness (anaideia) in their telling of his philosophy. 
 But as I aim to show, Diogenes‟ shamelessness—his outrageous, audacious and 
flagrantly rude behavior—was an integral part of his philosophical practice. He was 
brazen and contemptuous of others, and he was often treated with contempt himself, but 
his shamelessness and contempt were programmatic and critical to his capacity to „live 
according to nature.‟ This also offers a clue as to why classical Cynicism has not always 
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had a warm popular or scholarly reception. Hegel wrote the Cynics off as un-
philosophical, simple, and ultimately uninteresting.42 And Ferdinand Sayre, whose 1938 
study on Diogenes was highly critical of the philosophy and its founder, describes it as 
follows: 
The Cynics attacked and ridiculed religion, philosophy, science, art, 
literature, love, friendship, good manners, loyalty to parents and even 
athletics—everything which tended to embellish and enrich human life, to 
give it significance and to make it worth living. The callous amoralism 
expressed by the word “cynicism” reflects the impression made by them 
upon their contemporaries.43  
 
Diogenes did attack and ridicule all of these things, and he did make a callous impression 
on some his contemporaries for doing so. But his goal was to demonstrate that one must 
actively search, question and, ultimately, figure out what gives life significance and 
makes it worth living rather than falling back upon what, according to society, one is 
supposed to value. For Diogenes, as for the later Cynics and cynics today, this was and is 
always an ongoing process. Rather than looking to universals, the Cynics worshipped the 
everyday and were committed to action over abstract theory. They can still prompt us to 
ask ourselves what we value because they also demand that we explain or justify why. 
And such demands can prompt discussions or dialogue, and inspire individual citizens to 
push for change.  
 I should note that who deserves the title of the original Dog has been contested, 
just as it was in ancient Greece through the sixth century BC. As Marie-Odile Goulet-
Cazé argues, “Opinions are divided between Antisthenes—a follower of Socrates whose 
claim is based on a tradition of ancient sources, the only defect of which is that they are 
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late (Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, Aelian, Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and the Suda)—
and Diogenes of Sinope, whose claim is supported by modern scholarship.”44 Antisthenes 
was indeed a follower of Socrates (he was present at his death), and he wrote extensively 
on such topics as rhetoric, logic, ethics and politics.45 He was also known to have given 
lessons on asceticism at the Cynosarges gymnasium, and by some accounts Diogenes 
heard him there and became something of a disciple.46 This explains why the heritage of 
Cynic philosophy is sometimes traced back to Antisthenes (and even to Socrates). But as 
Donald R. Dudley points out, “the validity of the tradition which makes Antisthenes the 
founder of Cynicism has been questioned in both ancient and modern times,” and he 
concludes that while Antisthenes may have had some influence on the development of 
classical Cynicism, Diogenes should be considered its founder.47 Dudley makes a solid 
case for his argument: Antisthenes may have been an ascetic, but he was not a vagrant, 
and unlike Diogenes, who “poured scorn on all his contemporaries,” he was not disposed 
to rant and rail at those around him, and even attended philosophical lectures and was 
paid (albeit very modestly) for his teachings.48 And regardless, Diogenes was, and 
remains, the literary hero of the philosophy of Cynicism and the figure most associated 
with its practices. 
 But before getting into the specifics of Diogenes‟ life and philosophy, and thus of 
what it meant to be „cynical‟ in ancient Greece, it is necessary to clarify what Cynicism 
was not. As Dudley contends, “it would be an exaggeration to speak of any Cynic 
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„school‟ in the regular sense of organized teaching and a common body of doctrine.”49 
While this study will focus on the life of Diogenes, the later cynics who carried on this 
philosophy through the sixth century AD were a motley crew of individualists whose 
preaching and teachings took various aims. Rather than a strict philosophical school, 
Dudley explains that “Cynicism was really a phenomenon which presented itself in three 
not inseparable aspects—a vagrant ascetic life, an assault on all established values, and a 
body of literary genres particularly well adapted to satire and popular philosophical 
propaganda.”50 As will be shown, the improvisational character of Diogenes‟ challenges 
to convention and power allowed him to turn his daily habits and practices into 
affirmations of the contingent nature of social and political interactions. It was also, I 
think, one of the qualities that gave his philosophy its staying power in the centuries that 
followed him, for the later cynics were able to „improvise‟ their practice of Cynic 
philosophy to fit their own social and political circumstances without abandoning the 
spirit of Diogenes.      
Diogenes the Dog 
 
Because he left few (if any) writings of his own, the story of Diogenes‟ life and 
philosophy can only be pieced together from other sources, and the legitimacy of some of 
these accounts remains contested today. Diogenes Laertius‟ biographical sketch of 
Diogenes in Lives of Eminent Philosophers is generally considered the most important 
ancient secondary source on him, and he claims that Diogenes wrote fourteen dialogues 
and seven tragedies. But the works themselves were not preserved and this claim may be 
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unfounded, and what we know of Diogenes today comes largely from the chreia 
(anecdotes or „sayings‟) that were said to be associated with him during his lifetime and 
from which the standard conceptions of his character and philosophy have been drawn. 
(Laertius‟ biography is the richest source of these chreia, which explains its lasting 
significance.) Still, some details notwithstanding, there has been enough corroboration 
between sources on particular aspects of his life to establish the central tenets of the 
philosophical movement of ancient Cynicism for which he is the archetypal figure. 
 Diogenes was not born in Athens, but arrived there sometime during the course of 
the fourth century BC after having been exiled from his native Sinope for his purported 
involvement in defacing the city‟s currency. The exact nature of his crime (or whether it 
was a crime) is unknown, as the historical accounts are varied and inconclusive. But his 
practice of „defacing the currency‟ became an essential feature of the Cynic philosophy, 
and Diogenes arrived in Athens with a mission: to once again „deface the currency,‟ 
though this time it was not the coinage that he planned to defile but the customs, norms 
and conventions that dictated Athenian social and political life. Taking up residence in a 
tub in the middle of the marketplace, Diogenes sought to show others that they were 
missing out on the happiness that would come from converting to his ascetic lifestyle and 
freeing themselves from the fetters of material desires and the pressures of attending to 
socially acceptable measures of status and value. Yet Diogenes‟ asceticism was 
idiosyncratic, and while it required a strict commitment to disciplining the body and mind 
it was hardly restrictive of pleasure per se. Sexual desires, for example, he considered 
perfectly natural, and he saw no reason to be ashamed of satisfying them or to reserve 
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such pleasures for moments of privacy. Indeed, Diogenes often made a point of „enjoying 
himself‟ in the middle of the square, a sight that frequently offended the Athenian public.  
His trademark uniform was a ragged cloak, and the historical and literary records 
describe him carrying nothing but a leathern wallet (though by some accounts he is also 
said to have carried a staff, but only in his old age when he could not have walked 
without one). Diogenes‟ near-naked appearance and minimal possessions are of 
significance because they represented his chosen way of life, a life dedicated to showing 
others that he could live happily among them while continuing to honor his own beliefs 
(in ancient Greek this translated to living well, so we can think of happiness, or 
eudemonia, as a state of well-being). A beggar by his own volition, he practiced his 
particular brand of asceticism publicly as an expression of his independence and, 
relatedly, as a reaction against the status quo. Diogenes‟ conduct was not only rational 
according to his principles but also programmatic, and “every one of his gestures and 
statements, his mode of dressing, his diet, his living in a tub, his verbal and behavioral 
responses to what he heard and saw, his shocking antics—all these were parabolic 
expressions of his philosophical stance.”51 What he aimed for was a life of freedom 
grounded in disciplined self-sufficiency, and he held that such a life was attainable if one 
had the courage to live it. And it was in this spirit that he embraced poverty, defied 
manners, and openly mocked all commonly accepted conceptions of virtue and decency, 
doing so in ways that his fellow Athenians considered rude, impertinent, and crazy but 
also quite often amusing.  
 The word „cynic‟ literally meant „dog-like,‟ and Diogenes and the later cynics 
“defiantly claimed [the canine epithet] as a metaphor for their novel philosophical 
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stance,” agreeing with those who called them dogs even as they disagreed with them on 
almost all other occasions.52 Indeed, as far as Diogenes was concerned, he might as well 
be compared to a dog in the eyes of his contemporaries, for he renounced membership in 
any human community ordered by „unnatural‟ laws. He contended that the rules dictating 
a dog‟s way or mode of life, unlike the rules governing society, were natural and thus 
legitimate, and because of this he looked to their habits and behavior (as well as those of 
other animals) as sources of inspiration for his own mission to live naturally. And, like 
the stray dogs that roamed the city, begging for food and taking care of their needs as 
they pleased, Diogenes refused to leave the Athenians alone—he would bark (sometimes 
literally, sometimes figuratively) at those he didn‟t like, or those who questioned or 
threatened his capacity to live his life on his own terms. Diogenes chose the status of a 
permanent outsider in Athens, and he took this status very seriously. While he lived 
„with‟ the Athenians he was adamant that he was not „of‟ them. 
There is a distinctly anti-materialist or anti-luxury as well as libertarian and even 
anarchist quality to Diogenes‟ cynicism, which may be one of the reasons for its failure to 
translate easily into politically reformist projects. Considering the social and political 
worlds to be necessarily corrupted by excess, he claimed strict indifference to the 
intricacies of Athenian political affairs and refused to recognize political or social rank.53 
Diogenes took it as his duty as well as his right to declare the superiority of his style of 
life over that of any and all of his contemporaries, and he not only braved the possibility 
of retaliation but also invited it. There are records, for example, of interactions between 
Diogenes and Alexander the Great, and we learn from Diogenes Laertius that when 
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Alexander once approached him and announced, “I am Alexander the great king,” 
Diogenes stood tall before him and responded “And I am Diogenes the Dog.”54 This 
could be read a number of ways, but it seems that what he most likely meant was that it 
was as ridiculous for Alexander to call himself a king as it was for Diogenes to call 
himself a dog. They were simply men, not dogs or kings, and there was no more nobility 
to being a king than there was to being a dog—either as „kings‟ or „dogs‟ they were 
equals. Diogenes‟ remark was not only insolent but also decidedly courageous, as there 
could have been serious consequences for his insolence should Alexander have taken the 
insult to heart. Yet interestingly, the king seems to have respected his courage. Diogenes 
Laertius also tells us that on another occasion, “Alexander is reported to have said, „had I 
not been Alexander, I should have liked to be Diogenes.‟”55 
Parrhesia, autarkeia and ‘living according to nature’ 
 
Diogenes‟ cynicism was “a philosophy of revolt and a reaction against what he 
perceived to be the dismal spectacle of human existence,” but it was also a publicly 
performed personal response to particular conditions, circumstances, and concerns.56 His 
attraction to concepts such as parrhesia and autarkeia make sense in this context: 
Diogenes was hell-bent on speaking out against authority, and he was determined to 
prove that he was capable of surviving on his own. But, paradoxically, he did need a 
public, because he needed an audience for his revelations. Michel Foucault, whose final 
lectures in 1984 were devoted to a study of both courage and truth, discussed at length 
the paradox of the cynics, who were at once private and public. He gives the following 
                                                        
54 Ibid., 46. 
55 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers II, VI. 32-34. 
56 Navia, Diogenes of Sinope, 112. 
   
 
 34 
definition of parrhesia: it is “the exercise of telling men the truth, announcing it without 
ever being overcome by fear.”57 Diogenes remained in Athens because, while he did not 
accept the rationality or utility of its laws and customs, he had a need to tell the Athenians 
this and to show them why. These revelatory performances of his had an almost 
compulsive quality—he could not simply use his reason to determine the truth of his own 
needs, he had to show others that he knew better. Such demonstrations were required of 
the practicing cynic (and, I think, are still required of cynics today).  
 Because Diogenes‟ debunking required revelation to others, speaking the truth 
was above all else the means by which he lived in accordance with human nature as he 
conceived it. It also positioned him uncomfortably on a line straddling the divide between 
private and public. Foucault highlights the critical importance that the concept of 
parrhesia holds for the Cynic mode of life: Cynicism is a “form of philosophy in which 
modes of life and truth-telling are directly and immediately linked together,”58 where the 
capacity to speak freely is conditioned by the cynic‟s capacity to live freely in a literal 
sense—without attachments, and without “all the pointless obligations which everyone 
usually acknowledges and which have no basis in nature or reason.”59 Diogenes was not 
only the beggar wandering through the streets, covered in a tattered cloak, slinging insults 
at those around him and shocking them with his shameless insistence on satisfying his 
physical needs in public. He was also “the man who roams, who is not integrated into 
society, [who] has no household, family, hearth, or country,” and who can clearly discern 
the irrationality of the socially constructed laws and conventions that dictate the lives of 
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others because of the distance afforded by his independence from them.60 His 
independence conditions the possibility of truth-telling, while the act of parrhesia, the act 
of exposing everything, is the ultimate exercise of his freedom and requires him to 
remain with society if not exactly in it. While the experience of freedom includes a 
necessarily private dimension it must also be witnessed, and Diogenes‟ life was thus an 
exposure of the truth of himself. 
It is in this sense that Foucault argues that parrhesia constitutes an act “by which 
the subject manifests himself when speaking the truth, [and] thinks of himself and is 
recognized by others as speaking the truth.”61 Foucault underscores the performative 
dimension of cynicism and the importance of the presence of others in the becoming of 
the cynic self. Diogenes chastised his contemporaries for the hypocrisy of their morals, 
for their „slavish‟ desires for wealth and status, and for living in contradiction with 
human nature as he conceived it. And he spoke with his body as much as with words, 
with his physical presence and his actions, to show that it was possible to live in honest 
and open resistance to the status quo, that a disciplined, ascetic life was perfectly 
sustainable, and that, therefore, the conventions of his time could not be „natural.‟ So, by 
exposing the lies of the Greek conventional world, Diogenes revealed both the „natural‟ 
world and himself. As Foucault explains, cynicism  
brings to light, in their irreducible nakedness, those things which alone are 
indispensable to human life or which constitute its most elementary, 
rudimentary essence. In this sense, this mode of life simply reveals what 
life is in its independence, its fundamental freedom, and consequently it 
reveals what life ought to be.62  
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Diogenes‟ exposure of his own living, breathing and very bare body was a direct 
challenge to the Athenians to defend the rationality of their needs, their wants, and their 
ways. 
He was well aware that his saying no to the polis would meet with resistance and 
entail risks, but Diogenes Laertius notes that Diogenes maintained that “nothing in 
life…has any chance of succeeding without strenuous practice; and this is capable of 
overcoming anything.”63 I will now turn to the strenuous practice of self-sufficiency 
(autarkeia) in Cynic philosophy. Becoming self-sufficient required testing the limits of 
one‟s capacities, and Diogenes was adamant that it required considerable self-discipline 
(askesis). Through disciplined asceticism, he sought to train his body to endure hardship 
with ease, and by strengthening his body he also believed he would strengthen his mind. 
Diogenes Laertius offers the following evidence for this argument: 
[Diogenes] used to affirm that training was of two kinds, mental and 
bodily: the latter being that, whereby, with constant exercise, perceptions 
are formed such as secure freedom of movement for virtuous deeds; and 
[he would say that] the one half of the training is incomplete without the 
other, good health and strength being just as much included among the 
essential things, whether for body or soul. And he would adduce 
indisputable evidence to show how easily from gymnastic training we 
arrive at virtue.64 
 
The historical sources are in agreement that Diogenes was committed to physical fitness, 
and that he roamed through and around the city and embraced every opportunity to train 
and challenge his body. He also insisted on wearing his ragged cloak and nothing more 
regardless of inclement weather, and was known to roll in hot sand in the summer as a 
means of testing his threshold for pain and discomfort. By pushing his limits physically, 
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Diogenes contended that he was able to demonstrate the irrationality of many of the 
needs and wants of the Athenians—the desires of his contemporaries were superfluous to 
their real necessities because he could prove that he did not need them to survive or live 
happily.  
 And like his body, Diogenes maintained that reason (logos) could be honed with 
practice, and that it also required regular exercise to perform at its best. He insisted that 
although logos was a natural human faculty, it was a faculty that only very few people 
actually made use of. Indeed, Diogenes argued that it was Athenians‟ failure to train and 
utilize their logoi that deprived them (and anyone ruled by man-made laws and norms) of 
a life lived naturally. His insistence on this point is important because it reconciles his 
otherwise contradictory claim that as a „dog‟ he was more human than anyone else in 
Athens. Although Diogenes sought to emulate some of the behaviors of animals such as 
dogs and mice, he never actually sought to become a dog or a mouse. His logic here is 
clear—animals lack the capacity to reason, and it would be perfectly unnatural for him, 
as a human being, to revoke his own.65 He argued that when we, as human beings, put 
our reason to use, we see what we really need to survive, and we can therefore recognize 
the fact that so much of what is considered desirable according to society distracts us 
from nature‟s true gifts. Diogenes Laertius tells us that Diogenes “would continually say 
that for the conduct of life we need right reason or a halter,” and the Greek word for 
„halter‟ here also translates to „noose‟ or „rope.‟66 The active use of one‟s logos, then, was 
required for a true and naturally lived life, and for Diogenes, those who did not use their 
logos dangled from the hangman‟s noose of convention. This noose might not strangle 
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them completely, but it would prevent them from living properly as free humans because 
they would be dependent on laws and conventions to tell them how to think and what to 
do. Like a pet dog‟s collar and leash, the noose dragged them through life rather than 
letting them lead themselves. 
 Diogenes‟ commitment to physical self-discipline extended to his diet, which was 
decidedly austere and consisted largely of bread, lentils, and lupines to ensure that he was 
capable of surviving on the simplest of means. Nevertheless, although his regular 
regimen consisted of simple foods, he was also reported to have enjoyed Athenian 
delicacies such as cakes, olives, and even wine from time to time. This may seem to 
contradict his commitment to asceticism (and, along with his habit of shameless sexual 
gratification, contributed to accusations that he was a hypocritical hedonist), but he 
charged that these infrequent indulgences demonstrated one of the more important 
aspects of his self-sufficient character—that he was resourceful and adaptable, able to 
secure the means for his material existence in an uncertain world. By this line of 
reasoning, there was nothing wrong with indulgence from time to time as long as he did 
not become dependent on them. In a similar vein, Diogenes justified his commitment to 
the principles of parrhesia and autarkeia despite his choice to live his life as a beggar. 
His critics have certainly asked how is it that a vagrant could claim to be not only free-
spoken but also self-sufficient when he was surviving off the goodwill of his fellows. 
Plato confronted Diogenes on this issue, and Sayre‟s study of Diogenes highlights such 
supposed inconsistencies in Cynic philosophy. Sayre censured Diogenes‟ refusal to work 
and his prideful indolence, and he complained that “the Cynics denounced the pleasures 
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of others, while indulging themselves without stint in their own.”67 Ultimately, he 
concluded, “the Cynic „life according to nature‟ was a slump towards animalism and a 
retrogression from civilization.”68 Yet Diogenes clearly did not abstain from work out of 
laziness (indeed, a person who was as fanatic as he was about discipline and exercise 
could hardly be considered lazy). Rather, he chose the life of a beggar as a means of 
consciously exercising and expressing his own freedom. As R. Bracht Branham argues, 
“begging—the rejection of work, of a life considered productive by society—is required 
by freedom to avoid becoming subject to society‟s rules and authority.”69 It was, then, yet 
another means by which he could actively say no to the status quo. 
The animalistic or primitivist readings of the cynics offered by Sayre and others 
have been largely discounted by more recent scholarship, but the important cynic concept 
of cosmopolitanism (kosmopolites) is still sometimes mistaken as a declaration of 
Diogenes‟ desire to return to a primitive lifestyle, or as his advocacy of a „return to 
nature.‟ (This seems to stem from the work of scholars such as Sayre and the cultural 
anthropologist George Boaz, who also read a kind of primitivism into cynicism though 
his portrayal of the cynics is more flattering). But as Shea notes, today “most scholars 
agree that for Diogenes cosmopolitanism signifies a form of apoliticism, or more 
accurately, antipoliticism.”70 The contemporary meaning of cosmopolitanism has 
changed significantly from the original, but Diogenes is generally credited with having 
coined the term (literally a combination of the Greek words for citizen and universe). His 
cosmopolitanism did not express an appreciation for the „worldliness‟ of a man (or 
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woman) who has traveled widely and witnessed many other ways of life, but it also did 
not represent his appreciation of the natural world as such. Rather, as Diogenes Laertius 
tells us, Diogenes declared his cosmopolitanism with the following announcement to the 
Athenian public: “I am a citizen of the world.”71 What he meant by this was that he was 
not a citizen of any city or nation. His statement was a negation of the laws created by 
man rather than an acknowledgement of „belonging to the world,‟ for he was saying to 
the people of Athens that no matter where he went he would always be a foreigner. As 
Dudley explains, “the cosmopolitanism of Diogenes was not the well-traveled man‟s 
interest in alien cultures, like that of Herodotus, but rather a reaction against every kind 
of coercion imposed by the community on the individual.”72 His cosmopolitanism 
highlights the individualistic character of his philosophical practice, for he was 
essentially saying to the people of Athens, „keep your laws off my body and out of my 
philosophy.‟ So, despite Diogenes‟ claims to political indifference, his cosmopolitanism 
was a celebration of his status of exile and permanent foreigner. 
 We must ask, then, why Diogenes insisted that living happily meant living 
according to „nature‟ if he was not advocating a „return to nature.‟ Marie-Odile Goulet-
Cazé has argued that in Cynic philosophy, human existence can only be rightly 
understood by observing and assessing the immediate physical world, and in this world 
only the laws of nature (phusis)—which behave unpredictably, requiring an attention to 
forces of contingency and uncertainty—could put constraints upon their freedom.73 For 
Diogenes, nature‟s laws were revealed in the ways they restricted his physical freedom 
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and fixed the boundaries of his capacity to control the world around him. While nature 
certainly provided him with gifts, such as sunshine for warmth and lupines and water to 
ease his hunger and quench his thirst, it also threatened him with weather, sickness, and 
other challenges to his material existence. According to Cynic philosophy, the laws of 
nature were something to be respected more than humbly honored. As Goulet-Cazé notes, 
Diogenes “wanted to be master of his own destiny…[and] in no way [did] he revere 
nature as one would a god. He simply [had] the wisdom not to struggle against it in 
vain.”74 It is largely on this account that he was indifferent to questions or concerns about 
history, the after-life, or the existence of gods. Why worry about the past, the future, or 
other worlds when we can only know this one, Diogenes might ask, especially in light of 
the fact that we can never know what circumstances we will face over the course of a life 
(or how long we will live, for that matter)? Such thinking distracts each of us from the 
actual practice of living within the physical, material world, and for Diogenes, when we 
are not actively committed to experiencing the present we cannot aspire to self-mastery 
but instead become hollow and enfeebled versions of ourselves.  
While Diogenes may have sworn upon „living according to nature,‟ most of what 
is known about his appreciation for nature comes from his hostility to custom and his 
habit of emulating the behavior of animals. Still, it appears that he was a materialist of 
sorts, and his understanding of what the world is made of and how it came to be also 
served as justification for his beliefs and behaviors. Diogenes Laertius gives us a hint at 
the cynics‟ ontology in the following often cited passage:  
according to right reason, as [Diogenes] put it, all elements are contained in all 
things and pervade everything; since meat is not only a constituent of bread, but 
bread of vegetables; and all other bodies by means of certain invisible passages 
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and particles, find their way in and unite with all substances in the form of 
vapour.”75 
  
Dudley has argued that this passage clearly demonstrates “a bit of popularized 
Anaxagorean physics,” and he suggests that Diogenes might have employed it as a clever 
means of capitalizing on Anaxagoras‟ philosophy to rationalize his habits of eating and 
relieving himself publicly. 76 Regardless, Diogenes was clearly endorsing the idea that all 
things contains elements of everything else, and that all elements in the world move 
through all of its different bodies.77 It is on this ground that he is often thought to have 
based one of his more controversial claims, his endorsement of cannibalism as a perfectly 
„natural‟ practice.78 There is no record of Diogenes actually engaging in cannibalism, and 
it is most likely that he took up the subject for its shock value rather than as a genuine 
appeal to the Athenian community to take up the practice, but it does highlight his 
insistence that, on the most basic level, we are all composed of and share the same 
elemental particles. If we are all animals and we eat other animals, and if other animals 
sometimes eat us, then what‟s wrong with eating one another? What, he might ask, makes 
cannibalism necessarily unnatural?  
Suggestions such as these challenged not only the laws and conventions of Athens 
but also the theoretical systems of its other resident philosophers. As Bracht Branham 
argues, “unlike the metaphysicians of his day, Plato being the prime example, Diogenes 
was content to derive his thinking directly from his social—or in his case anti-social—
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practice without grounding it in a metaphysical domain remote from experience.”79 If, for 
Diogenes, the only things that can be known are learned through actual, practical 
experience, then what is real cannot be logically deduced, and he had no patience for 
Plato‟s theoretical constructs and universals. Indeed, their approaches to philosophy 
could hardly have been more different, and, unsurprisingly, there are records of decidedly 
unfriendly exchanges between the two of them. Plato was reported to have called 
Diogenes not only a dog but also a “Socrates gone mad,” and we hear from Diogenes 
Laertius that Diogenes, true to form, called “Plato‟s lectures a waste of time.”80 Diogenes 
certainly did not give lectures in the sense that Plato did. Rather, he lived his philosophy 
and taught through the example of his own actions, and the only ideals he could get 
behind were those that could be actualized. If Plato could not produce his Forms he could 
not live by them, and it is in this sense that Diogenes‟ hostility to „high theory‟ and 
abstract argument can be tied to “his belief that the test of truth is less a matter of logical 
finesse than of the philosopher‟s ability to practice persuasively what he teaches. Plato 
stands condemned on both counts.”81 
Rascal with a cause 
 
Diogenes Laertius recounts a famous exchange between Plato and Diogenes, 
where Diogenes is said to have stormed into a lecture that Plato was giving. When the 
latter “defined Man as an animal, biped and featherless,” to much applause, Diogenes 
“plucked a fowl and brought it into the lecture room with the words, „Here is Plato‟s 
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man.”82 Diogenes‟ sarcasm here is poignant, and his statement is a clear (and humorous) 
challenge to Plato‟s teachings and his authoritative position as a philosopher. It also 
exemplifies a critical aspect of cynic philosophy and of Diogenes‟ approach to parrhesia. 
Speaking freely was not just a right. It was a responsibility, and it required hounding the 
Athenians and capitalizing on any and all opportunities that they offered him to mock 
their ideals and their practices. Diogenes went looking for trouble, and the exchange 
described above demonstrates this. He himself considered Plato‟s lectures a waste of 
time, but he paid enough attention to the „reigning philosopher‟ of Athens to know when, 
where, and how to charge into those lectures and seriously insult him. Diogenes may 
have claimed independence from the Athenians, yet he nevertheless remained keenly 
aware of what was going on around him and found clever and creative ways to criticize 
them on the basis of what he heard them saying and saw them doing. Cynicism was (and, 
I argue, still is) a necessarily interactive philosophical practice; Diogenes found specific 
targets for his attacks on convention and the mode of attack (verbal assault, shocking 
behavior, sarcastic statement, etc.) was tailored to fit the particular situation and 
audience. Rather than staying put in his tub in the square and simply preaching about the 
evils of convention and the blessings of a cynic way of life, he moved around, and his 
hostility was aimed at the various individuals he witnessed going about their days.  
There was, then, a decidedly innovative and unpredictable quality to his activities. 
Bracht Branham notes that Diogenes‟ „method‟ consisted “of a continual process of 
„adaptation‟ or „improvisation‟ as circumstances [confronted] him with a series of 
differing problems. As the question, the interlocutor, and the specific context [varied], so 
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[did] Diogenes‟ responses.”83 He was quite skilled at „thinking on his feet,‟ and his 
adaptability widened the scope of his philosophical reach because it allowed him to turn 
any and all of his encounters into parrhesiatic opportunities. If living happily was 
primarily a matter of renouncing society‟s excesses and adopting a disciplined and ascetic 
way of life, Diogenes could easily have left the community and roamed the countryside, 
eating frugally, exercising regularly, and satisfying himself away from the prying eyes of 
a disapproving society. But, to revisit the paradoxically private and public nature of the 
philosophy, this was not an option. It was parrhesia that Diogenes considered „the most 
beautiful thing in the world,‟ and his commitment to freedom of speech demanded that he 
have a public that actually listened to him. This required getting the attention of those 
around him, and this, I believe, is what made sneers and sarcasm essential to the practice 
of cynic philosophy. Insults and shocking or offensive behavior are hard to ignore, and 
Diogenes knew this and used it to his advantage. His insolence was programmatic: he 
taunted and teased his contemporaries because it was an effective means of gaining their 
full attention even if at times it also gained him their ire. Diogenes was obnoxious and 
opinionated, but there was also a playfulness to his rhetorical puns, and in addition to 
anger his pranks provoked laughter and amusement. Anthony A. Long has noted that 
most of the aphorisms attributed to Diogenes by Diogenes Laertius “have at least three 
things in common: black humor, paradox or surprise, and ethical seriousness.”84 In 
creating his Cynic „self,‟ Diogenes embodied a particular style of life characterized by a 
paradoxical combination of silliness and seriousness—he used humor to show the 
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Athenians how foolish their conventions and customs were, and in doing so he 
demonstrated the depth his commitment to his own beliefs.  
Bracht Branham claims that “the humor of the traditions about Diogenes reflect 
the polish of a self-consciously rhetorical practice that made optimal use of the 
argumentative resources of the pointed anecdote or chreia,” and he highlights “the fit 
between ideology and rhetorical practice, between parrhesia and Cynic traditions of 
philosophical jesting.”85 Diogenes was able to toe the line between frivolity and 
seriousness in a way that effectively engaged his audience, and his use of humor allowed 
him to push his points to the edge of tolerability without crossing over it. He was a 
philosophic jester, but his disruptive behavior had serious dimensions that were not lost 
on his contemporaries; his outrageous conduct sometimes elicited angry responses from 
those he insulted or offended, but it also generated a fair amount of curiosity, and his 
antics were a subject of public fascination as well as ridicule and scorn. Indeed, it seems 
Diogenes‟ rhetorical skills were remarkable and garnered him some admiration even if 
the content of his assertions was not always appreciated. We are told by Diogenes 
Laertius that Diogenes “had in fact a wonderful gift of persuasion, so that he could easily 
vanquish anyone he liked in argument,” and “so magical was the spell which the 
discourses of Diogenes exerted” that he had devoted followers who were converted to his 
way of life by the power of his words and deeds. 86 Whether or not he had disciples 
during his own lifetime is contestable (and if he had any they were few), but this does 
suggest that his antics were, at least at times, difficult to dismiss. Indeed, Long argues 
that “Diogenes appears to have been a well-educated man who enjoyed argument with 
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other philosophers…and [who] earned the respect of many citizens,”87 and many of the 
sayings and anecdotes ascribed to him reveal a clever wit and a keen sense of comedic 
timing. Although he was generally considered something of a madman, even at his most 
scandalous his behavior was tolerated and the Athenians did not cast Diogenes out. In 
fact, they seem to have taken care to protect him, and Diogenes Laertius also tells us that 
when a boy once threw stones at his tub and broke it, the youth was flogged and he was 
promptly provided with a new one.88  
Diogenes himself had a complicated relationship with the Athenians, for despite 
all of his sneering and his sarcastic denunciations of their ways of life he needed them—
not only for material support but also for the very practice of his philosophy. His 
conception of living naturally was hostile to convention but not to the idea of communal 
life itself, and rather than leave the city, Diogenes considered it his duty to reveal to the 
people of Athens the irrationality of their ways. In addition to considering himself the 
„teacher of not wanting,‟ he also compared himself to a doctor who must inflict pain in 
order to heal his patients, and Dio Chrysostom wrote of Diogenes that, “just as the good 
physician should go and offer his services where the sick are most numerous, so, said he, 
the man of wisdom should take up his abode where fools are thickest in order to convict 
them of their folly and reprove them.”89 He was deeply committed to demonstrating that 
anyone with the courage to commit him or herself to his way of life could live happily 
according to nature, and Diogenes Laertius suggests that he intentionally set the bar 
above reach with the hope that the Athenians might amend some of their ways. He reports 
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that Diogenes “used to say that he followed the example of the trainers of choruses; for 
they set the note a little too high, to ensure that the rest should hit the right note.”90 He 
did not hate his fellow Athenians—instead, he hated their ways of life, and on this point 
he was clear. His shamelessness and his indifference to conventions were meant to 
unsettle, upset and even hurt those who witnessed his actions or were the recipients of his 
verbal attacks. But it was his compassion for his contemporaries that was the impetus for 
his criticism of them: he saw himself as a „philanthropist.‟ Diogenes was living his life in 
the presence of others in order to shock them into recognizing the evils of their ways, and 
even if his cares went unappreciated and his work was slow going (for the record, he did 
not expect much change), he still felt like he was giving back to humanity. Thus, his 
insolence and non-conformity were a sign of both his independence from and his 
devotion to the people of Athens.  
Why did „living according to nature‟ demand the use of sneers, sarcasm and 
unpleasant behavior? Because this practice of living entailed having the courage to take 
charge of one‟s life and submit only to nature‟s often unpredictable rules, which required 
exercising and utilizing one‟s faculties of body and mind to the fullest. As humanity 
possesses the capacity to speak, living according to nature also entails speaking freely, 
and, for Diogenes, loudly asserting one‟s freedom was not only his natural right but also 
his responsibility. He and the cynics who would later take inspiration from him were 
dedicated to exposing their truths even if (and perhaps because) these truths were 
unwanted, and this practice above all else exemplified their capacity to live naturally.  
Sneers and sarcasm were necessary because truth-telling required the public‟s 
attention—the courageous Cynic did not beg or plead his fellows to see and live as he 
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did, he poked and prodded them to insure that his messages would not be ignored. 
Laughter, at the very least, constituted a response to Diogenes‟ sneers, sarcasm and 
otherwise outlandish behavior. And as Niehues-Probsting notes:  
The Cynic…was not a man of pain. This addition is important. The Cynic 
was laughed at because of his contemptibility; but he was, as Diogenes 
said about himself, not beaten down by laughter. Cynicism became the 
exercise and eventually the art of swallowing contempt and being 
unperturbed by it. To pretend consciously to be contemptible could—from 
a psychological point of view—be a defense against unwanted contempt 
and an act of self-determination.91  
 
So, Diogenes not only refused to let laughter „get him down‟ but he also encouraged it. It 
was a sign of recognition and a reassurance that he was succeeding in his mission to 
make a mockery of convention. He was, Niehues-Probsting argues, both an expert at 
expressing contempt and a living, breathing example of everything his society found 
contemptible.92 Diogenes „defaced the currency‟ of Athens in order to show its people 
what he took to be a shortcut to happiness, and what he wanted was for those around him 
to actually acknowledge the true or natural limits to their freedom and to realize that their 
own self-respect depended upon resisting all others. 
Foucault claimed that “parrhesia was first of all and fundamentally a political 
notion,” and although Diogenes claimed indifference to the world of politics, his 
commitment to showing the Athenians that they bent their knees to the wrong masters has 
obvious political implications.93 Still, we must remember that he was not rallying them to 
join him. Desmond argues the following: 
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the Cynic sage renounces the things of external Fortune to gain an 
absolute internal freedom. Here the Cynics are at their most negative and 
most idealistic at once. Their wisdom is a total skepticism with regard to 
externality: nothing can be known or possessed except the inner self, and 
so one should renounce all externals in order to gain an absolute “wealth” 
in one‟s own self-certainty.94 
 
Though the cynics are sometimes referred to as the „Army of the Dog,‟ theirs was an 
army of independent warriors, modeling themselves on Heracles and working alone in 
their philosophical practices to do battle with all visions of the world that conflicted with 
their own. Diogenes was the original rebel (or rascal) with a cause—he was the champion 
of truth and the foe of falsehood and hypocrisy, and he committed his life to proving that 
there was room for honesty in society even if it was often unwelcome. 
Learning from Diogenes 
 
Diogenes and his legacy challenge us, as individuals, to seek the truth, to share it 
with one another, and to do so in the face of political and social forces that are resistant to 
change and have the power to retaliate against us. His cynicism was a personal reaction 
against the world created by men that attacked not only the futility of its customs and 
beliefs but also the fact that these were so frequently contradictory and hypocritical. He 
chastised his contemporaries not only for what they believed but just as importantly for 
the lack of commitment and sincerity with which they followed the moral and ethical 
codes that they claimed to hold so dear. This brings me to back to the question of the role 
of cynicism in American political culture today. Diogenes was adamant that he knew how 
to live better than anyone else, and the cynics have often been criticized for the hubristic 
tendencies in their philosophy. There are arguments to be made for such criticism, 
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perhaps the most obvious being that Diogenes took it upon himself to insult others simply 
for not living their lives as he lived his. His insistence on knowing better, and his noisy 
disparagement of others for their „slavish‟ habits, in many ways flies in the face of 
democracy‟s pluralist virtues and demonstrates its own kind of dogmatic rigidity. Still, he 
was far from selfish in his insistence on knowing the truth; his incivility was the means 
by which he demonstrated his commitment to unsettling the social and political structures 
of those he lived with, and he was convinced that this unsettling was done for their 
benefit. Diogenes was no ordinary prankster, and despite his airs of superiority he 
submitted himself to a „greater purpose‟—to living according to nature, which required 
him to mock his fellows.  
 There are lessons to be learned from Diogenes‟ ardent commitment to living his 
life as an assertion of the truth. It is my contention that the most valuable and lasting of 
these lessons is that although telling the „truth of oneself,‟ and telling the truth of society 
by exposing or debunking its lies, is a frightening and unwieldy process, it can 
nonetheless be done. This is a simple lesson in theory, but hardly an easy one to follow in 
practice. It requires the courage to confront not only the unknown but also that which we 
purport already to know or to be certain of, and it thus requires a respect for the limits of 
what we can know as well as a willingness to challenge them. We learn from Diogenes 
that one can live in open and honest resistance to the status quo, and that a disciplined 
ascetic life is sustainable. We also learn that such a lifestyle will compel us to defy laws 
and norms and in doing so to confront one another, and that this process is dangerous and 
will likely entail ridicule, scorn, alienation, or worse. For Diogenes, the principled pursuit 
of truth trumps comfort and safety, and his earnest commitment to expressing his 
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independence and defining himself on his own is admirable. He respected the fact that he 
could not know everything and that people, nature, and fortune were unpredictable. But 
just as importantly, Diogenes respected himself, and he worked diligently to test his 
knowledge and capabilities as a means of continually adapting to the uncertainties of the 
world around him. He was brave enough to live the „truth‟ through the process of seeking 
it out, and he cared deeply about his responsibility to reveal his truths to his fellows. 
Diogenes, then, teaches us that there is much to be gained from „not-wanting‟—namely, 
our own freedom and the capacity to reveal ourselves confidently as who we are rather 
than who we should be in the eyes of others. He may have been proud, but he was intent 
on showing others that anyone could be as proud and as happy as he was if they were 
brave enough to live as he did.  
 Yet there are also limitations to looking to Diogenes (and to cynicism) as a model 
for inspiring political and social change. Though ancient cynicism was necessarily 
practiced publicly, it consistently eschewed the kind of collective action often considered 
the defining mark of the political. Diogenes both started and ended with the project of 
transforming the individual, and while he believed that any individual had the capacity to 
undergo such a transformation, human society was viewed as fundamentally corrupted 
and beyond salvation. Is social and governmental (and not just personal) sincerity 
possible? Diogenes argued that it is not. His conception of human nature acknowledges a 
capacity for sincerity and virtue, but he did not believe that we could live happily 
according to nature without renouncing social practices and politics altogether. Diogenes 
told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but, but there were few Athenians who were 
willing to really respond to what he said. He did not actively inhibit reform, but he 
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certainly did not advocate for it despite his habit of constantly provoking his fellows to 
question their actions and beliefs. This political pessimism Diogenes shares with cynical 
realists. While he said „everything,‟ his expectations for wider political change were 
meager because he was convinced that politics are corruptive. 
 I will take up the difficulty of determining what actually constitutes the „truth‟ in 
democratic politics shortly, but first it is worth briefly discussing Diogenes‟ legacy as a 
philosophical and literary hero. His reputation throughout the course of ancient cynicism 
was quite varied, and it veered between depictions of him as a semi-saint and as a social 
villain. In regards to Diogenes‟ legacy, Shea says the following:  
His activities as defacer of public norms give us, at best, an ambiguous 
portrait of the Cynic as rascal as well as moralist…This is what makes him 
such an interesting figure upon which to base a discussion of the modern 
intellectual: he responds to the aspiration to courageously confront the 
injustices that plague society even as he forces a direct confrontation with 
the darker aspects of the will to change the world.95 
 
And although I think we can agree that few would want to adopt his style of life in toto, 
that does not mean that others have not continued to emulate his spirit of speaking truth 
to power. The later cynics had a tendency to „interpret‟ Diogenes‟ way of life, adopting 
aspects of his philosophy and molding them to fit with their own takes on Cynicism, 
which over the course of its history was often blended with other philosophies such as 
Stoicism and Epicureanism. The fact that Diogenes became an idealized figure has 
contributed to the confusion and debates over the „true‟ story of his life and the contents 
of his philosophy. Regardless, he remained a well-known and memorable character in the 
literary works of and on the cynics through the sixth century AD (when ancient cynicism 
as a movement is considered to have ended). I would argue that the individualistic, 
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improvisational and adaptable character of Diogenes‟ cynical practice made the 
philosophy itself „adaptable‟ after his death. Not all of the later cynics can be said to have 
challenged power directly, but in different ways they improvised their images of 
Diogenes to fit their own particular circumstances while still committing themselves to 
parrhesia and autarkeia.  
 We can also identify a number of individuals in more recent history who can be 
said to have carried on Diogenes‟ courageous practices of dissent and who were 
committed to exposing the un-reasonable nature of so many cultural norms and political 
conventions. For example, Diderot, Rousseau, Voltaire, and Nietzsche have all been 
compared, in different ways, to Diogenes, and all were well aware of his position in the 
annals of philosophy. Indeed, cynicism and the figure of Diogenes were controversial 
subjects discussed by the Enlightenment philosophes, and Voltaire famously accused 
Rousseau of being a “foolish and false Diogenes,” neither worthy of nor possessing the 
merits of the original.96 None of these thinkers adopted the disciplined asceticism of 
Diogenes in the sense of embracing poverty and rejecting culture through and through, 
but they certainly adopted his spirit of rebelling against „un-natural‟ and „un-reasonable‟ 
laws and conventions. While they did so in different ways and to different ends they all 
knew how to use sarcastic humor and shocking literary antics to relay their challenges to 
the status quo, and they braved the possibility of social alienation and political 
persecution along the way. I would also add H.L. Mencken to this list of neo-cynics. 
Mencken, who has at times been referred to as „the American Voltaire,‟ was inarguably 
dedicated to challenging what he considered to be the irrational and hypocritical morality 
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of early twentieth-century America. I will turn to Mencken in detail in the next chapter, 
but for now I would like to point out that although he is often thought to epitomize the 
caustic „modern‟ cynicism that is lamented as a symptom and source of today‟s bitter 
public disillusionment, this is an unfair and unfounded characterization of his life and his 
work. Rather, Mencken‟s caustic social and political criticism was in line with that of 
Diogenes in critical ways: he made people angry, he made them laugh, and he most 
certainly captured their attention. And he did this in pursuit of the truth, and in defense of 
the principles of freedom and equality. 
So how, then, do we recognize, or experience, cynicism today? Cynicism is a 
multi-faceted term, but the alleged dichotomy between an ancient and modern cynicism 
works to obscure the calls of the potential cynics in our midst. Diogenes‟ cynicism was 
an ethos, a practical and personal way of life, but it also cultivated a particular character 
type—a „self‟ that was defined through the process of continually claiming its 
independence through resistance to conformity. Cynicism cannot be a social ethos or 
even a collective mood. For the ancients, it was individualistic to the core, and its 
resistance to law and order was libertarian (or even anarchist) in that the only leader the 
cynic recognizes is the self. It is on these grounds in particular that I am contesting the 
claims that we live in a cynical culture today, or that it constitutes a modern ideology. 
Cynicism is not generalizable, and contra Sloterdijk, it cannot constitute a collective 
weariness with the hypocrisy and lies that are present in our political and social worlds. 
Rather, it is enacted only through the particular actions of practicing cynics, those daring 
individuals who are wont to dedicate their lives to speaking truth to power. If we say, as 
did Hellmann, that cynicism is „an unpleasant way of telling the truth,‟ we might also say 
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that any „genuine‟ cynic today has not abandoned the spirit of Diogenes, for he or she 
assumes the role of the „truth-teller,‟ or parrhesiast, a dangerous position to shoulder in a 
democracy but also an important one.  
Cynicism is not (and indeed cannot become) the dominant or exclusive mood of 
American political culture—we are not a society made up of principled truth-tellers, and 
Diogenes‟ cynicism was grounded upon a profound respect for and commitment to the 
truth. But we can still learn from (or at least learn to listen for and listen to) potential 
cynics in our midst even if we cannot (and would not want to) aspire to become part of a 
cynical public. The fact that we cannot all become cynics collectively, that we cannot 
come together in a wider cynical culture, does not foreclose the possibility that cynicism 
can motivate us individually to search for the truth and to then do something political 
with it. Democracy needs citizens who will regularly speak truth to power, and it needs 
all citizens to be ready to do this on occasion. Today, cynicism does not need to be 
practiced as a way of life as it was for Diogenes. Instead, we, as individuals, can adopt a 
cynical mood from time to time, and assume the character type in order to challenge 
power in particular instances by facing our fears and the potential repercussions that 
speaking freely for the sake of the truth can entail.  
Truth and democratic pluralism 
 
Foucault has argued that “democracy is not the privileged site of parrhesia, but 
the place in which parrhesia is most difficult to practice.”97 This, he claims, is “[b]ecause 
in democracy one cannot distinguish between good and bad speakers, between discourse 
                                                        
97 Foucault, Courage of Truth, 57. 
   
 
 57 
which speaks the truth and is useful to the city, and discourse which utters lies, flatters, 
and is harmful.”98 There is a subtlety to Foucault‟s argument here that can be missed at 
first glance. Parrhesia might indeed be not only difficult but impossible to practice in 
other systems of government, and individuals attempting to engage in it under a 
totalitarian regime, for example, would most likely be forcibly (and perhaps ultimately) 
silenced. But it is particularly difficult to practice in a democracy because it is difficult to 
make oneself heard and recognized above the noise of opposing truth-claims, and doing 
so requires positioning oneself against the majority. A system that permits myriad 
competing voices thus highlights the risk of engaging in parrhesia: to freely speak „truth‟ 
is to enter into a conflict between different sets of entrenched feelings and opinions, a war 
that can lead to violence when it is a matter of confronting the beliefs of others and to 
disorientation when it is a matter of confronting one‟s own. Making oneself heard is a 
frightening prospect. But, in light of the fact that we, as a public, are aware of the 
possibility of political mendacity and operate in a culture obsessed with the exposure of 
political as well as personal scandals, the risks of parrhesia are outweighed by the need 
for it. As Linda M.G. Zerilli has argued, “[a]lthough holding political leaders accountable 
for the veracity of their statements is surely important and indeed essential to our belief in 
representative government, the question arises as to whether democratic citizens are in a 
position to do something with the truths that come to light as a result of such 
investigations.”99 To engage in parrhesia is to care about the truth, and to engage in the 
cynics‟ practices of truth-telling is not only to refuse to live in contradiction with the truth 
but also to commit to seeking it out. 
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 But does such a commitment to truth require a renunciation of politics? In her 
discussion of what it means to „speak truth to power,‟ Wendy Brown wonders  
whether obsessing about lying politicians suppress the larger challenge 
they pose to the fiction that democratic politics is or can be a field of truth. 
Might even the cynical declaration „All politicians lie‟ function to restrict 
the reach of the problem? That is, might a preoccupation with lying 
facilitate a disavowal of the unique, and perhaps uniquely distressing, 
character of the field [of politics] with regard to truth?100  
 
Brown argues that even though politics and truth are incompatible, the field of truth 
remains relevant to the realm of politics. Following Foucault, she asserts that power 
cannot function without a mask or a veil, and that it essentially dissolves or unravels once 
its „truth‟ is revealed. Power, then, must remain hidden, and Brown asserts that “if the 
lifeblood of politics is power, and if power cannot speak its own truth without undoing 
itself, then politics is not and cannot be a field of truth. Even speaking truth to power is, 
in a certain sense, a parapolitical act, one that aims to expose an object in the political 
field from outside that field.”101 Exposing power‟s truth is „gadfly work‟ for Brown, but it 
still serves a critical function in a democracy.  
 And such acts of exposure are precisely what Diogenes and the cynics aimed for 
(as did Mencken, as I will show in the pages to come), and their parapolitical acts did 
make some political difference. Cynics did (and do) speak truths about power, a fact that 
our focus on the mendacity of politicians distracts us from. If cynicism cannot be a 
collective or public mood, it can nevertheless have an impact on the American citizenry 
by sparking debates over public complicity in government action and inaction. Diogenes 
was something of a thorn in the side of his fellows, but I am venturing that his most 
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redeeming quality was the sincerity of his mission to nurse them back to health. His 
eccentricities were a demonstration of his sense of self-respect as well as his respect for 
humanity as he conceived it, and he did believe that there was a healthy state that his 
contemporaries could aspire to. Diogenes committed himself to speaking the truth as he 
saw it, but he also made no effort to quiet those who did not like hearing what he had to 
say. As hostile as he was to other philosophies and systems of understanding the world, 
his ultimate goal was to put the question of truth on the table and to force his fellows to 
acknowledge not only the limits of their knowledge but also the fact that there were 
things that they knew but chose to ignore.  
 In his 2005 Nobel Lecture, Harold Pinter declared the following: “I believe that 
despite the odds which exist [against us], unflinching, unswerving, fierce intellectual 
determination, as citizens, to define the real truth of our lives and our societies is a 
crucial obligation which devolves upon us all.”102 The concerns Pinter presents in this 
lecture, which is focused on the American political system and targets both politicians 
and the public, are echoed in part by Friedman when he decries the American public‟s 
complacency with political dishonesty and suggests that we desire to be told not the truth 
but „what we want to hear.‟ Pinter is outraged, in particular, by the injustice and 
illegitimacy of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and he suggests that the very 
dignity of humankind is at stake if we fail to define the real truths of our lives, which 
means that we must strive to define who we are as Americans and to consider the 
obligations this places upon us as citizens. For Pinter, it seems, truth and power are 
generally incompatible, and in politics preserving power requires restricting truth, so the 
                                                        
102 Harold Pinter, “From Nobel Lecture: Art, Truth, and Politics,” in Elkins and Norris, Truth and 
Democracy, 15. 
   
 
 60 
only antidote to the spread of abusive political power is the public‟s commitment to 
search for and expose the truth. This would suggest, then, that as American citizens we 
must be actively engaged in the search for truth, in the process of debunking or 
unmasking lies and misinformation. Pinter does not propose that „the truth will set us 
free‟ but rather that without it we are damned, and in underscoring the importance of 
searching for the truth he expresses the hope that to care about what is done in our names 
is the first step toward political change.  
 Yet the idea of searching for the truth in politics immediately raises the question 
of how certain we can ever be about what constitutes the truth, or how we can divide fact 
from fiction. What does it mean to attend to truth in democratic politics, a sphere of 
multiple, competing truth-claims? As Jeremy Elkins has noted, “truth matters to politics, 
but what kinds of truth matter and how they matter are themselves political questions.”103 
This seems a basic point, but it is one that is disregarded by the charge that American 
cynicism perpetuates the spread of disillusionment, and that as a society our orientation 
towards politics has become, as Chaloupka claims, one of „lost belief.‟ Disbelief in the 
sincerity of particular (or even most) political leaders does not necessarily entail that the 
larger American public is of the opinion that politicians cannot be right or wrong, or good 
or bad, or that their statements cannot be true or false. Americans, as individuals and as a 
public, may sometimes fixate on political mendacity, but I do not think that we have 
given up on the concept of the truth, or on the difference between right and wrong, and 
that these are concepts that we can and should openly discuss. The fact that we may have 
difficulty coming to an agreement on what is true or false or right or wrong does not 
mean we should dismiss the significance of these concepts. Indeed, one of the many 
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hurdles we must face when considering the contentious nature of what constitutes „the 
truth‟ in democratic politics is that, for many people, what constitutes the truth is not 
contentious at all.  
 We are often all too confident about what we do or do not know, or what is or is 
not politically pertinent information; hence Robert Post‟s claim that “the rub of politics is 
that what reeks to us of deception and dishonesty to others epitomizes political truth.”104 
Relevant here is the question of whether truths, to qualify as such, require a rational or 
natural basis. William A. Galston argues that because “the demand for certainty is 
incompatible with politics,” the question of how to demarcate what can be considered 
true is impossible to answer conclusively.105 Yet he notes that  
in practical life there is no escaping the need to assess truth-claims on the basis of 
information and arguments that will leave us well short of certainty. In every 
situation there is a point between the extremes of randomness and certainty at 
which further inquiry won‟t make us less uncertain, a point at which „look before 
you leap‟ shades over into the „paralysis of analysis.‟ Unfortunately there is no 
algorithm that locates that point—one of many reasons why politics is an art 
rather than a science.106  
 
Galston thus distinguishes truth from legitimacy. He also notes that when it comes to 
what the public does or does not believe, truth is not always the guiding force, but that 
this is not necessarily the fault of the government or a result of the dishonesty of political 
leaders. Regardless of the specifics of what they believe and why, Galston insists that in a 
democracy people “have a right to be wrong, a right they often exercise.”107 And it is this 
right to be wrong that protects our capacity to speak freely in a democracy even as it 
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complicates our relationship with the truth; it is a right that must be secured if we are also 
to secure the capacity to speak at all.  
 Pinter asked us, as individuals who are part of a wider American public, to 
consider whether there is or could be a point at which we will actually speak out against 
the actions of our leaders and government and say, „not in my name.‟ Diogenes did and 
said this daily, in honor of the truth. While few of us may have the inclination to declare 
our commitment to truth in politics (as well as life) on a regular basis, I am arguing that it 
is our responsibility as citizens to be willing and able to do so at times. This is a lesson 
that I think we can learn from the father of ancient cynicism, and that we can and must 
put to use today. And following in this vein, I think that when it comes to understanding 
the role of truth in American politics, we must consider Galston‟s take on the situation: 
“[t]he bad news is that so many Americans are ready to believe the worst[, but t]he good 
news is that they continue to believe in the distinction between truth and falsehood, and 
in the possibility that truth can guide political action.”108 The cynical realist would scoff 
at this statement, but has the American public given up on how the system should work, 
or on the right to speak up and demand that it does in particular instances? Like Galston, I 
do not think that we, as individuals and as a society, have lost faith in the concept of the 
truth (though we may have a tendency to equate „the truth‟ with our beliefs, an issue I 
will elaborate on in the chapters to come). And sometimes we should listen to what our 
political leaders are saying to us, not just because we like what they say or we hate it, or 
because we believe that what they say is true or false, but because we need to hear them 
if we are to have any hope of weighing in on the discussion of political and social issues.  
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 What Diogenes and his legacy can inspire us to do is to listen to and question our 
leaders, and to question one another and ourselves. This is not because he had a „true‟ or 
„correct‟ vision of the world, but because his criticism can remind us that we should 
question and test the validity of our own visions. Mencken does just that, though in his 
own way, and it is to his cynicism I will now turn. Like Diogenes, he had his own 
prejudices and his own conceits as to how one should live one‟s life, and charges of 
hubris that have been leveled at both of them are fair in some respects. But also like 
Diogenes, Mencken exhibited not only a deep sense of and appreciation for the virtue of 
self-respect but also an appreciation for the principle that every human individual has the 
right to respect him- or herself and that this right should be protected. Their love of 
liberty is tied to this principle, and while it may be idealistic I do not think this means that 
we should discount the value of their criticism.   
Chapter 2: The Diogenes of his day—H.L. Mencken’s 
American cynicism 
  
“[H]ere is nothing sinister that smells of decay, but on the contrary this Holy Terror 
from Baltimore is splendidly and exultantly and contagiously alive. He calls you a swine, 
and an imbecile, and he increases your will to live.”—Walter Lippmann, 1926 
 
H.L. Mencken, the outspoken cynic who began a four-decade assault on the 
political and social scenery of the United States just over a hundred years ago, spent most 
of his life ridiculing America and her people, and the relationship (or lack thereof) 
between truth and democratic politics was one of his favorite subjects. The chief reason 
that politicians lied, he argued, was not that they were crooks (though according to him 
they were), nor was it that the American public was stupid (though according to him it 
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was). Rather, politicians lied because the American people were willfully ignorant—they 
did not want to hear the truth, and indeed, they feared it. For Mencken, the American 
stance towards truth could be best described as anxious rather than ambivalent. In Notes 
on Democracy, he offers the following observation: “the truth, indeed, is something that 
mankind, for some mysterious reason, instinctively dislikes. Every man who tries to tell it 
is unpopular, and even when, by the sheer strength of his case, he prevails, he is put down 
as a scoundrel.”109 
 A prominent journalist and a prolific writer, Mencken was himself regularly put 
down as a scoundrel, though it may have been the rudeness of his delivery as much as the 
„truths‟ he told that riled his vast readership. Considered by his detractors to have been 
something of a „national menace,‟ he is still remembered today for the caustic wit that 
characterized his unique style, but the lasting significance of his cynicism remains 
controversial. David Mazella has painted Mencken as a founder of the “disillusioned and 
disillusioning voice” of „modern‟ cynicism, wherein the parrhesiatic, or truth-telling, 
practices of Diogenes and the ancient cynics have been replaced by the work of media 
experts who exploit and exacerbate public frustration with politics for their own 
professional and personal benefit.110 In a similar vein, William Chaloupka claims that 
“there is no better place to mark the beginning of contemporary journalism‟s cynical slide 
than with Mencken, the high-school graduate turned Nietzsche interpreter turned colorful 
and angry critic” who delighted in exposing political shams and hypocrisy, and whose 
relentless insistence on denigrating American life made him both famous and 
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infamous.111 For Mazella and Chaloupka, the ancient cynics‟ commitment to pursuing 
truth and courageously denouncing falsehood has morphed into a new form of cynicism, 
a mass phenomena characterized by widespread disbelief in the honesty of democratic 
politics. Both thinkers credit Mencken with providing the groundwork for 
institutionalizing „modern‟ cynicism via the mass media. But although they do not 
discount his influence they do, I think, underestimate its ultimate value for democracy.  
 A closer look at Mencken‟s life and work reveals that he embodied much more of 
the Cynical spirit of Diogenes than is generally acknowledged. As a cynic, he neither 
inspired extensive public disbelief nor created the building blocks for a media industry 
built upon generating and profiting from such sentiments. What Mencken did do was 
whip up a heady mix of anger and amusement from a national audience that found him 
very difficult to ignore. His aim, he claimed, was “to combat, chiefly by ridicule, 
American piety, stupidity, tin-pot morality, [and] cheap chauvinism,”112 and this he did 
with remarkable flair. Mencken‟s writing was affective—his idiosyncratic style was 
humorous but also biting, as he turned his words into „weapons‟ trained at poking and 
prodding the American public into both recognizing and responding to contemporary 
political and social issues. He was not disillusioning; rather, Mencken was often 
extremely aggravating. He exposed „truths‟ in such a way that his readers, as witnesses of 
sorts, could not help but affirm or deny them, and many felt compelled to enter the public 
sphere to challenge what he said and did. A self-professed “libertarian of the most 
extreme variety,” Mencken insisted that he could “imagine no human right that is half as 
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valuable as the simple right to pursue the truth at discretion and utter it when found.”113 
This was a right that he made a career out of exercising, but, more importantly, it was one 
that he worked diligently to defend for everyone.  
 There are certainly aspects of Mencken‟s „philosophy‟ that do not map 
conveniently onto that of Diogenes, and this has led to, or at least contributed to, the 
tendency to read his cynicism as an unfaithful outgrowth of the ancient philosophy. He 
did not embrace the ancients‟ vagrant and ascetic lifestyles, and in fact he 
„professionalized‟ his cynicism and made a decent living for himself through his practices 
of ranting and railing against the American people. His work was also much more overtly 
political. Whereas Diogenes claimed complete indifference to politics and renounced his 
ties to the Athenian political community, Mencken took his responsibilities as a citizen of 
the United States very seriously (among other things, he was proud of the fact that he 
always voted and paid his taxes). Nevertheless, the tendency to sharply distinguish 
Mencken‟s cynicism from that of the ancient Cynics, and even to posit his criticism as 
withering while affirming the latter‟s as admirable, is misguided. For Mencken, 
journalism was not just a job that he did to pay the rent and feed his family, nor did he 
pursue it in order to achieve fame and fortune. It was a way of life and a medium for 
speaking the truth that demanded courage, discipline and self-reliance, and he was as 
hell-bent on defending liberty, championing freedom of speech and challenging 
hypocrisy as was the original Dog. What Mencken‟s criticism cynical is above all makes 
the performative dimension of his truth seeking and revealing. Cynicism requires an 
audience. Like Diogenes, Mencken refused to simply seek the truth on his own and live 
his life accordingly—he had to show others that he knew better than they did, that he had 
                                                        
113 H.L. Mencken, cited in W.H.A. Williams, H.L. Mencken (Boston: Twayne, 1977), 123. 
   
 
 67 
caught them in their lies. He used offensive rhetoric to expose the prejudices of his 
culture in an attempt to force the American people to acknowledge the ways in which 
their actions and beliefs contradicted their own democratic ideals. By provoking them 
into responding to his accusations that they were stupid, weak, fearful, self-righteous, 
moralistic, racist, misogynistic, and the like, Mencken drew them into conversation on 
these topics and dared them to prove him wrong.  
Flash, flair and fun 
 
In 1927, Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant remarked that just “as Diogenes searched for 
an honest man, so does [Mencken] search for a free American.”114 This, I argue, is true, 
but the concepts of honesty and freedom were intertwined for Mencken as well as for 
Diogenes, and for both cynics a free man was an honest man. Indeed, one of the more 
compelling things about Mencken‟s writing is not the flash and flair of his wit but his 
commitment to honesty—his humor stems more from his capacity to pinpoint truths 
about his culture rather than from a talent for stretching the truth to fit comedic purposes. 
This is a point often lost on his critics, who highlight his hyperbolic tone and his liberal 
use of stereotypes as evidence of a mere stylist with a shallow mind and a hunger for 
recognition. Mencken did employ such techniques, but those who have consequently 
written him off as an ambitious careerist, or as a genuine racist, misogynist, or anti-
Semite, have missed the mark. What he aimed to do was to shame his fellow citizens into 
recognizing the extent to which racist, misogynist, and anti-Semitic sentiments, among 
others, influenced politics and held material weight in a society that hypocritically 
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claimed allegiance to the principles of liberty and equality. Reflecting back on his writing 
towards the end of his career, Mencken offered the following assessment of his work: 
“[t]he imbeciles who have printed acres of comments on my books have seldom noticed 
the chief character of my style. It is that I write with almost scientific precision—my 
meaning is never obscure.”115 He laid bare the contradictions between what Americans 
preached and what they practiced, not as an expert analyst of his society but as an 
outspoken member of it. 
 Mencken‟s treatment of the subject of race offers an almost counter-intuitive case 
in point here. As Edward A. Martin has argued, he 
was “un-euphemistic” in that he frequently used the most blatantly racist and 
offensive terminology [to discuss] racial attitudes and problems. [But he] used 
such language because it came from the ordinary speech patterns of southern 
racists, and was inappropriate to the liberal views he was expressing: the effect 
was to ridicule racists among his readers.116  
 
In a pre-politically correct culture where such sentiments were frequently expressed 
openly and without apology, Mencken mocked prejudice in its own terms. He criticized 
the „southern yokels‟ and the „Ku Kluxers‟ by employing the same slurs that peppered 
their discourse, and since his writings were so far-reaching, this ridicule rarely went 
unnoticed by those he was aiming at. As I.J. Semper remarked in 1929, what often makes 
Mencken‟s language harsh and shocking also increased the accessibility of his criticism: 
he wrote “as other men talk—in the racy, fluent, tuneful idiom of the everyday.”117  
 Yet Semper also called Mencken the “veritable Doctor Rhetoricus” of his age, 
and the bluntness and forcefulness of his writing was coupled, somewhat paradoxically, 
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with linguistic playfulness.118 Charles Scruggs, who has written extensively on 
Mencken‟s influence on and involvement with the intellectuals of the Harlem 
Renaissance, cites his honesty and courage as reasons that he was read and respected by 
the likes of James Wheldon Johnson, George Schulyer, and others, but he adds that the 
chief reason they read Mencken was that he was fun.119 Fascinated by the American 
language, Mencken put his immense vocabulary to use to report upon major issues and 
events, prominent public figures, and the quotidian practices of people across the country, 
and he did so with an air that oscillated between seriousness and silliness. He was, as 
Alistair Cooke has argued, “a humorist by instinct and a superb craftsman by 
temperament,”120 and he put his linguistic skills to the task of challenging the political 
and cultural status quo while poking fun at his society from a variety of angles. The 
results, it seems, were not only infuriating or amusing depending upon who you asked, 
but also unique in their combination of subject matter and style. As Wheldon Johnson 
stated in 1918, “nobody in the country writes quite like him. Sometimes we know that he 
is laughing at his readers, and sometimes we suspect that he is laughing at himself. We 
might call him a humorous cynic, and when he is most cynical, he is most enjoyable.”121 
The makings of a ‘national menace’ 
 
Henry Louis Mencken was born into a close-knit, middle-class family on 
September 12, 1880 in Baltimore, Maryland. His parents, August and Anna, were first-
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generation German-Americans, and August was the proprietor of the local tobacco 
business and cigar factory that his own father had started upon immigrating to the United 
States. The oldest of four children, Henry was just three years old when the family moved 
to a row house at 1524 Hollins Street in West Baltimore. With the exception of the five 
years that he was married to Sara Powell Haardt (who sadly succumbed to tubercular 
meningitis in 1935), Mencken lived in this Hollins Street home until his death in 1956. 
Over the course of his career his work required him to regularly commute to New York 
City and to travel extensively throughout the United States. Nevertheless, he refused to 
relocate from Baltimore even when he was offered lucrative newspaper positions and 
editorships in other cities.  
 It is significant that Mencken remained a Baltimore resident throughout his life. 
As his local nickname „Horrible Harry‟ indicates, his presence there was not always 
appreciated. Nevertheless, despite the censure that he hurled at all of the „Baltimoralists‟ 
in his midst, Mencken felt that the city was where he belonged. Indeed, his cynicism was 
grounded in the stability of his attachments to his family, his friends, and perhaps more 
than anything, the house on Hollins Street. Mencken eventually wrote the following 
tribute to his familial abode:  
I have lived in the same house in Baltimore for nearly forty-five years. It 
has changed somewhat, as I have—but somehow it still remains the 
same…It is as much a part of me as my two hands. If I had to leave it I‟d 
be as certainly crippled as if I lost a leg.122 
 
Mencken‟s identification with the home he grew up in was not just sentimental. Though 
critical of many aspects of middle-class American culture, he took with him into his 
career not only a respect for discipline, ambition and thrift, but also a profound respect 
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for the ways in which communal life can build individual character and foster the 
confidence and self-assuredness necessary to speak one‟s mind. In this sense the impact 
of his upbringing on his iconoclasm was paradoxical: as W.H.A Williams argues, “no 
rebel was ever more conventionally and securely rooted.123 
 For Mencken, Baltimore‟s charm sprang directly from the fact that its residents 
stuck to their own traditions and stubbornly resisted adopting the ever-changing fashions 
and tastes of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Baltimoreans, he argued, 
understood the benefits of settling into enduring local communities where families and 
friendships could grow over time and where they could feel a sense of identification and 
connection with their surroundings as well as with each other. A Baltimorean was, 
Mencken claimed, of Baltimore and not just from it, and this was a distinction that he 
took quite seriously. It is also a distinction that is overlooked by critics who have accused 
him of being „un-American‟ on account of his German ancestry. It is significant, given 
his respect for family, that he was not raised in an environment that displayed or 
encouraged any particularly overt German patriotism; the Menckens did not speak the 
German language at home and they only rarely engaged with Baltimore‟s German 
community.124 Mencken was proud of his ancestral heritage, but he was also adamant that 
his roots lay in Baltimore, and he identified as a Baltimorean even more so than a 
German-American. It is true that Mencken‟s musical tastes leaned toward German 
composers such as Bach, Beethoven and Wagner, and he was a devoted reader of German 
writers and thinkers such as Nietzsche. But Mencken hardly believed that Germany was a 
historical land of „superior‟ people or even that Germany was a superior nation in 
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comparison to the United States or the rest of the world (indeed, he argued that the 
majority of people in any nation were „inferior,‟ and the Germans were no exception to 
this rule). It is my contention that the influence of his German heritage on his opinions 
and beliefs has been greatly exaggerated.  
 Mencken graduated from the Baltimore Polytechnic Institute, a public high 
school, when he was 15 years old, holding the highest GPA on record by the school at the 
time and serving as valedictorian of his class. Yet although his academic performance 
was excellent and he claimed to have respected a few select instructors at the BPI, he was 
already priding himself on being a largely self-educated man. A voracious reader from an 
early age, Mencken had begun taking advantage of Baltimore‟s public libraries when he 
was eight, and throughout his life he would continue to not only patronize the Enoch Pratt 
Free Library but also to refer to it as „his school.‟ Indeed, he credited his personal reading 
habits with developing his own „superior‟ intellect, and at the peak of his career Mencken 
went so far as to make the following claim: “altogether, I doubt that any human being in 
this world has ever read more than I did between my twelfth and eighteenth years.”125 All 
boasting aside, it was certainly true that he read just about anything that he could get his 
hands on, exploring a wide range of subjects and genres in his commitment to 
continuously expanding the horizons of his own knowledge. Foreshadowing the 
acrimonious exchanges he would have with numerous academics throughout his career, 
upon graduation from high school Mencken cited his distaste for „schoolrooms and 
pedagogues‟ as the primary reason that he refused to pursue a higher degree of any sort. 
What he wanted was to learn from life outside of the classroom, not only by reading 
about the world on his own but, just as importantly, by observing it, by watching it unfold 
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before his own eyes. Mencken set his heart on becoming a newsman, despite (or perhaps 
because of) the fact that at the time this was not considered a „respectable‟ career choice.  
 Unfortunately, August Mencken was not at all supportive of this plan, and he 
made it very clear that if Henry did not intend to pursue further formal education then he 
would be joining the family business. Mencken could not bring himself to defy his 
father‟s orders, and he soon began to learn the rudiments of making and selling cigars. 
Still, although he worked diligently for his father, the vast majority of his free time was 
dedicated to reading and experimenting with writing. It was during this period in his life 
that he began to seriously explore the works of some of the writers who would come to 
profoundly shape his thinking: Mark Twain, Oscar Wilde, Henrik Ibsen, George Bernard 
Shaw, Charles Darwin, Friedrich Nietzsche, Thomas Henry Huxley, Herbert Spencer and 
William Graham Sumner. Along with Darwin (and those biologists and social 
philosophers who drew from him), Mencken‟s discovery of Nietzsche had a particularly 
profound influence on his budding „philosophy.‟ From these thinkers he culled a belief in 
individualism and self-reliance that would undergird much of his work, and as Williams 
has argued, “Mencken‟s Darwinized Nietzsche gave him the closest thing he would ever 
have to an ideology.”126  
 Mencken read Nietzsche through the lens of the philosophy of „survival of the 
fittest,‟ and calling Nietzsche “a thorough-going and uncompromising biological 
monist,”127 he argued that in order to properly understand Nietzsche‟s thought one had to 
go back to Darwin. Mencken was a materialist, and he took from Darwin the belief that 
competition is valuable for the survival and development of the individual and species. 
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Darwin, he claimed, “proved, in The Origin of the Species, that a great many more 
individuals of any given species of living being are born into the world each year than 
can possibly survive. Those that are best fitted to meet the condition of existence live on; 
those that are worst fitted die.”128 I want to emphasize that although Mencken flirted with 
aspects of social Darwinist thought, he hardly ascribed to the tenets of the ideology in 
toto. Like Nietzsche, he remained largely skeptical of human progress throughout his life, 
and he argued that the vast majority of his fellow countrymen were stupid and craven and 
that the prevalence of such weaknesses was hardly confined to particular strata of society 
(or to his own era). This is significant because although Mencken was sometimes guilty 
of underestimating the material and psychic impacts of political, economic, and social 
disadvantage, he did not distinguish between superior and inferior beings on the basis of 
such social constructs as race, gender or class.  
 Much like his father before him, Mencken valued courage, honesty, intelligence 
and competence in one‟s endeavors as marks of the superior individual, and during his 
tenure as a cigar maker and salesman he became increasingly desperate to prove that his 
potential was being wasted and that his skills as a reader, writer, and observer of 
American life had be put to use. Nevertheless, knowing that he would be permitted to 
follow his passion only, so to speak, „over his father‟s dead body,‟ by late 1898 Mencken 
was slipping into a state of despair and even considering suicide.129 Henry Mencken felt 
himself at an impasse. Had it not been for August Mencken‟s unexpected death on 
January 13, 1899, H.L. Mencken‟s future as an editor, journalist and writer might never 
have materialized. He mourned the loss of his father, but it did not take him long to take 
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advantage of his newfound freedom. Shortly after August‟s burial, he found his way to 
the offices of the Baltimore Herald, and at the age of 19 became the youngest paid 
reporter on staff.  
The cynic in his own times 
 
By 1905, Mencken was the paper‟s managing editor and had had his first book, on 
the plays of George Bernard Shaw, published. When the Herald closed in 1906, he 
changed employers and began his nearly forty-year relationship with the Baltimore Sun. 
Mencken‟s book on the life and works of Nietzsche (the first of its kind to be written in 
English) was published in 1908, and that year he also began to review literature for The 
Smart Set, a publication he would later co-edit with George Jean Nathan. He went on to 
have his own regular column in the Evening Sun, contribute articles and editorials to 
countless other publications, assume editorship of The American Mercury, publish 25 
additional major works of his own, and (reportedly) answer every letter that he received. 
Mencken‟s productivity as a writer and editor remains dizzying. 
 And the intensity of the reactions that Mencken‟s editorials, columns, books, and 
activism stirred up across the United States is indicative of the shock-value of his work 
and the success he had in capturing the public‟s interest on a wide range of subjects 
pertaining to American politics, society and culture. Still, although he was a smashing 
success in the sense of achieving notoriety on the national scene, by many accounts he 
was also considered the most hated man in America during his heyday in the 1920s. In 
1926 alone, there were over 500 different editorials printed about him in newspapers and 
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journals across the country, and at least four-fifths of these were hostile.130 Never one to 
shy away from criticism or controversy, Mencken compiled an assortment of particularly 
impassioned excerpts from these testimonials and published Menckeniana: A 
Schimpflexikon in 1928. The following small selection from that volume offers a glimpse 
of what some of his fellow Americans thought of him: “the verbose Diogenes from 
Baltimore”; “a mangy mongrel”; “the dog that bites the hands that feed it”; “one of those 
little skunks who spread their poison wherever they go”; a man inflicted with “dysentery 
of the mouth.”131 At times his detractors even threatened him physically. Mencken was 
repeatedly warned not to travel in the South if he cared for his life (though these warnings 
never stopped him), and at the height of his fame (or infamy) it was not unusual to find 
his likeness burning in effigy on the courthouse lawns of small towns across the Bible 
Belt (a term that he himself coined).132  
 That being said, there were many who welcomed and found inspiration in 
Mencken‟s railings against American „piety, stupidity, morality, and chauvinism.‟ 
Throughout his career (and particularly in the 1920s) he was revered as well as reviled, 
and in many circles was granted such nicknames as „the American Voltaire‟ and „the 
Sage of Baltimore.‟ Though Mencken had few friends and many foes in the academic 
world, his magazine The American Mercury became a Bible of sorts across college 
campuses nationwide, and in 1926 Walter Lippmann called him “the most powerful 
personal influence on this whole generation of educated people.”133 Mencken‟s 
outspoken rebellion against the „tyranny of the majority‟ resonated with the concerns and 
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frustrations of many individuals and groups who wanted to challenge inequalities, 
generate social and political change, and fight for the right to dissent in a culture working 
hard to bolster traditional political, social and cultural „values.‟ As Huntington Cairns 
notes, “[for] a dozen years following the establishment of the Mercury, [Mencken] was 
on the public stage as a commentator on American life, and for two thirds of that time he 
had the largest following ever had by a publicist in that position. At the peak of this phase 
of his career, The New York Times editorialized that Mencken was the most powerful 
private citizen in the United States.”134 Love him or hate him, there is no denying the fact 
that he was a force to be reckoned with.  
 In 1928, Irving Babbitt (a literary critic, academic, and one of Mencken‟s 
nemeses) lamented the deleterious effects of the rise of „Menckenism‟ among the 
American youth.  
The symptoms of Menckenism are familiar: a certain hardness and smartness and 
disposition to rail at everything that, rightly or wrongly, is established and 
respected; [and] a tendency to identify the real with what Mr. Mencken terms „the 
cold and clammy facts‟ and to assume that the only alternative is to fade away 
into sheer romantic unreality.135  
 
This description of „Menckenism‟ is not wholly inaccurate. There was a hardness and a 
smartness to his work, and he did rail at many things that, rightly or wrongly, were 
considered established and respectable (indeed his hardness, smartness and humor sprang 
from the ways in which he juxtaposed „cold, clammy facts‟ with the rhetorical claims of 
American nationalism and moralism). Just as importantly, Mencken did condemn those 
who ignored or glossed over „the facts‟ of life to a realm of „unreality,‟ though it was not 
always a „romantic‟ one. The romantic, he argued, “is a variety of man whose eye 
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inevitably exaggerates, whose ear inevitably hears more than the band plays, [and] whose 
imagination inevitably doubles and triples the news brought in by his five senses.”136 
Whether discussing literature or political and social issues, Mencken criticized 
romanticism on the grounds that it painted a distorted and misleading picture of human 
life. But he also leveled similar charges against utopianism and idealism, and most of all 
upon „Puritanism.‟ All were trained on imagining and pursuing a vision of what ought to 
be rather than actively addressing what was, and this, as he saw it, rendered them toxic 
influences on both the individual and society.  
 Still, Babbitt‟s definition of „Menckenism‟ ignores (or mistakes) the motivations 
for his cynicism. Mencken wrote because he cared about the (dire) state of American 
democracy, and Henry May claims that “[t]his is [what differentiated] him and his merely 
bourgeois-baiting, alienated contemporaries.”137 Mencken tapped into the air of 
disillusionment that permeated the social and political atmosphere of the United States 
after the First World War, but he was not disheartened by his lack of illusions and he 
carried on demanding acknowledgement of American hypocrisy. He was, above all, a 
staunch individualist whose most definitive characteristic was the courage that drove him 
to speak and to write his mind. When asked what inspired him, Mencken offered the 
following response: “[t]he two main ideas that run through all my writing, whether it be 
literary criticism or political polemic, are these: I am strongly in favor of liberty and I 
hate fraud.”138 Mencken aired his grievances about his culture not only as a journalist and 
critic but also, I venture, as a concerned citizen who refused to sit back and witness his 
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society violate its own value system. He did not expect the „tyrannical majority‟ to 
change much on behalf of his „generous‟ efforts to defend civil liberties, but he did 
consider it his duty as a member of the „superior‟ intellectual minority to do all that he 
could to protect them. The distinction between these two categories—the inferior but 
tyrannical majority and the elite minority—figures prominently in Mencken‟s work. Yet 
it is worth noting here he was uninhibited by fears of disapproval, and in fact he 
encouraged anyone to exercise the right to speak freely and to rail right back at him.  
 Mencken went to great lengths to disrupt the illusion that the American people 
exercised—much less enjoyed—their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, 
claiming that, instead, they allowed not only the government but also their friends and 
neighbors to police their conduct and to tell them how they should live their lives. 
Nevertheless, he never fully abandoned the middle-class values with which he was raised 
and, paradoxically, his attacks on the moralism of the American „booboisie‟ were not 
rooted in a rejection of bourgeois principles per se. Throughout his life he continued to 
espouse such traditional American ideals as individualism, self-reliance, limited 
government and free enterprise. In committing himself to defending these ideals in honor 
of the right to liberty shared by all Americans, his activism bolstered progressive causes 
more often than not. Attempts to classify Mencken exclusively as a conservative or a 
liberal thinker, or to label him as a realist or an idealist, inevitably fail because his 
cynicism defies such dichotomies and he simply does not fit comfortably into any one of 
these categories. As Douglas C. Stenerson contends, “critics who have damned H.L. 
Mencken as an arch-reactionary or hailed him as a libertarian have not seen the whole 
man. The truth is that he was both. His social and political thought is particularly 
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fascinating because it embodies so many conflicting elements in the American 
heritage.”139 
On words, weapons and wars 
 
Mencken‟s professional dexterity was impressive; at various moments throughout 
his career he assumed, with gusto, the roles of “journalist, literary critic, popular 
philosopher, social critic, philologist, editor, autobiographer, [and] satirist.”140 Still, we 
must remember that he was largely self-taught when it came to his knowledge of the 
genres and subjects that he worked with, and the range that he tackled was extensive. 
Mencken‟s critics (particularly those in the academic world) have accused him of 
spreading himself too thin, and although he was exceptionally well read, such arguments 
are not invalid. He was, as Williams has noted, an “anti-specialist whose work tends to 
displease most specialists in the various fields in which he sported,” and he was often 
guilty of disregarding the complexity of causal forces behind political and social 
phenomena.141 Mencken does not (and could not) offer expert analyses of particular 
political and social issues, nor did he claim to. What he does offer is a shockingly honest 
assessment of what was going on in American politics and society even when he fails to 
adequately explain how or why. In fact, I would argue that this „failure‟ contributed to the 
potency of his effect, for Mencken thrust upon his readers the burden of explanation and 
response. Unfettered by the constraints of academic specialization, he cried foul 
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whenever he found the mores, not to mention the laws, of his contemporary America to 
contradict the principles upon which the United States had been founded.  
 Throughout the course of his career, Mencken maintained that he was enormously 
amused by the knavery and foolishness of his fellow citizens. Nevertheless, he took his 
(self-appointed) position as an acute observer and critic of American life very seriously. 
As George H. Douglas has argued, “Mencken was a writer who sought to understand 
American society thoroughly and rigorously, but he did this not by the [customary] 
means open to scholarship, not by cool detachment, but by engagement—by wrestling 
with his subject, punching it, knocking it down.”142 Indeed, there is a decidedly 
aggressive and even militaristic tone to much of Mencken‟s work, and he named his 
inaugural newspaper column „The Free Lance‟ for good reason. In it, he set about 
satirically skewering his fellow Baltimoreans on any subject he saw fit, and although 
Mencken knocked his targets around figuratively rather than physically, his attacks 
certainly hit home. „The Free Lance‟ (first published in 1911) frequently caused outrage, 
and the Sun received and regularly printed impassioned responses to the column at its 
author‟s behest. It was with pride that Mencken would later venture the following 
statement: “In my gladiator days on the Baltimore Sun I never attacked a single man 
without means of hitting back. Often I insisted upon the paper giving him the means—
[and] I controlled space that was dedicated to anyone wanting to attack me.”143 Mencken 
lashed out at his fellows, but he invited the American people to treat him as he treated 
them, and he took care to facilitate anyone who felt the urge to strike him back.  
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 His column was read widely and caused amusement as well as anger, but despite 
its success, „The Free Lance‟ was abruptly shuttered in 1915. Although an official 
explanation was never provided, Mencken‟s stance against U.S. involvement in the First 
World War, his brash criticism of propaganda and media censorship in the years leading 
up to it, and his alleged German sympathies have all since been cited as reasons for the 
column‟s demise. At the time, Mencken had come under increasingly heavy fire from the 
public as well as the authorities for his „un-American‟ opinions and statements, and he 
was subjected to governmental surveillance and censorship throughout the duration of the 
Great War. The experience of being watched and silenced was one that Mencken never 
forgave much less forgot. He would later offer the following assessment of democracy in 
the United States: “Democracy, like virtue, seems to be something that everybody 
whoops up but nobody follows as a career. Very few Americans actually believe in it, 
[and whenever] the test comes they are willing to deprive other people of their 
rights…[and] to exchange their own for some form of security.”144 Mencken‟s reproach 
was not unfounded given its historical context and the very real effects that movements 
such as the first Red Scare had on anyone (citizen or non-citizen) accused of espousing 
beliefs or opinions that deviated from the American norm. Citing equality before the law, 
limited government and freedom of speech as the only elements in a democracy that are 
genuinely valuable, Mencken claimed that all three of these principles had been 
abandoned by a public all too willing to trade in its values (and its ethics) for the safety 
promised by conformity.145  
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 Still, his own faith in the values of liberty and equality was shaken but not broken, 
and he remained committed to the task of exposing American hypocrisy in terms both 
harsh and humorous. According to Mencken, the War had confirmed that “hypocrisy is 
actually a kind of ideal in America. When the American cannot be really virtuous he 
becomes a hypocrite, and soon or late he convinces both himself and his neighbors that 
his hypocrisy is a sufficient surrogate for the virtue he lacks.”146 Soon after the war was 
over Mencken returned to admonishing the government‟s abuse of power and the public‟s 
complacency toward it with increased fervor. Declaring that he was “unalterably opposed 
to all efforts to put down free speech, whatever the excuse,”147 Mencken consistently 
advocated for some of the country‟s most notorious radicals, at times adding not only his 
name and time but also his money to their defense. It should be emphasized that in doing 
so he lent his support to the causes of individuals and groups espousing beliefs that were 
antithetical to his own. Mencken‟s political leanings could most accurately be described 
as liberal in the classical sense (he stood for civil liberties, limited government, respect 
for the rule of law, and a free market economy). Yet he publicly defended, among others, 
the Italian immigrants and accused anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti and the activist and 
labor leader Thomas Mooney, and he not only published the work of Emma Goldman in 
The Mercury but also formally lobbied the Bureau of Immigration on her behalf and 
donated funds to the „Emma Goldman Recovery Committee.‟148 Though his requests that 
she be allowed to return to the United States were never granted, Goldman appreciated 
his efforts. She and Mencken had developed a correspondence, and in 1930 she wrote to 
him with the following message: “Bless your heart…How naïve of you to think that you 
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could change the law in my direction. It is splendid of you to want to attempt it…[and] 
the fact that you have tried has done me a world of good.”149  
 Mencken was, paradoxically, an idealist in his own right, and his mission was to 
show everyone—experts and laymen alike—that they sacrificed their own dignity when 
they handed over their rights and liberties. He tailored his criticisms as well as his 
activism to achieve the biggest impact for each particular individual or case that he took 
on; “My weapon,” Mencken argued, “is [always] adapted to the enemy and to the 
fight,”150 and his cynicism, like that of Diogenes, was often improvisational. Yet there is 
an irony to the aggressive tone and militaristic tropes that crop up in his writing given the 
intensity of his opposition to the United States‟ involvement in both World Wars. A strict 
isolationist, Mencken saw no reason to justify military engagement in any conflict short 
of a foreign invasion of American soil. He has been criticized roundly on this issue. In the 
case of World War II, it is certainly true that he refused to acknowledge or take seriously 
the very real threat that Nazism posed to human life and dignity as Hitler rose to power in 
the 1930s. Mencken grossly underestimated Hitler‟s power and influence as a demagogue 
(as well as his ultimate intentions). But this does not automatically make him a fascist or 
an anti-Semite—though he has long suffered such accusations—nor does it make him a 
German loyalist (and, for what it‟s worth, he later admitted he had been wrong). The 
attachments that Mencken felt to Germany were cultural and not political. “The fact is,” 
he wrote, 
 my „loyalty‟ to Germany, as a state or nation, is absolutely nil. It would do me no 
good whatsoever if the Germans conquered all of Europe; it would do me a lot of 
damage if they beat the United States. But I do believe I was right when I argued 
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that unfairness to them was discreditable and dangerous to this country, and I am 
glad that I did.151  
  
Mencken‟s concerns lay primarily with the effects that both wars had at home, 
and while his opinions on the U.S.‟s military involvement overseas may have been off the 
mark, his condemnation of the government‟s suppression of free speech and the right to 
dissent, and of its persecution of anyone suspected of being „un-American,‟ is hard to 
fault. Challenging the motives of both the Wilson and Roosevelt administrations for 
going to war, Mencken argued that “to wage a war for a purely moral reason is as absurd 
as to ravish a woman for a purely moral reason. Such notions do not make for innocence, 
and hence for self-respect; they make for hypocrisy. The more war has to be explained 
and justified, the less good will issue from it.”152 Mencken called the press as well as 
politicians to task for fanning the flames of wartime chauvinism, and he chastised the 
public for buying into it—their enthusiasm did not make for bravery, he argued, but for 
hypocrisy. “The kinds of courage I really admire,” Mencken stated, “are not whooped up 
in war, but cried down, and indeed become infamous. No one, in such times of irrational 
and animal-like emotion, ever praises the man who stands out against the official 
balderdash, and seeks to restore the national thinking, so called, to a reasonable 
sanity.”153 This was the man that Mencken had taken it upon himself to try to be. 
Making sense of Menckenism  
 
Neither a political nor a philosophical movement, „Menckenism‟ was, at heart, an 
improvisational critical practice characterized by the particular ways that Mencken 
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himself went about „telling it like it is.‟ He summed up his personal creed as follows: “I 
believe that it is better to tell the truth than to lie. I believe that it is better to be free than 
to be a slave. And I believe that it is better to know than be ignorant.”154 For Mencken, 
both freedom and knowledge depend upon a practical search for truth, while the practice 
of publicly revealing this truth is in turn both an expression of one‟s freedom and a 
demonstration of what one knows. Yet although the concepts of truth, freedom and 
knowledge are intimately connected in his cynical „philosophy,‟ he never formally 
defines any of them philosophically. This is not due to intellectual oversight. It is, rather, 
due to Mencken‟s belief that formal conceptual definitions belong to the realm of 
metaphysics, and that the retreat to such a realm constitutes a death knell for thinking. 
Indeed, all absolutes were anathema to Mencken, regardless of whether they took 
philosophical, religious or scientific forms, and he was hostile to any system of thought 
that claimed authority on the bases of theoretical proofs. In this he was like Diogenes. 
“Philosophy,” Mencken stated, “consists largely of one philosopher arguing that all 
others are jackasses. He usually proves it, and I should add that he also usually proves 
that he is one himself.”155 What Mencken sought were truths rather than the Truth, and as 
far as he was concerned, anyone doing otherwise was a fraud. 
 Nietzsche, however, was one of the few exceptions to that rule, and it is clear that 
Mencken felt he had discovered something of a kindred spirit in this German philosopher 
waging a lonely war against convention. His book on Nietzsche offers some of the 
clearest insight into the bases of his own iconoclasm because it is, in many ways, less an 
examination of Nietzsche than an account of the cynical „philosophy‟ of H.L. Mencken. 
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“All life upon earth,” Mencken asserts, “is nothing more than a battle with the enemies of 
life. A germ is such an enemy, cold is such an enemy, lack of food is such an enemy, and 
others that may be mentioned are lack of water, ignorance of natural laws, armed foes 
and deficient physical strength.”156 Drawing upon his reading of Darwin, he claims that 
all natural beings are shaped by the various ways that they respond to challenges and 
adapt to their environments; although human animals cannot always know what dangers 
they will face, their chances of survival increase when they actively examine the world 
around them and take measure of threats that arise. For Mencken, to exist is to struggle, 
but although living is a risky business, humans are far from helpless beings cast into a 
hostile world. As we struggle with competitive energetic and material forces, he asserts 
that “[our] perceptions, corrected by our experience and our common sense, must serve 
as guides for us, and we must seize every opportunity to widen their range and increase 
their accuracy.”157 Whether or not the majority of human beings make practical use of 
their perceptions, experience and common sense is, of course, another issue entirely for 
Mencken. Still, he argues that although man must respect the laws of nature, humans can 
use their instincts and their knowledge of these laws to respond to adversity in ways that 
afford the individual as well as the species the chance to not only survive but thrive. 
 Like his take on Nietzsche‟s materialism, Mencken‟s assessment of the distinction 
between superior and inferior individuals (and, relatedly, his assessment of the pernicious 
effects of Christian morality on humanity) reflects an intuitive if not always subtle 
understanding of Nietzsche‟s thought. He describes Nietzsche‟s superior man as follows: 
“[he] is a being capable of facing the horrors of life unafraid, of meeting great enemies 
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and slaying them, of gazing down upon the earth in pride and scorn, [and] of making his 
own way and bearing his own burdens.”158 For Mencken, a superior individual is a free 
spirit—a courageous, independent and self-sufficient being who honestly measures the 
pains as well as the pleasures of living on this earth and resolves to make the best of both. 
Such individuals, he asserts, are rare, and by contrast the vast majority of human beings 
are so afraid of losing their battles with the enemies of life that they sacrifice their 
independence for the perceived safety of the herd. “Liberty,” Mencken argues, “means 
self-reliance, it means resolution, it means enterprise, [and] it means the capacity for 
doing without.”159 These are precisely the qualities that separate strong individuals from 
the weak and the few from the many. Clinging together, the fearful and weak devise 
moral systems that seek to teach the brave and powerful individual to sacrifice his or her 
strength for the good of the group, and this has the effect of weakening the species as a 
whole. Mencken asserts that it is not the „good‟ that the weak (and tyrannical) majority 
are after so much as the suppression of any threats presented by the strong, and they 
cleverly endeavor to convince the strong to relinquish their independence and superior 
prowess by shaming them for the qualities and characteristics that distinguish them from 
the rest of the group. 
 But Mencken also admits that there are material advantages to conforming to the 
morals of the majority—even if he has no respect for those who do so. Indeed, despite 
morality‟s pretentions to self-sacrifice, Mencken claims that “all morality, in fact, is 
colored and modified by opportunism,”160 and his biggest complaint against Christianity 
(which, following Nietzsche, he considers the most insidious of all slave-moralities) was 
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not that its mission to make lambs out of lions was at odds with the laws of natural 
selection (though he believed that it was). Rather, it was that Christian morality was a 
sham concocted by clever but weak members of the species to constrain the instincts of 
the strong for their own benefit. Man, Mencken asserts, is naturally self-serving, and “a 
code of morals [is] nothing more than a system of customs, laws and ideas which [has] its 
origin in the instinctive desire of some definite race to live under conditions which best 
[serve] its welfare.”161 Morality, then, does not destroy the natural forces that drive 
human beings into conflict, nor does it aim to shape all human beings into passive bodies 
capable of peaceful coexistence—it simply changes the weapons they have at their 
disposal to protect themselves and their interests, and this, ironically, is Christian 
morality‟s silver lining. Mencken argues via Nietzsche that “humanity [has] escaped utter 
degeneration and destruction because, despite its dominance as a theory of action, few 
men actually [practice] Christianity.”162 His hatred of hypocrisy notwithstanding, he 
concedes that the very fact that Christians so rarely practice what they preach has been a 
saving grace for the species: its laws and customs may harness individual strength and 
thus weaken humanity, but the laws of nature have not permitted it to kill the human race 
off completely.  
 The name that Mencken gave to the particular variety of Christian moralism that, 
he charged, had taken root in the United States since its founding was „Puritanism.‟ In 
doing so, he took a bit of creative license. Fred Hobson has noted that it was not 
technically Puritanism and its legacy that Mencken decried but essentially an American 
equivalent of Victorianism. Throughout his career he railed, among other things, against 
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the “enforcement of genteel standards in literature, American reticence about discussing 
sex, [the] movement toward prohibition, [the] distrust of hedonism, [and] the American 
passion for „decency‟ and „respectability,‟”163 and these issues were more closely linked 
to Methodist revivals in American culture than to the nation‟s puritanical past. 
Nevertheless, Mencken effectively used the term „Puritan‟ pejoratively as a moniker for 
all things oppressively and aggressively „moral‟ in American society. Defining 
Puritanism as “the haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy,”164 he 
maintained that anyone attempting to police the private lives of his or her neighbors in 
the name of „decency‟ and „respectability‟ was essentially sadistic. As far as he was 
concerned, the Puritans strove not to make people „better‟ but to make them suffer, and 
one of Mencken‟s chief complaints against Puritanism was that it claimed to mitigate the 
human proclivity to dominate others but actually exploited it. Despite its pretensions to 
acting in the name of the Lord, he asserts that “there is only one honest impulse at the 
bottom of Puritanism, and that is to punish the man with the superior capacity for 
happiness—to bring him down to the miserable level of „good‟ men, i.e., of stupid, 
cowardly and chronically unhappy men.”165  
 Yet Mencken claimed that its success in proscribing happiness and spoiling the 
fun in life, though loathsome, was not surprising. Puritanism (like any form of moralism) 
capitalized on not only the weakness and fearfulness of the American people but also, 
and relatedly, on their irrationality and stupidity. Mencken argues that the common 
American is deeply afraid of the unknown, and that in order to avoid facing it he or she 
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turns against rationality and eagerly embraces the fantasy of Truth. Absolute truths in any 
form provide respite from the insecurity of uncertainty, not because they are „true‟ but 
because believing in them spares one the energy of thinking. Such a person, according to 
Mencken, never doubts, refuses to use reason and the evidence of his or her senses, and 
rejects common sense in favor of the doctrines of a fictional higher power that promises 
certainty in an uncertain world. On the subject of what, specifically, constitutes stupidity 
he says the following:  
Any kind of handicap save one may be overcome by a resolute spirit—
blindness, crippling, poverty. The history of humanity is a history of just 
such overcomings. But no spirit can ever overcome the handicap of 
stupidity. The person who believes what is palpably not true is hopeless.166 
 
For Mencken, stupidity and certitude are synonymous. Of that, paradoxically, he was 
most definitely sure. Instead of accepting the „cold, clammy‟ facts of life—that human 
beings are material bodies struggling with one another and with the forces of nature—the 
stupid individual cowers before the Truth and dismisses the truths of life all together. 
Mencken claimed that a superior man, by contrast, is not tempted by the comfort of 
certainty. Rather, “he sees daily evidence that many things held to be true by nine-tenths 
of all men are, in reality, false, and he is thereby apt to acquire a doubt of everything, 
including his own beliefs.”167 The key to not only surviving but appreciating life on Earth 
for as long as possible was to develop the courage to constantly test one‟s knowledge.  
 For Mencken, there was no undertaking more worthy than that of pursuing the 
truths of a world constantly upset and shaken by material forces that naturally frustrated 
human attempts to control them. He argued that because “all human progress, even in 
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morals, has been the work of men who have doubted the current moral values,” the motto 
of the superior individual must always be “I am not too sure.”168 Yet although Mencken 
claimed that hypocrisy, irrationality, and stupidity were the marks of the inferior 
majority, it is significant that he did not in fact essentialize or naturalize these 
characteristics. As Marion Elizabeth Rogers argues 
for Mencken the superior man, regardless of race or social background, is simply 
the man of honor. By that he means an independent, enlightened citizen, 
predisposed towards liberty, [and] on guard to keep his freedom from eroding 
under the pressure of self-styled patriots or unscrupulous politicians who play 
upon the fears of people in troubled times.169  
 
The man or woman of honor is, in a word, a person of great integrity—he or she is not 
only unafraid to challenge the majority in defense of the democratic principles of liberty 
and equality under the law, but is also strong enough to resist the temptation to pander to 
its fears or its (foolish) idealism for the sake of personal gain. This strength is critical, 
because the superior individual is as much a human animal as the inferior and is not 
invulnerable to these temptations. Indeed, he or she may even engage in unscrupulous 
behavior from time to time. Yet Mencken asserts that one of the things that marks the 
superior individual from the inferior and the honorable person from the moral lies in their 
responses to such moments of weakness: “the difference between a moral man and a man 
of honor,” he claims, “is that the latter regrets a discreditable act, even when it has 
worked and he has not been caught.”170 Mencken contends that the instant the moral 
individual‟s hypocrisy is revealed, he or she immediately starts denying wrongdoing and 
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pointing fingers at others. The honorable individual, by contrast, takes the high road by 
acknowledging the slip and accounting for the dishonorable act.  
 Mencken called Nietzsche‟s thought a „counterblast to sentimentality,‟ and 
asserted that “[i]f Nietzsche left no other vital message to his time, he would have at least 
forced and deserved a hearing for his warning that Christianity is a theory for those who 
distrust and despair of strength, and not for those who hope to fight on.”171 Fighting on 
against sentimentality is precisely what Mencken did in his own time, and he certainly 
managed to force a hearing on the dangers that morality posed to liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness in American life. Following Nietzsche‟s lead, Mencken asserted that 
American moralism is both spawned by and feeds off of fear, and he insisted that, 
contrary to popular belief, the United States is hardly the land of the free or the home of 
the brave. “The American people,” he claimed,  
taking one with another, constitute the most timorous, sniveling, poltroonish, 
ignominious mob of serfs and goose-steppers ever gathered under one flag in 
Christendom since the end of the Middle Ages, and they grow more timorous, 
more sniveling, more poltroonish, more ignominious every day.172  
For Mencken, American exhortations to freedom and bravery amounted to 
egregious examples of hypocrisy in a decidedly two-faced society. “Ask the average 
American,” Mencken wrote, “what is the most salient passion in his emotional 
armamentarium—what is the idea that lies at the bottom of all his other ideas—and it is 
very probable that, nine times out of ten, he will nominate his hot and unquenchable rage 
for liberty.”173 Yet the majority of his fellow citizens, as he saw it, willingly traded their 
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liberty and dignity for the security promised by moral conformity. Clearly, Mencken 
himself was not afraid to condemn them for their cowardice or their lies.  
Paging ‘Dr. Rhetoricus’? 
 
There is no denying that, taken at face value, Mencken‟s „philosophy‟ was harsh 
and unforgiving, and it has certainly been received as such both during his own time and 
today. As Charles A. Fecher argues, “in a nation dedicated to the principle that no man is 
better than any other, [Mencken‟s philosophy did not] and does not make for 
popularity.”174 But popularity, at the end of the day, was not Mencken‟s goal. His 
primary goal, rather, was to force hearings on the extent to which Americans were, in 
fact, actually dedicated to the principle of equality, and the extent to which they truly 
valued liberty. It was in defense of these principles that he wrote, and his criticism was 
earnest and honest. Mencken may have been distrustful of the inherent „goodness‟ of 
human beings and of the motivations behind most human behavior, but he was no 
misanthrope. Though he ranted and railed against his society, he did not hate life, or for 
that matter his fellow Americans. Rather, he hated what he considered to be their 
hypocrisy. 
 Mencken had the audacity—some would say the nerve—to criticize American 
culture from within and in honor of the very ideals that it promised but failed to uphold. 
His cynicism toed the line between revolt and reform in a way that raised questions about 
the state of American democracy and that many people found uncomfortable but could 
not ignore. And in this his criticism resembles that of Diogenes. At the core, both were 
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cultural rebels devoted to living a life of freedom even if their visions of what it meant to 
be free were not symmetrical. Despite his insistence that “no normal being wants to hear 
the truth,”175 Mencken considered it is duty to ensure that everyone would hear him tell it 
as he saw it. And like Diogenes, he showed that there was room for honesty in society 
even if it his observations were unwelcome. On the subject of cynicism, Mencken said 
the following:  
One of the most curious of human delusions lies in the theory that cynics 
are unhappy men—that cynicism makes for a general biliousness and 
malaise. It is a false deduction, I believe, from the obvious fact that cynics 
make other men unhappy…For what a cynic believes, though it may be 
too dreadful to put into formal words, at least usually has the merit of 
being true—and truth is ever a rock, hard and harsh, but solid under the 
feet.176 
 
If the goal of the cynic is to force people to face uncomfortable truths, Mencken and 
Diogenes showed that a little comedic relief goes a long way. Both cynics recognized that 
humor has the ability to lighten moods and to help their unwanted or undesirable 
messages go down more easily. It draws attention to their unsolicited and unwanted truth-
claims but can also soften the blow a bit—a joke, like an insult, is difficult to ignore, and 
the combination of the two can be twice as affective.  
 Indeed, it is because the truth can be such a bitter pill to swallow that dark humor 
plays such an indispensable role in cynical practices. Mencken‟s assessment of human 
nature and the politics that are motivated by it was that although man may be capable of 
virtue and of actions unmotivated by drives to further self-interest, the mere fact of 
having such a capacity hardly translates to the inclination or desire to act upon it. 
Nevertheless, Mencken was not a political realist in the classic sense; his recognition of 
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„the human drive to dominate‟ was muddled with a kind of idealism that prevented him 
from fitting comfortably into any theoretical camp. He believed in freedom of speech and 
the right to dissent. I would argue that for Mencken, the ends never justified the means in 
political contestations, even if he was never surprised by the extent to which corruption 
infiltrated the political process, or if he charged the public with inviting political 
mendacity as much as he charged politicians for indulging in it. “The capacity of human 
beings,” he argued, “to believe the obviously not true is apparently almost unlimited. 
Politicians fall into trouble, not by overestimating it, but by underestimating it.”177 Still, I 
would argue that Mencken could most accurately be considered a political meliorist 
rather than a pessimist: his view was that things could never be the best or the worst, but 
that they could improve (and that they did, albeit very slowly). He might have compared 
his contemporary America to the Dark Ages, but he was well aware that the times were 
quite different, despite his frequent use of medieval metaphors to describe his 
countrymen. 
 Mencken made fun of his fellows and of himself, and he had fun doing so. This 
lightheartedness helped him to expand his readership, and as such to expand the reach of 
his messages; as William H. Nolte has argued, “Mencken‟s most appealing quality…was 
his enthusiasm and exuberance. He delighted in the world about him, and he conveyed 
that delight to his readers.”178 Mencken did not, so to speak, let his frustrations get him 
down. “We live,” he argued, “in a land of abounding quackeries, and if we do not learn to 
laugh we succumb to the melancholy disease which afflicts the race of viewers-with-
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alarm. I have had too good a time of it in this world to go down that chute.”179 I think that 
there is something valuable to be learned from the fact that he also did not give up on his 
society, even if he did not expect much change to come from his efforts.   
Liberty, equality and hypocrisy in America 
 
In 1947, Mencken gave an interview on public affairs in which he was asked 
whether he preferred to be called „The Sage of Baltimore‟ or „The Man Who Hates 
Everything.‟ He responded with the following statement: “I don‟t give a damn what you 
or anyone else calls me…[but] in the present case it is a little inaccurate to say that I hate 
everything. I am strongly in favor of common sense, common honesty, and common 
decency.”180 Given his criticism of the common man, it may be surprising at first glance 
that Mencken endorses „common‟ sense, „common‟ honesty and „common‟ decency here. 
In fact, these are concepts he consistently praises in his work. Although Mencken is often 
charged with harboring aristocratic sensibilities on account of the dichotomy he presents 
between superior/elite individuals and inferior/common ones, he argues that one of the 
marks of the superior individual is his or her capacity to cast off Truth while making use 
of the common sense, honesty and decency that are available to all. Mencken does not, of 
course, define these concepts, nor does he feel the need to. Yet I suspect that he had an 
additional motivation for employing such terminology in his discussions of the American 
public. Though he argues that most Americans would identify liberty as their most 
cherished principle, Mencken claimed that what they were really obsessed with was 
status, or what he terms „social aspiration.‟ “[The American‟s] dominant passion,” he 
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asserts, “is a passion to lift himself by at least a step or two in the society that he is a part 
of—a passion to improve his position, to break down some shadowy barrier of caste, to 
achieve the countenance of what, for all his talk of equality, he recognizes and accepts as 
his betters.”181 Mencken was yet again making fun. And the jury is out as to whether or 
not he was correct in his assessment. But I, for one, would agree with him at least on 
some levels, and if he was right it is hardly surprising that his audience often did not take 
kindly to being called common, average, or inferior.   
 That being said, one might ask what use is Mencken, a critic who for the most 
part fell out of popular favor in the 1930s, for us today? There are certainly limitations to 
looking to Mencken as a model for inspiring political and social engagement, much less 
change, for he consistently eschewed the kind of collective action often named as the 
defining mark of the political. Yet that did not keep him from getting involved in the 
public sphere and speaking out on political issues and causes. One of the remarkable 
things about Mencken is that not only was he not „disillusioning‟ (he did not „generate‟ 
disillusionment, even if he was read and embraced by disillusioned members of society), 
he also was not, on the whole, disillusioned in the common sense of the term. Mencken 
did not succumb to disappointment and frustration; he acted upon his observations and 
his frustrations with hypocrisy in American life, and in doing so he often cut directly 
across the kinds of ideological lines that are prevalent in politics today. Mencken sought 
to break down (what he took to be) the illusions that the American people had about 
themselves, e.g. that they were committed to upholding such basic democratic principles 
as equality before the law, political tolerance, government accountability and 
transparency, and civil liberties. What I think is most compelling about his cynicism (and 
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that of Diogenes) is that they both manage to maintain a measure of ideological aloofness 
that is nevertheless combined with a commitment to engaging their respective societies in 
a discussion (or argument) about its current state of affairs. This is not because they did 
not have their own prejudices, which they did. But in committing to fight hypocrisy, and 
to doing so with a laugh and a wink as well as with a (metaphorical) club, Mencken was 
able to rail against his society in a way that was heard all across the political spectrum.  
 Mencken‟s cynicism started very public arguments about what it means to be an 
American and what national values the American people honor. It also inspired 
individuals and groups who were dissatisfied with their culture to start conversations 
about how to change it. Though Mencken was hardly a Progressive (indeed, he did not 
identify specifically with any political or social movement and was not a member of any 
political organization, liberal or conservative), he lent his support to particular causes on 
both the liberal and the conservative sides of the political spectrum throughout his 
career.182 And although he has sometimes been branded a foe of democracy, his criticism 
of democracy, like his discussions of superior and inferior people, has been taken out of 
context. Mencken chastised the spectacle of democratic politics (while also claiming to 
delight in this same spectacle) but he by no means sought to replace the system with 
another form of government. Rather, his attacks on government were aimed at the people 
who run for office, those who vote for them, and the corrupt and inefficient manner in 
which elected officials manage the tasks that are placed before them. Mencken did not so 
much denounce the system itself as the ways in which it operated in practice. In fact, 
although Mencken argued that government is by nature evil because it restricts individual 
liberty, he saw it as a necessary evil, and never advocated getting rid of government 
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altogether (and in this his cynicism does differ from that of Diogenes, who refused to 
accept any of the laws of his society). There were times when Mencken felt that a 
person‟s liberty could legitimately be curtailed by the government, but this was only 
when it presented a direct and immediate threat to the physical or material well-being of 
another person.     
 David Greenberg argues that Mencken‟s world-view, though generally 
characterized as libertarian, “might better be described as a kind of slapstick nihilism, 
equal parts Nietzsche…and Groucho Marx (who sang in Horse-feathers, „Whatever it is, 
I‟m against it‟).”183 This seems to me an apt description, and one that is closely attuned to 
the remarkable combination of seriousness and silliness so typical of Mencken‟s work. 
He shared with Nietzsche a number of core beliefs: that „conclusions are consolations,‟ 
that conventions constrain creativity, and that the ultimate mission of the moral man or 
woman is to enslave and thus destroy the strength and vitality of the free spirit. He also 
appreciated Nietzsche‟s courageous honesty and his unique style, which he called the 
kind of writing “that one cannot read aloud without roaring and waving one‟s arms.”184 
But to a much greater degree than Nietzsche, Mencken was humorist, and his comedic 
tendencies amplified the effect of his of criticism. His style, unique in its own right, was 
at once frank and funny, earnest and capricious, and also, somehow, ridiculously relevant 
to his time. I think that Nietzsche, Mencken, and Groucho Marx all shared an irreverent, 
liberating and life-affirming spirit. Consider, for example, Mencken‟s assessment of the 
role of the iconoclast in any age: “The liberation of the human mind has best been 
furthered by gay fellows who heaved dead cats into sanctuaries and then went roistering 
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down the highways of the world, proving to all men that doubt, after all, was safe—that 
the god in the sanctuary was a fraud. One horse-laugh is worth ten thousand 
syllogisms.”185 It‟s difficult to imagine that, given their respective oeuvres, either 
Nietzsche or Groucho Marx would have disagreed with him.   
Chapter 4: Provoking Perfectionism—Stanley Cavell 
on Doubt and Democracy 
 
“Whoso would be a man must be a non-conformist...[and] go upright and vital, and 
speak the rude truth in all ways.” —Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1841 
 
 
What is the role of the cynic in any given age? And to what extent might this role, 
and its attendant goals, be related to those of the non-conformist that Ralph Waldo 
Emerson celebrates in Self-Reliance? I will address both questions in the pages to come, 
but for the moment I would like to focus on the significance of Emerson‟s ties to the 
philosophy of cynicism. I chose this epigraph because it reveals a cynical side to 
Emerson‟s thinking largely elided by the American philosopher Stanley Cavell, to whose 
reflections on skepticism and Emersonian Perfectionism I turn in this chapter. Cavell has 
written extensively on Emerson‟s work, and indeed, he credits „The Sage of Concord‟ 
with provoking many of his own meditations on the relationship between self and society, 
between philosophy and politics, in American culture. Yet although Cavell has 
commented at length on Self-Reliance, he does not address the narrator‟s affirmation of 
“the rude truth.”186 This omission is noteworthy because it seems to me that the theme of 
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„speaking the rude truth‟ permeates the text of this essay, and as this is a theme that lies at 
the heart of cynic philosophy, it is worth probing the parallels between Emerson‟s 
proverbial non-conformist and the non-conformism of the cynics. Doing so ultimately 
reveals, I argue, a new perspective from which to consider not only Self-Reliance but also 
Cavell‟s endorsement of Emersonian Perfectionism as a necessary response to the 
difficulties of democratic life.   
 I should note from the outset, however, that Cavell never affiliates his thinking 
and writing with cynicism or its critical practices. In fact, he does the opposite, and 
proposes that his work on Emerson Perfectionism offers an antidote to the hopelessness 
of a cynical response to the predicaments and perplexities of the human experience of 
living with others in an uncertain world. And Cavell is, to a certain degree, on the mark 
here: cynicism does, by and large, present human quarrels and concerns with others as 
unsettleable or unresolvable, and this is its chief weakness as a critical attitude. Rather 
than affirming a shared world, the cynic takes a stand of near-permanent protest against 
his or her society with the goal of staying true to the self (or, in Foucault‟s words, 
“caring” for the self). So, although cynicism is not selfish it is self-centered; the cynic 
advocates for the transformative potential that comes with questioning society and 
freeing the self from the fetters of conformism, but the locus of change is always the 
individual rather than the community and this, I think, is the philosophy‟s Achilles heel. 
By focusing on the personal benefits of breaking away from conformism and 
conventionality, cynicism does not adequately appreciate the interdependencies between 
the self and society, and instead posits a world in which the tow are, by their very nature, 
diametrically opposed. They are not, and this is a point that Cavell is attentive to. Despite 
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his reputation as an individualist, Cavell examines the reciprocity between the self and 
society quite closely, and his work on skepticism and Emersonian Perfectionism shows 
that caring for the self in fact depends upon also caring for, and having commitments to, a 
community of others. Human beings, Cavell argues, need others and a measure of 
conventionalism if they are even to begin making sense of, and finding meaning in, their 
lives. And while the cynics do not deny this human need to convene (remember, they do 
require an audience), the meaning-making capacities of conventionality are something 
they take for granted in their commitment to self-reliance.  
 Nevertheless, this is not reason enough to discount the affirmative aspects of 
cynic philosophy, or to deny its relation to Cavell‟s work. Indeed, there are striking 
similarities between the cynics‟ concerns for the state and the fate of the human self in 
society and those advanced by Cavell, and his reading of Emerson‟s Self-Reliance helps 
bring this to light. Focusing intensely on the significance of Emerson‟s statements that 
“the virtue most requested in society is conformity” and that “self-reliance is its 
aversion,” Cavell contends that Emerson  
is pretty explicitly naming his own writing as saying of itself that it is written in 
aversion, aversion to conformity. And since the work of the word „conformity‟ in 
its sentence is to name a virtue, a contribution to a way of life, the implication is 
that his writing in self-reliance exhibits or enacts a contribution to a counter way 
of life.187  
 
This smacks of Diogenes and his cynicism. According to Cavell, Emerson identifies 
himself as the non-conformist narrator, and his aversive writing signifies an act of 
disobedience; it demonstrates Emerson‟s determination to adopt a self-reliant style of life 
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by defying his society‟s most requested virtue.188 And following in this vein, Cavell also 
notes that Emerson‟s use of the concept „aversion‟ should not be construed simply as a 
„dislike‟ or an „avoidance‟ of conformity. Instead, he suggests that Emerson‟s aversion 
can be seen as an act of turning toward his society as much as (and, I think, more than) a 
turning away from it. This implies that Emerson‟s writing is more than an act of 
disobedience—it is also an act of “rude” confrontation, one in which he provokes his 
readers into (potentially heated) conversation by telling them truths about themselves 
and, just as importantly, about himself. Indeed, for Emerson it is the very process of 
telling such truths that allows him to become himself, and hence to be true to himself. 
Emerson‟s „aversion,‟ Cavell argues, signals a conversion; it signals a transformation of 
the self via an enduring aspiration towards an “unattained but attainable” self (and it is 
precisely this kind of transformation that Cavell likens to Foucault‟s conception of caring 
for the self).189 
 And, it is this possibility of transformation, of cultivating the self by embracing 
the possibility of perpetually liberating oneself  “from a present state to a further or next 
state,” that grounds Cavell‟s interest in moral perfectionism.190 He is adamant that the 
search for the truth of oneself is not aimed at the attainment of a „perfect‟ self, and 
through his reading of Emerson he maintains that the goal of perfectionism is not to 
achieve a „final destination‟ but rather to learn to embrace processes of change in an 
uncertain world. It entails a process of discovery, and what Cavell ultimately draws from 
Emerson‟s writing is a vision of moral perfectionism that “proposes confrontation and 
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conversation as the means of determining whether we can live together, [and] accept one 
another into the aspirations of our lives.”191 This requires actively questioning the self‟s 
„place‟ in the world, as well as testing the strengths and boundaries of one‟s relationships 
with others to see what they are in fact comprised of. For both the cynics and for Cavell, 
doubt functions as the catalyst for a process of self-transformation, but more than the 
cynics Cavell stresses that this process can, and in fact should, push us to value and 
respect our relations with others and with the world for what they are: often unpredictable 
and uncertain, but also brimming with the potential to help us make sense of and find 
meaning in our lives. Still, it is my contention that recognizing rather than rejecting the 
similarities between the cynics‟ concerns for the care of the self and those of Cavell 
actually strengthens his argument that Emersonian Perfectionism offers us tools with 
which to address the dilemmas of democratic life. As Piergiorgio Donatelli notes, the 
search for truth epitomized in Emersonian Perfectionism “is a search for direction 
[wherein] we need a guide, which Cavell epitomizes in the figure of the friend” who can 
help us find our way when our understanding of ourselves, others or the world has been 
shaken and we feel lost, or confused, or dissatisfied with our experiences and frustrated 
by our expectations.192 Cavell argues that such a guide, be it another person, a text, a film 
or anything else that strikes us and provokes us to question what we know, can inspire us 
to embrace change instead of avoiding it. Emerson‟s non-conformist serves as one such 
guide for Cavell. But the cynics can also be friends who guide us to question ourselves 
and to change our ways (even if they are reluctant to admit doing so) and their 
provocative potential should not be discounted. 
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 As Richard Flathman has argued, to engage in the kind of confrontation-
conversation that Cavell‟s vision of Emersonian Perfectionism suggests “is to put oneself 
at risk, to make a wager at high stakes and with uncertain odds,” because our arguments 
(and hence our very selves) might not be understood, or accepted, by those with whom 
we endeavor to communicate.193 And this speaks to the message of Emerson‟s non-
conformist on „speaking the rude truth,‟ and to what I am proposing are important 
connections between Cavell‟s thinking and writing on Emerson‟s act of „rude‟ 
disobedience and the philosophy of cynicism. Calling “truth handsomer than the affection 
of love,” Emerson indicates in Self-Reliance that in order to be (and to continue to 
become) himself he must commit to the practice of questioning that searching for the 
truth requires, even if this earns him the ire of his fellows, for —only then can he be true 
to himself.194 What Emerson shares with the cynics, then, and what we can learn from 
them as well as from him, is the lesson that despite (or even because of) the risks 
involved there are rewards for speaking the rude truth should if we muster the courage to 
do so. Hence, my aim next will be to parse out the similarities and the differences 
between the cynics‟ practices of speaking the truth and those of the non-conformist of in 
Self-Reliance in order to answer the questions with which I began. 
On speaking the rude truth 
 
What is the role, and what are the goals, of the cynic in any age? A highly 
idiosyncratic critical stance toward the public world, cynicism has been practiced in a 
variety of ways (and its practices have been embodied by a variety of different figures) 
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since Diogenes of Sinope first pledged to „deface the currency‟ of ancient Athens in the 
fourth century BC. Still, those individuals who have embraced the philosophy of 
cynicism throughout the ages and across various places and spaces have shared the 
commitment to courageous free-spokenness, the hostility to conformity, and the fondness 
for black humor that characterized the original Dog. H.L. Mencken possessed these 
qualities in abundance. A self-described extreme libertarian, Mencken insisted that the 
most valuable human right was the right to seek and to speak the truth, and he chastised 
early twentieth-century American society for suffocating this right (and the truth) beneath 
the weight of puritanical values, parochial beliefs and unexamined opinions. As a 
journalist and writer, Mencken made it his mission to challenge the American status quo, 
and he taunted his readers into responding to his harsh criticism of the state of the 
nation‟s social and political culture, asking:  
What is the spirit of Americanism? I precipitate it conveniently into the doctrine 
that the way to ascertain the truth about anything, whether in the realms of exact 
knowledge, in the purple zone of the fine arts or in the empyrean reaches of 
metaphysics, is to take a vote upon it, and [to insist] that the way to propagate that 
truth, once it has been ascertained and proclaimed by lawful authority, is with a 
club.195  
 
A fierce critic though hardly an opponent of democracy, Mencken used his acerbic wit to 
try to force his fellow citizens to question the legitimacy of the customs, conventions and 
convictions that governed their lives. He did not expect to inspire much change, and he 
knew that his antics were seldom appreciated. But that did not diminish his zeal for 
hammering against the establishment.  
 Mencken was a provocateur, and such is the role of the cynic in any era: he or she 
uses sneers, sarcasm, and shocking language and behavior to jolt others into reacting to 
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critical claims about their societies and about themselves. This role is an admirable one, 
and in a democracy it serves the valuable purpose of confronting citizens with important, 
if often unwanted, truths about their social and political culture. Yet it is also, I have 
argued, a role that has limits when it comes to prompting substantial social and political 
change. This is, to some extent, due to the rudeness of the cynics‟ rhetorical practices. 
Mencken‟s truths were frequently rude in the common sense of the word, as he used 
insulting and offensive language to catch the attention of his audience knowing full well 
that his methods would meet with at least as much disapproval as the truths that he told. 
And, unsurprisingly, his readers often responded with anger not only to what he said but 
also to how he said it; in fact, they were particularly prone to responding to him as a 
polemical public figure, and in this sense his offensiveness sometimes eclipsed the 
significance of his truth-claims by distracting his audience from the import of the issues 
themselves. But this was what Mencken expected, and understanding why is essential to 
understanding cynic philosophy and its aims. It is through the process of seeking and then 
speaking the truth that the cynical self is manifested, and this process requires an 
audience. Mencken provoked controversy and picked fights with the American public in 
order to prove that he could live a meaningful life in honest pursuit of the truth, and his 
goal was not to motivate others to take up his practices, nor was it to push them to act 
collectively in answer to the lies and the hypocrisy that he exposed. Rather, Mencken 
proudly paraded his heterodoxy in the face of his peers in order to showcase his self-
reliance and his capacity to live well without their approval. His thinking here was 
heavily influenced by his reading of Nietzsche, whom he said “preaches a mighty crusade 
against all those ethical ideas which teach a man to sacrifice himself for the theoretical 
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good of his inferiors.”196 Ultimately, Mencken provoked controversy not to try to change 
his society but to be true to himself by reorienting his relation to it.  
 Foucault has argued that cynicism, in essence, amounts to a practice “of truth-
telling, of truth-telling without shame or fear, of unrestricted and courageous truth-telling, 
of truth-telling which pushes its courage and boldness to the point that it becomes 
intolerable insolence.”197 This is an apt description of the philosophy, but it is important 
to remember that the cynic always works to toe the line of intolerability such that he or 
she provokes reactions (and sometimes anger) from others but is never cast out of society 
altogether because the practice of truth-telling requires an audience. And, although 
Mencken sought to reorient his relation to his society by confronting it he did so not only 
out of respect for his own truths but also out of respect for truth itself; he did not expect 
to generate widespread change, but his provocative non-conformism did have a purpose 
that reached beyond caring for his own person. For the practicing cynic, caring for the 
self and caring for the truth and the freedom to speak it go hand in hand, and although the 
philosophy is self-centered it is this aspect that gives cynicism a wider socio-political 
significance. Mencken maintained that his practice of truth-telling would meet with 
resistance not only because of his choice of language (though he acknowledged that the 
overt rudeness of his rhetoric could, and would, upset his audience) but also because he 
was convinced that the “truth, to the overwhelming majority of mankind, is 
indistinguishable from a headache.”198 Most people, Mencken argued, fear the truth and 
consequently tend to avoid it—this is why he was determined to make it very hard for 
them to avoid him.  
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 How does this compare to the outspoken non-conformist of Self-Reliance? 
Emerson (whose work Nietzsche admired) also takes on the role of a provocateur in this 
essay, and he does so for reasons similar to those of the cynics. “For non-conformity,” 
Emerson writes, “the world whips you with its displeasure,” but he goes on to conclude 
that “to be great is to be misunderstood” and that to brave the costs of the world‟s 
displeasure by adopting a life lived in aversion to conformity is to adopt a better way of 
life.199 Like Mencken, Emerson‟s aim in speaking the rude truth was not to incite 
widespread social or political reform but rather to affirm his own independence and 
individuality by asking us, as members of his audience, to consider the state of our own. 
His motto, like Mencken‟s, might have gone something like this: to be all that you can be 
you can‟t be like everybody else, and you have to make sure everybody knows it. 
“Henceforward I am the truth‟s,” Emerson announces, followed by the assertion that “I 
must be myself [and] I cannot break myself any longer for you.”200 This is a provocative 
statement, and one that is closely aligned with cynic philosophy. Emerson breaks with his 
society‟s expectations in honor of the truth because those expectations would otherwise 
break him—they would prevent him from becoming his true self by telling him what that 
self should be like. And the fact that he does not expect his society to appreciate his non-
conformity has as much to do with the nature of the truths that he seeks and tells as it 
does with his act of defiance.  
 For Emerson, becoming self-reliant also entails learning to see, act and live 
against the grain, and like Mencken he takes it upon himself as a writer to tell us this 
even though he does not expect us to want to hear it. Indeed, he also expects us to be 
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afraid of what he has to say. “We [have] become timorous, desponding whimperers,” 
Emerson writes of his society, “[and we] are afraid of truth, afraid of fortune, afraid of 
death, and afraid of each other.”201 On what grounds does he make this claim? Invoking 
the injunction to „Trust Thyself,‟ Emerson outlines the risks that we, as individuals living 
within communities of others, may face when seeking out truths about our societies and 
ourselves. Firstly, we might be subjected to „the rage of the multitude‟ and face scorn, 
contempt or worse from our peers who do not want to hear the truths that we have to tell. 
Emerson acknowledges that this possibility understandably generates anxiety and the 
tendency to avoid the truth altogether.202 But he argues that the other “terror that scares us 
from self-trust is our consistency, a reverence for our past act or word,” and he is 
adamant that “with consistence a great soul simply has nothing to do.”203 Those 
individuals who crave consistency do so not out of fear of social reprisal but because they 
fear losing hold of their capacity to understand and to make sense of themselves and to be 
known and understood by others. What Emerson is getting at here is that we, his 
audience, are afraid of finding out the truths of ourselves because we are afraid that in 
leaving our „old‟ selves behind we might realize that we no longer „know‟ ourselves, and 
that we have also become unknown to others in our communities. At root, the craving for 
consistency derives from a fear of change. And this is a fear that Emerson takes most 
seriously and which informs Cavell‟s reading of Self-Reliance.   
 This is important because it speaks to Emerson‟s understanding of his task as a 
writer, and to Cavell‟s interest in Emerson as a provocative writer. Emerson, as Cavell 
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reads him, wanted to be heard, not only for his own sake but also for ours. As Emerson 
writes of his contemporaries:  
Well, most men have bound their eyes with one or another handkerchief, 
and attached themselves to [some] community of opinion. This conformity 
makes them not false in a few particulars, authors of a few lies, but false in 
all particulars. Their two is not the real two, their four not the real four; so 
that every word they say chagrins us and we know not where to set them 
right.204  
 
This is a profoundly cynical statement, and one that Cavell has claimed to find „chilling.‟ 
But it is also a statement that has fueled Cavell‟s thinking on Emerson and on skepticism 
and moral perfectionism. For Cavell, Emerson‟s statement „that every word they say 
chagrins us‟ challenges the bases of human intelligibility and belief, and evidences the 
threat of skepticism, because it prompts us to doubt anything and possibly everything that 
we have claimed to „know‟ about ourselves, or our friends, or our enemies, or our 
society. And, in doing so it prompts us to wonder whether we can ever really „know‟ 
anything about any of these things (or anything at all). But Cavell also reminds us that 
this doubt need not empty our world of meaning. By pushing us to question what we 
know, Emerson‟s provocation in Self-Reliance can—and in Cavell‟s case does—generate 
a response to this doubt, and may encourage us to cultivate a richer understanding of 
ourselves, others and the world. Emerson embraced a self-reliant style of life because he 
wanted to be himself, to discover who that self was and who it might become, and this is 
something that his society‟s desire for conformity stood in the way of. Yet following 
Cavell, I think Emerson also wanted to ask us, as his readers, to listen carefully to his 
rude truths because he was sure he was saying something not only about himself but also 
about us, about the nature of living in common with others.  
                                                        
204 Ibid. 137. 
   
 
 113 
 Cavell argues “that it is a principal object of Emerson‟s thinking to urge a 
reconsideration of the relation („the‟ relation?) of soul and society, especially as regards 
the sense of priority of one over the other.”205 What Cavell means to call attention to here 
is the importance of re-considering this relation, of keeping this process of questioning 
open rather than closed. This is something that furthers his claim that Emerson‟s writing 
is philosophical because his prose simultaneously questions his audience and itself (and 
himself), not as a means of resolving differences between them but as a means of seeking 
to better understand what makes them different, and what can bring them together and 
drive them apart. Emerson, Cavell argues, suggests “the idea of philosophy as a way of 
life…[and reminds] us that the power of questioning our lives, in, say, our judgments of 
what we call their necessities, and their rights and goods, is in the scope of every human 
being (of those, at any rate, free to talk about their lives and modify them).”206 And 
Emerson‟s Self-Reliance, Cavell proposes, is a work of philosophy. Indeed, he claims that 
Emerson, along with Henry David Thoreau, should be credited with laying the building 
blocks of American philosophy in and of itself. 207 This is a claim that has met with some 
resistance, for although Emerson is widely recognized as one of the early leaders of 
American letters, the lasting effects of his writing upon the nation‟s social and political 
culture remain matters of controversy today.208 The writer John Updike, for example, has 
likened Emerson‟s „philosophy‟ to one of „righteous selfishness,‟ and numerous critics 
have accused him of propagating, among other things, the „sin of pride.‟209 My aim in 
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mentioning this is not to debate the details of Emerson or Thoreau‟s respective 
philosophic legacies, nor is it to enter into a wider discussion of what constitutes a 
distinctly American philosophy. Rather, I would simply like to emphasize that, like 
Diogenes and Mencken, Emerson was a provocateur whose staunch individualism and 
iconoclasm have contributed substantially to his mixed critical reception over the years. 
 Of course, Emerson does not fit the model of the cynic in full. He was not prone 
to using off-color humor and other outrageous or sensationalist tactics to capture the 
attention of his readers, nor was he as quick to dismiss the possibility that his criticism 
might inspire others to change their ways. Society, according to the cynics, is always a 
lost cause, since by nature it subverts the independence of the individual, and in doing so 
constrains the creativity, the capacity for expression, and the health and happiness of the 
human self. Like Diogenes, Mencken remained doubtful about his (or anyone‟s) capacity 
to orchestrate a significant shift in his social and political culture, and he saw no reason 
why he should be held responsible for proposing concrete solutions to the concerns that 
he raised: “My business is not prognosis, but diagnosis. I am not engaged in therapeutics, 
but in pathology.”210 Although Mencken did not deny that human societies can and do 
undergo change, he was adamant that a basic dichotomy pitting society against the 
individual, and the majority against the minority, would always remain. And to some 
extent, he blamed very the nature of the human species for this. “As animals go,” 
Mencken maintained, “man is botched and ridiculous. Few other brutes are so stupid or 
so cowardly. The commonest yellow dog has far sharper senses and is infinitely more 
courageous, not to say more honest and dependable.”211 Even taking into account 
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Mencken‟s penchant for hyperbole, such a vision is, to say the least, predicated upon a 
conception of human nature that overstates the fixity of its structures and understates its 
capacity for creativity and for surprising actions and reactions. In this sense, what his 
cynicism fails to properly consider are the myriad ways in which human beings can and 
do relate to, and care for, one another and for the world, and the role that conventions 
play in orchestrating these relations.   
 For Cavell, Emerson‟s self-reliance entails turning towards one‟s society in 
conversation-confrontation, and he does not foreclose the possibility that his society 
might turn towards him to acknowledge what he has to say. Indeed, as Cavell notes, “if 
(Emerson) believed that his audience could not turn to him, it would be folly for him to 
write as he does. As it would be folly if he believed that he was not subject to the same 
failings as they.”212 But Emerson did declare his intent to „go upright and vital, and to 
speak the rude truth‟ in the face of his society‟s displeasure, and he did so in order to 
prove his commitment to the truth and to being true to himself, commitments that 
necessarily set him apart from his community and that he shared with Diogenes and 
Mencken. And I would like to highlight the value that Cavell places on Emerson as a 
thinker and writer who not only shares his thoughts and experiences with his society but 
who also dares to humble, chasten and shame his readers into reacting and responding to 
what he has to say.213 (Again, something that Emerson shares with the cynics.) Cavell 
proposes that we, as his audience, might learn from the experience of being humbled, 
chastened or shamed to question our society and ourselves and to respond to one another 
and affirm our relations rather than reject them. Cynics like Mencken embrace practices 
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of truth-telling as a means of asserting their individuality, but Cavell suggests that such 
practices can also be inclusive rather than purely exclusive: once provoked, we, as 
individual beings, can question ourselves but also each other, and Cavell commends the 
conversational aspect of turning towards one‟s society that cynicism ignores.  
 While cynic philosophy harbors some elements of skepticism (understood in the 
most general sense as a stance of questioning that denies the human capacity to know 
anything with certainty about ourselves or others or the world), Cavellian skepticism 
aims to show us what our practice of questioning can teach us. “At the bottom of all 
philosophy,” Mencken asserts, “of all science and of all thinking, you will find the one 
all-inclusive question: How is man to tell truth from error? The ignorant man solves this 
problem in a very simple manner: he holds that whatever he believes, he knows; and that 
whatever he knows is true.”214 Human beings, Mencken claimed, have a strong tendency 
to equate what they believe with what they know, and what they know with the truth, and 
he argued that it is not the truth that they want but the illusion of certainty. “The public,” 
Mencken contended, “with its mob yearning to be instructed, edified and pulled by the 
nose, demands certainties; it must be told definitely and a bit raucously that this is true 
and that this is false. But there are no certainties.”215 For Mencken doubt was sacrosanct, 
but he claimed that ignorance had and always and will always make a mockery of the 
American public because the vast majority of human beings do not want to question the 
beliefs that they already hold. Mencken insisted that to live in accordance with the truth, 
and hence to live freely and honestly, was the only way to live with the dignity that the 
human self deserves. And it is this aspect of cynic philosophy that Cavell‟s work on 
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skepticism builds upon by further exploring, in the absence of certainty, what possible 
grounds are available to us, as individual beings and as a society, to make sense of and 
find meaning in our lives by acknowledging what we share in common with others. 
From cynicism to Cavellian skepticism 
 
Cavell shares with the cynics the basic skeptical assumption that human beings 
cannot know anything with certainty. Yet unlike the cynics, he takes as keen an interest 
in the human drive to deny certainty (that is, to challenge the bases of all human 
knowledge and belief) as he does in the quest to affirm it. Investigating the realms of 
human knowledge and belief that lie between these two poles, Cavell gives a more 
nuanced assessment of the role that doubt plays in human understanding and 
intelligibility than Diogenes and Mencken do, and he argues that the „true‟ or extreme 
skeptic‟s position is as dogmatic as that of the „true believer.‟ (Mencken hailed 
skepticism as the hallmark of the higher mind, a position that Cavell would, I think, take 
issue with.) For Cavell, both positions avoid the „messy‟ aspects of knowledge and of the 
concept of the truth—the fact that we do not always have the evidence to „prove‟ things, 
or that we do not agree with others on the evidence that is presented and do not want to 
believe it. But Cavell does not discount the power of these positions to influence human 
thought and understanding and action (or lack thereof). Indeed, he takes them quite 
seriously, particularly the position of the skeptic, to which I will now turn. 
 According to Cavell, skepticism can be seen as more than a challenge to the quest 
for certainty; it is symptomatic of a greater drive to reject what we share with others as 
sufficient evidence of the reality of who we are and what we are responsible for. The 
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skeptic‟s questioning at once produces and is a product of disappointment with, and 
distrust of, the world and others and the self that human beings may experience—it is a 
response to the fact that our relationships with others and the world may be vulnerable, 
and that by extension we ourselves are vulnerable. This realization, Cavell notes, can be 
frightening, and it is “why the skeptic‟s knowledge, should we feel its power, is 
devastating: he is not challenging a particular belief or set of beliefs about, say, other 
minds; he is challenging the ground of our beliefs altogether, our powers to believe at 
all.”216 The skeptic‟s position, then, is truly isolating in its extreme form, as it denies our 
ability to understand anything and, by extension, to account for or be accountable for 
anything we say or do. This need not, however, be cause for despair, and the aim of 
Cavell‟s work on skepticism is to demonstrate what its practice of questioning can 
actually tell us about our world, and about others and ourselves. When we choose to put 
aside isolation by engaging the skeptic‟s questions, Cavell argues that we are able to 
realize that “[i]n questioning our knowledge, doubting it, we see what our everyday 
relationship with the world consists in.” 217 In fact, doubting and affirming our 
knowledge, ourselves and the world go hand in hand in Cavell‟s his definition of „living 
our skepticism,‟ which entails questioning our selves and our relationships to see what 
they provide us with rather than to emphasize everything that they lack.  
 The skeptic‟s concerns can thus be addressed in another light: we can see that the 
practice of questioning how much we can „know‟ is related to the question of how much 
we want to know and what we are willing to allow ourselves to find out. Cavell turns the 
skeptic‟s position back upon itself to probe further into the human desire to deny the 
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commitments and cares we do have. What we may call Cavellian skepticism, or „living‟ 
skepticism, constitutes a mode of living that is built upon a practice of challenging the 
limits of what we, as individual beings, can know about our selves, about others, and 
about the world that we share. Its objective, however, is not to dwell on these limits. 
Rather, Cavell invites us to consider what such a process of questioning can show us 
about what we do know and understand and care for in the world around us. On this 
subject, Cavell states the following: “My interest, it could be said, lies in finding out what 
my beliefs mean, and learning the particular ground they occupy. This is not the same as 
providing evidence for them. One could say that it is a matter of making them 
evident.”218 What insight about our lives, Cavell asks, can be gained through the process 
of engaging the skeptic in his or her practice of questioning? In the absence of certainty 
about the presence of other minds or the existence of the world, what is it is that we 
nevertheless do know about ourselves and our lives? In his endorsement of „living 
skepticism,‟ Cavell argues that although skeptical doubt unsettles our understanding of, 
among other things, the existence of the world, it need not divest our understanding of the 
world or our lives of meaning. While the „true‟ or extreme skeptic would argue that 
nothing can be certain, Cavell claims that the act or process of questioning our 
knowledge does not have to empty the world of meaning because meaning and caring are 
not based on certainty but rather on the actual experience of having and recognizing 
commitments and cares. 
 Thus, Cavell does not aim to refute skepticism. Instead, he acknowledges that 
human beings can never be completely free from the doubt that drives it (or that derives 
from it). Instead, what he does aim to do is highlight the extent to which this doubt can 
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push us, as separate beings, to test the strengths of our relationships with others and the 
world in order to find out what they are, in fact, comprised of. “My object,” Cavell 
argues, “is not to answer the questions, „What, or who, is the skeptic?‟ What is the power 
of his position?‟; it is an attempt to show why those questions are worth asking.”219 To 
live one‟s skepticism requires accepting the fact that self-knowledge is not grounded in 
certainty, and what its practices of questioning reveal is the extent to which we can (and 
already do) make sense of and find meaning in our lives. Cavell argues that individual 
fears and anxieties over what we can and cannot know about our relations with others and 
with the world ultimately derive from fears and anxieties over what we do and do not 
know about ourselves. “Knowing oneself,” Cavell attests, “is the capacity…for placing-
oneself-in-the-world,” but embracing this capacity, he admits, requires courage, and he 
insists that it is something each of us must work at.220 To „place-oneself-in-the-world,‟ 
Cavell argues, is to take stock of one‟s existence by accounting for one‟s life experiences; 
it entails troubling the boundaries of one‟s knowledge through a practice of questioning 
that leads to a clearer understanding of the ways in which our attunements with others 
and the world shed light on the depths of our own selves. And, to „place-oneself-in-the-
world‟ demands that we accept the fact that our understanding of our lives, and of 
ourselves, will always lack totality. Put another way, Cavell suggests that „knowing 
oneself‟ requires, somewhat paradoxically, that we admit that self-knowledge is not built 
upon certainty, and that our understanding of ourselves is never complete. Still, he 
maintains that although we may not be able to prove with certainty whether (or how or 
why) we or others or the world exists, the sense of confusion that such a realization can 
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produce is something that we can understand—it is something intelligible, and it is 
something that is (potentially) communicable to others. For Cavell, “what skepticism 
suggests is that since we cannot know the world exists, its presentness to us cannot be a 
function of knowing. The world is to be accepted; as the presentness of other minds is not 
to be known, but acknowledged.”221  
 According to Cavell, then, the human being‟s essential relation to the world is one 
of acknowledgment rather than knowledge, which he describes as an acceptance (or an 
admission, or a confession) of what we do understand, or of what is intelligible, about 
ourselves and about others and the world. Cavell‟s work in and on ordinary language 
philosophy undergirds his arguments here, and I will elaborate on the connections 
between skepticism and this subject shortly. But for the moment, suffice it to say that 
Cavell insists that an absence of proof for what we claim to know does not leave us 
without the means to make sense of, or to care about, our lives. As Hilary Putnam has 
noted, Cavell is “concerned to make us see something that troubles the skeptic, 
something that can and should give us a sense of „vertigo‟ at certain times, without 
causing us either to become skeptics or to find illusory comfort in [an] over-
intellectualized response.”222 What ultimately interests Cavell is how we each, as 
individual beings, respond to such moments of „vertigo‟ or confusion, moments when the 
grounds of our understanding and beliefs have been seriously shaken. Avoidance 
constitutes one mode of response, and Cavell is sensitive to the temptation, and even the 
allure, of turning away from that which agitates our understanding, and, hence, our sense 
of „self.‟ But as he reminds us, there is another possible response, one that can potentially 
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reap more satisfying rewards than avoidance. We might also, when faced with „vertigo,‟ 
take the chance of acknowledging and even confronting that which is unsettling, a move 
that could lead to personal transformation. It is in the province of his work on this second 
mode of response that Cavell‟s thought is most closely aligned with the philosophy of 
cynicism. And it is also, I argue, where he reaches beyond cynicism to provide a more 
hopeful vision for the future prospects of American democracy. 
The importance of the ordinary 
 
Cavell‟s reflections on skepticism are tied to his thinking about ordinary language 
philosophy and, more specifically, to his readings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. 
Austin. So, although a detailed discussion of his treatment of this branch of philosophy is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, an introduction to his writing on the subject is in order. 
What ordinary language philosophy teaches us, Cavell argues, is that although human 
understanding starts with the individual self, this is not because the self is more important 
than the community, but rather because accepting one‟s individuality is essential to 
understanding our connections and commitments to any community whatsoever. For 
Cavell, human understanding proceeds from the private to the public, but he is adamant 
that what we think or say or do demands acknowledgment from an audience of others if it 
is to register as meaning anything at all. Thus, his concern for the state of the self is 
inextricably intertwined with his concerns for community, and for the possibilities and 
responsibilities that our connections with others bestow upon us. Cavell lays out the 
critical task of the ordinary language philosopher as follows: “his problem is to discover 
the specific plight of mind and circumstance within which a human being gives voice to 
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his conditions.”223 Yet the meaning of this proposition is not immediately obvious—we 
must still ask what it is that the ordinary language philosopher is trying to discover, and 
why he or she endeavors to discover it. The key elements of the statement that need to be 
parsed out are the philosopher‟s focus on the specificity of the mind, the fact that this 
mind is in a „plight‟ due to (and thus is troubled by) a particular circumstance, and the 
importance of the mind‟s (and the self‟s) efforts to „give voice‟ to its concerns. Before 
working through these elements, however, we must first establish the bases for Cavell‟s 
interest in ordinary language more generally so as to establish his reasons for privileging 
its philosophical function. 
 Cavell argues that it is through the use of ordinary (or common) language, “words 
free of philosophical occupation,” that human beings come to understand not only the 
world and other beings but also, and more importantly, their own selves.224 Questions of 
self-knowledge, he claims, lie at the heart of all philosophical problems, and he runs 
through various discussions on ordinary language to consider the ways in which the 
human self comes into being, or gets its bearings, in the world, by putting commonly 
shared words to use in making sense of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and actions.225 Our 
ordinary words and concepts (or criteria) are those that do not require special information 
or identifications to make sense of—we learn what they mean by learning them alongside 
our experiences with others in the world. (To offer a basic example, we learn what pain 
and hope and sadness mean as we experience them and as we work to relate to others and 
share this experience through our shared use of language. Without the experience of the 
sensations that they produce we could not learn the concepts because we could never 
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understand them. Thus, what it is like to actually experience pain or hope or sadness 
could never be explained to us by supplying a missing piece of information). For Cavell, 
we learn ordinary language and our worlds side by side, and we are each responsible for 
making connections between the two, or for thinking through the ways that our 
understanding of our language illuminates our understanding of our relations with other 
beings and our place (or places) in the world. Sometimes we fail to make these 
connections accurately or intelligibly, and sometimes the realization of such a failure 
causes us to cast doubt upon the bases of our knowledge and our capacity to know about 
anything at all. Yet Cavell maintains that the sense of disconnect (and discomfort and 
fear) that the experience of this failure can produce is a natural one, and that it reminds us 
that our knowledge of ourselves, like our knowledge of others and of the world, is always 
partial and incomplete. Human understanding, he contends, depends upon shared 
agreements, or attunements, in language and culture, and these agreements can—and 
sometimes should—break down. 
 Cavell argues via ordinary language philosophy that human beings, as separate 
and individual creatures, are initiated into an inherited and shared system of language and 
they depend on this system in order to learn anything at all. This is why the learning of 
ordinary language and the learning of the world go hand in hand. As Espen Hammer 
explains, for Cavell, to come to know what a thought, a feeling, a belief, or an action 
actually is, we must learn to master each of their respective concepts in our native tongue; 
when we master the concepts, we understand the phenomena they represent.226 It is, then, 
through our mastery of ordinary language that we can come to recognize what our 
                                                        
226 Espen Hammer, Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the Ordinary (Cambridge, MA: Polity 
Press, 2002), 11. 
   
 
 125 
thoughts and feelings and beliefs tell us about what we do (and do not) know about our 
selves and our world. And it is also through our use of ordinary language and concepts 
that we can assert or give voice to our thoughts, feelings and beliefs, and thus make them 
evident to others. But Cavell contends that, despite the fact that ordinary language is 
systematic and that its systems permit human beings to make sense of the world and to 
express themselves through shared or common words and concepts, its mechanisms 
harbor an undeniable element of freedom. Our selection of words and concepts in a given 
situation or circumstance involves a measure of independent choice, and the ways in 
which we use them grammatically can play a critical role in the intelligibility of our 
assertions. “Knowing something,” Cavell proposes, “is ineluctably a matter of aligning 
concepts with the world; and it must be a problem whether any given instance of the 
failure of knowledge is a failure to have got the concept right or the world right.” 227 
Language, Cavell argues, is flexible and can change and adapt, but only to a point. One of 
the difficulties in using language is that we don‟t always know in advance where that 
point will land; when testing the boundaries of our grammar we sometimes find that we 
have pushed them too far and have crossed beyond the realms of intelligibility. Such 
moments cause confusion (for ourselves and for others), because we do not always know 
whether it is our words or our knowledge of the world that has failed us—neither does 
our audience. Still, Cavell contends that such moments, though unsettling, can present us 
with further opportunities for thinking about the connections between our language, our 
worlds and our selves, and for learning more about them. They can push us to question 
why our understanding of the ordinary has failed us, and how we might respond to such 
failures.  
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 Thus, as Sandra Laugier has argued, for the ordinary language philosopher, “the 
adequacy of language to reality—the truth of language—is not to be constructed or 
proven: it is to be shown in language and its uses.”228 Cavell works to demonstrate the 
ways in which the self comes into being through expressions that are conditioned by 
ordinary language and culture and hence are dependent upon participation in a life lived 
with (and understood and recognized by) other beings. Yet to say that one‟s expressions 
are conditioned does not indicate that the human self or its thoughts, feelings, beliefs and 
actions are determined. Despite Cavell‟s emphasis on the fact that human beings are born 
into language and culture, he sees neither language nor culture as rigid entities; they are 
no more fixed, „whole‟ or „complete‟ than we are as individual selves, and like us they 
are open to transformation. Language and culture are also, he argues, reliant upon our 
preservation, and, like living beings, they can evolve and die out. As Richard Eldridge 
notes: 
Nothing within ordinary thinking or linguistic practice guarantees its 
continuation; how it goes on is up to us, we who are initiated into it and go 
on within and from it, and this can seem terrifying. Yet ordinary thinking 
and linguistic practice are necessary media for the presence of things to 
discursively thinking, judgmental subjects, and we do not have the power 
to alter prior patterns of language and thought tout court… These patterns 
have a certain sway over us, and this too seems terrifying.229  
 
What Eldridge highlights here is the tension that exists between our abilities to alter or 
adjust the foundations of our systems of language and culture (and, hence, our own 
understanding), and our reliance upon the continuing existence and reliability of these 
very systems if we do not want to altogether uproot our senses of both self and 
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community. Though we can shift the limits of intelligibility, we are responsible for 
establishing and maintaining a ground upon which our intelligibility and our 
understanding can rest. And this is quite a responsibility, for the vitality of our shared 
language and culture, like our shared relationships, requires active participation and 
maintenance if they are to continue to provide us with any means to know or to care 
about whether we, or a world, exist.  
 Though Cavell maintains that we inherit ordinary (or native) languages from 
those who come before us, he does not mean to suggest that language or culture ensure 
that we will take an interest in, or care for, the state of our relations with one another, or 
with the world or our selves. Taking an interest or caring is, rather, something that each 
of us must decide to do. It is also, Cavell argues, something that we can, though will at 
times fail, to do. Our attunements in language and culture, like our relationships with 
others, are dependent upon the extent to which we work to maintain them in the face of 
circumstances that are at times beyond our control. Our language, culture and relations 
are all vulnerable to disintegration or destruction, for their existence depends upon our 
capacity to take an interest in them and to care for the continued existence of our selves 
and others as members of communities in a shared world. Stephen Mulhall summarizes 
Cavell‟s thoughts on the precariousness of human relations neatly:  
if the ground of the inheritability of language, the basis of the continued existence 
of the speech community and its members, is the capacity of human beings to see 
and hear themselves in the words and deeds of other human beings, then the 
continuance of that community cannot be guaranteed either by nature or grammar; 
it rests solely upon our capacity to take and maintain an interest in one another 
and in ourselves.230  
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For Cavell, human beings are initiated into the world through our attunements with others 
and our innate capacities to form connections and to communicate and otherwise express 
our thoughts and feelings and beliefs; indeed, these attunements produce the histories that 
give shape to our actions and experiences. But he holds that our attunements are 
dependent upon the extent to which we are able to sustain our relationships, and they are 
always threatened by the possibility that our connections may disintegrate and our 
abilities to understand one another may fail us. This, for Cavell, is a threat that we must 
not attempt to eradicate but rather learn to manage as best we can.  
 To return, then, to the ordinary language philosopher‟s essential task (which sets 
up Cavell‟s thinking as a philosopher), we can now begin to analyze the various elements 
of the problem he identifies. What does the practice of ordinary language philosophy 
really entail for Cavell? What can we learn from it? It entails discovering and bringing to 
light the potential points or moments at which one‟s sense of self is disrupted or disturbed 
by a moment of „vertigo,‟ when we reach for our ordinary concepts to make sense of this 
experience and to voice our concerns to others. It is worth quoting Hammer at length on 
this subject: 
We can now see more clearly what Cavell wants to achieve by the 
proposition that ordinary language philosophy is about whatever ordinary 
language is about. As opposed to science, its aim is not to gather relevant 
but hitherto unknown facts for explanatory purposes. Nor is it to 
understand how language functions, though this may of itself, of course, 
be of great significance. Rather, the situation in which humans find 
themselves urged to engage in the kind of reflection that Cavell 
recommends is one in which, despite the presence of all relevant facts, 
they feel puzzled by what they confront.231 
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We, as separate and individual beings, realize the significance of ordinary language and 
of our attunements and the relations that they facilitate in those moments of vertigo when, 
despite our knowledge of all the relevant facts, our understanding of the world, and of 
ourselves, is shaken. It is in such moments, Cavell argues, that “we begin to feel, or ought 
to, terrified that maybe language (and understanding and knowledge) rests upon very 
shaky ground—a thin net over an abyss.”232 But it is also in these moments that we can 
appeal to our ordinary language and concepts for help. They cannot prove our position 
but they can help us to make sense of the particular experience (and the experience of 
particularity) that such feelings of vertigo elicit, and as such they can give us the words to 
„give voice‟ to our experiences and concerns. For Cavell, our shared linguistic and 
cultural expressions are the tools with which we each „give voice‟ to ourselves as 
individual creatures living within communities. But in order for each or any of us to 
effectively voice our particular concerns, it is also imperative that the other members of 
our communities understand or can make sense of our expressions. As Eldridge has 
explained, for Cavell “giving voice implies not just brute discharge alone, but further a 
making intelligible of how the human condition is present in one who has been moved to 
speak. Nor will just any speech do; giving voice implies an achievement of 
expressiveness that is beyond the communication of bits of information about the 
material world.”233 What it implies is an achievement of expressiveness about us, as 
individual beings and as members of groups or communities.  
 Cavell insists that it is vital to the ordinary language philosopher‟s problem that 
the mind in question has been moved, or provoked, to „give voice‟ to itself by the 
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experience of a troubling moment, one in which the sense of having a „place‟ in the 
world, a place that is with others but is also one‟s own, has been threatened or disrupted. 
We must be moved, or troubled or shaken, in order to really need to speak and to assert 
ourselves, and to try to differentiate as well as to see the connections between the „I‟ and 
the „we.‟ Indeed, it is “this aspect,” Cavell proposes, “of the moment of morality—in 
which a crisis forces an examination of one‟s life that calls for a transformation or 
reorienting of it—[that] is the province of what I emphasize as moral perfectionism…[It 
emphasizes] that aspect of moral choice having to do, as it is sometimes put, with being 
true to oneself, or as Michel Foucault has put the view, caring for the self.”234 Each of us, 
as individual beings, can choose to avoid or to turn away from the questions that such 
crises provoke or, alternately, we can choose to acknowledge them by actively examining 
what our lack of certainty about ourselves, and about others and the world, can teach us. 
There is a tension, Cavell argues, between the human creature‟s capacities to at times 
accept and at times question (and possibly reject) the systems of language through which 
we are able to make sense of and discover meaning in our worlds. And there is also, 
Cavell insists, a tension between our abilities to make sense of ourselves and of others as 
separate members of the human communities we are nevertheless a part of, and which we 
must maintain if we are to maintain our sense of independence and of „self.‟  
 My aim next will be to highlight the significance of what Cavell indicates is the 
necessity (or the irrefutability) of these tensions which sustain and enable and constrain 
human life—tensions between the known and the unknown, between intelligibility and 
unintelligibility, between what is separate and what is common, and between 
acknowledgement and avoidance. Cavell suggests that an appreciation of the necessity, 
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but also the elusiveness, of the ordinary (of the words and concepts and grammar that we 
cannot help but understand, but that cannot always supply us with meaning in moments 
of confusion) is key to understanding and appreciating these tensions. What he is 
ultimately concerned to show us is that the choices we each, as individuals, make in 
dealing with these tensions, and in particular the tension between acknowledgement and 
avoidance, have substantial ethical, social and political implications.  
Understanding acknowledgment and avoidance 
 
Cavell uses ordinary language philosophy to argue that there are words and 
concepts and attunements, and hence aspects of our lives, that we cannot help but share 
with others and understand. But he also argues that there are situations in which we can 
choose to acknowledge or to avoid what we share in common, and what we do and do not 
know about ourselves and our world, and that the consequences of our choices can 
impact our lives as well as the lives of others and the world that we share. I must 
emphasize, however, that in focusing on individual choices Cavell is by no means 
insinuating that our choices are not shaped or impacted (and sometimes compromised) by 
external social, political or even environmental forces. His point is that even though they 
often are this does not divest us of our responsibility, as individuals, for taking an interest 
in, and caring for, the choices that we do make and the actions that we do take. Indeed, 
recognizing the role that external forces play in shaping our understanding of ourselves 
and of our communities and the world is critical to appreciating the significance of what 
Cavell proposes is the tension between acknowledgement and avoidance in human life. 
As Timothy Gould has noted, “Cavell‟s investigations are twined around his interest in 
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our capacity for being the origin of our actions and for bearing up under our vulnerability 
to accidents and inadvertencies and, indeed in our ability to make something out of these 
very inadvertencies and happenstances.”235 To put it bluntly, Cavell maintains that 
although we are never entirely free agents we need not give in to the temptation to give 
up on our agency itself. 
 Yet before expanding upon what it would mean to give in to such a temptation, I 
would like to return briefly to what Cavell means by the concept of acknowledgment and 
to the way he juxtaposes it with the concept of knowledge. His use of the example of 
„being late‟ summarizes his thoughts here nicely:  
It isn‟t as if being in a position to acknowledge something is weaker than 
being in a position to know it. On the contrary: from my acknowledging 
that I am late it follows that I know I am late (which is what my words 
say); but from my knowing I am late it does not follow that I acknowledge 
I‟m late... [It is in this sense that one] could say acknowledgement goes 
beyond knowledge. (Goes beyond not, so to speak, in the order of 
knowledge, but in the requirement that I do something or reveal something 
on the basis of that knowledge).236 
 
 As I have argued, for Cavell acknowledgment can constitute an admission, or a 
confession, of what one knows, but it can also constitute other modes of response (such 
as a declaration, or even a celebration). He insists that our responses to what we know 
will not always be uniform (we will respond in different ways to different circumstances, 
and not always as others think we should, or even as we feel that we should or, 
afterwards, feel that we should have). And Cavell maintains that there are times when we 
will not respond at all, but will instead avoid (either intentionally or unintentionally) what 
we know about ourselves or others or the world. This does not, however, rob his 
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understanding of acknowledgment of its significance, and to provide one more example 
of what he means here, Cavell proposes that we consider the hypothetical circumstance of 
witnessing another person (or another living being) in pain. Upon seeing someone 
tearfully limping away from the scene of an accident, we may avoid responding (for 
many reasons) to his or her situation, but that does not mean that we do not see or 
understand that the person is experiencing pain, or is in need of help, upset or confused. 
As Cavell notes, “[if] one says that this is a failure to acknowledge another‟s suffering, 
surely this would not mean that we fail, in such cases to know that he is suffering? It may 
or may not. The point, however, is that the concept of acknowledgment is evidenced 
equally by its failure as by its success.”237  
 Of central importance to understanding the tension between acknowledgment and 
avoidance is the issue of self-knowledge and the role that each of us, as separate, 
individual beings, must play in actively probing our experiences through the use of 
language as we have learned it in and by living within and amongst groups of others. 
Cavell works to emphasize the extent to which we, as human beings, find ourselves 
capable of forming connections and communicating and expressing our thoughts and 
feelings to produce the histories that give shape to our experiences. What he suggests, 
then, is that we each, as individual beings, have the capacity to assume a stance of 
questioning, of both our selves and of others and the world, that allows us to make sense 
of and find meaning in our lives. This is not to say that we will necessarily like or enjoy 
or find satisfaction or comfort in what we make sense of, or in the meaning that we find, 
at least not always, and for some of us perhaps rarely. And it is also not to say that we 
will not at times be fooled or misled by one another, or that communication cannot break 
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down. But Cavell does argue that we will not become impossibly unintelligible to one 
another if the conventions that we share and that provide us with a basis for grounding 
our concepts in an intelligible history are recognized for the important role they play in 
communication and understanding. While a particular word or convention can cease to be 
relevant or intelligible (e.g. can cease to provide us with meaning), the fact that 
conventions exist, and the fact of the natural human tendency to convene, cannot be 
ignored. If conventions necessitate and demonstrate the necessary presence and existence 
of community and connections between people, then the awareness of them and the sense 
that they may fail us, or have been failing us, can be disconcerting to say the least. 
Despite the essential interdependence they suggest we cannot escape, the fact that they 
are not fixed or firm but rather dependent upon these shared relations illustrates the 
chance that if these relations were to disintegrate, so might our means of understanding 
what we take to be our existences. Where would this leave us? This can work in more 
than one way, of course, but it can have the effect of highlighting our separation from one 
another while at the same time pointing to a measure of dependence on others that can 
equally stoke feelings of vulnerability or fears of betrayal. Still, in such situations there is 
room for this questioning to be productive in the sense of generating further questions 
without necessarily drowning us in despair. 
 It is important for Cavell that we, as individual beings, realize that we can and do 
make choices between acknowledgment and avoidance in the various circumstances we 
find ourselves faced with over the course of our lives. To say that we can and do make 
such choices is not to say that we always can or do. Such an argument would tailspin into 
its own kind of dogmatism, akin to the kind experienced by the „true‟ skeptic and the 
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believer in Truth. But for Cavell, the skeptic and the „true believer‟ both avoid 
responsibility for what they say and do in the world, the first by eschewing certainty and 
the second by clinging to it. The skeptic argues that because we cannot know anything 
with certainty, whether it pertains to knowledge about ourselves, or about others and the 
world, we can never know what we are or not responsible for. And the „true believer‟ 
argues that because everything is certain in the world, we cannot control or be held 
responsible for anything that happens, since everything that happens is preordained. The 
skeptic‟s concerns can then be addressed or challenged in another light: it is not a matter 
of questioning how much we can know about the existence of the world, or others, or 
ourselves, but a matter of questioning how much we want to know and what we are 
willing to allow ourselves to find out. We doubt our capacity to know whether the other 
is suffering to avoid accepting the possibility that this pain could in fact be real, that our 
own suffering can also be real, and that we may be responsible for it or at least unable to 
ease the burdens that it imposes. Indeed, as Cavell states, “[s]kepticism about our 
knowledge of others is typically accompanied by complacency about our knowledge of 
ourselves,”238 for we choose not to believe what we already know in both instances. 
There does exist a limit to what or how much one may know at a given time, but Cavell 
implores us to make an effort to push the boundaries of this limit, to test its strength, if 
we are each to maintain a sense of what a present existence feels like, of what the having 
of cares and commitments entails.  
 This process, Cavell argues, forces us to accept our finitude and our separateness 
(though not necessarily our separation) from others and from the world, and to 
acknowledge the fact that our understanding of our lives, and of ourselves, will always 
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lack totality. Cavell is concerned with illuminating not only the possibilities for but also 
the necessity of change in human life. It is through our attunements in language that we 
make sense not only of others and of the world, but also ourselves. Our ordinary words 
can make sense even if they do not always do so, and even if the connections that we 
form through the use of ordinary language are no more grounded in certainty than the 
systems of language and communication that we acquire to make ourselves intelligible to 
one another. So, what we can learn from skepticism is that there are things that we do 
know in the absence of certainty, and that we need to question our selves, and others and 
the world, to find what out what these things are. “A „failure to know,‟” Cavell asserts, 
“might just mean a piece of ignorance, an absence of something, a blank. A „failure to 
acknowledge,‟ [by comparison, signifies] the presence of something, a confusion, an 
indifference, a callousness, an exhaustion, [or] a coldness.”239  
 As Hammer argues, in what Cavell “calls Emersonian perfectionism, he not only 
hopes to counter the selflessness of philosophy, but to demonstrate that serious reflection 
on ethics and politics requires an emphasis on the self.”240 What is at the heart of the 
matter, then, is the problem of—but also the potential for— self-knowledge in an 
uncertain world. We may learn from others, and be taught by others, but the education is 
less „received‟ than it is produced by the ways in which what we are being „taught‟ rubs 
up against or complements the concepts and criteria that we already use to make sense of 
ourselves and our worlds. “If there is a perfectionism,” Cavell suggests, it is “not only 
compatible with democracy but necessary to it, it lies not in excusing democracy for its 
inevitable failures, or looking to rise above them, but in teaching how to respond to those 
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failures, and to one‟s compromise by them, otherwise than by excuse or withdrawal.”241 
And while cynicism offers one possible mode of response, one that is decidedly 
confrontational but that certainly does not amount to a withdrawal from society, Cavell 
notes that there are others. We might, he suggests, respond with civility, and try to 
converse with one another and to work through our particular problems with the aim of 
changing our understanding of our community and of our selves.  
Doubt and democracy 
 
Cavell‟s writing on Emersonian Perfectionism does not aim to produce a 
comprehensive theory of the subject that could „compete‟ with other theories of moral 
life.242 (Indeed, he refuses to provide a formal definition of the concept, arguing that “a 
complete list of necessary and sufficient conditions for using the term” would not help his 
readers make sense of it.243) Rather, he focuses on illuminating what he calls the two 
dominant themes of Emersonian Perfectionism, both of which he culls from Emerson‟s 
preoccupation with the possibility (and the need) for invention and transformation in 
human life. “The first theme,” Cavell argues, “is that the human self—confined by itself, 
aspiring toward itself—is always becoming, as on a journey, always partially in a further 
state.”244 Emersonian perfectionism, then, describes an activity of cultivation, one in 
which the individual is provoked to see him- or herself in a new light and to consider the 
ways in which this experience of change alters his or her relations with others and with 
the world. And Cavell contends that the “second dominating theme is that the other to 
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whom I can use the words I discover in which to express myself is the Friend.”245 For 
Cavell, perfectionism constitutes an examination of one‟s life brought about by a moment 
of morality (or a moment of crisis) that demands recognition and that is provoked by 
someone (or something), but the „whom‟ (or the what) that prompts such a moment 
varies from individual to individual.246 And the „friend‟ who provokes such an 
examination may very well do so by telling us „rude‟ and unwanted truths about 
ourselves and our society, or about the particular ways in which we relate to our society 
and participate in its culture. Such a friend pushes us to face the unknown precisely by 
taking stock of what we do know about ourselves and about others and the world, and 
warns us that we may or may not like what we find when we question our knowledge and 
beliefs.  
 As Russell B. Goodman notes, “Cavell addresses „existing individuals‟ (not least 
himself), whose lives are governed by norms and claims as well as by the laws of nature, 
and who yet have the chance—indeed who cannot avoid the chance—to determine those 
lives through their own free actions.”247 And doing this is something that Cavell, drawing 
upon his reading of Emerson, argues that we may fear, because we may be afraid of what 
we can and cannot, do and do not, know about one another, our communities, and 
ultimately about our own selves. Emerson‟s work, Cavell notes, was a response to what 
he considered to be a mood of „silent melancholy‟ permeating his society, and he presses 
us to ask ourselves what might be done about it, or how we, as individuals and as a 
society, might respond to this mood and possibly assuage it. Cavell asks us to consider 
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the value of „friends‟ such as Emerson who can provoke us to change our moods, 
melancholic or otherwise. The very idea of friendship implies a bond or a connection 
(Cavell insists that the friend need not be another human being), but such a bond may not 
be based on feelings of affection in the usual sense (pleasant, comforting, etc.). In fact, he 
suggests that the friendships that trouble us are as important as those that provide us with 
a sense of love or peace or security. In either case, to enter into a friendship is to share 
something, perhaps a conversation or perhaps an argument, but it entails a sense of 
connection either way. Like Diogenes and Mencken, Emerson treats his audience with 
tough love by delivering the rude truth and asking his readers to consider the possibility 
of resisting conformity, questioning their convictions, and confronting their peers.  
 Cavell notes that in Emerson‟s  
sense of human existence, there is no question of reaching a final state of the soul 
but only an endlessly taking the next step to what Emerson calls “an unattained 
but attainable self”—a self that is always and never ours—a step that turns us not 
from bad to good, or wrong or right, but from confusion and constriction toward 
self-knowledge and sociability.248  
 
What Cavell aims to demonstrate here is that a certain practice of thinking and giving 
voice to one‟s thoughts can expose a deep and meaningful connectedness with others and 
with the worlds that we share; consequently, it can inspire individual as well as collective 
action. This connectedness places ethical responsibilities upon us that we may reject, but 
Cavell argues that rejection or avoidance is only one mode of responding to it. We can 
also acknowledge our connectedness, and to see that we strive for connection is a first 
step toward assuming a sense of ethical responsibility for others and for the world 
because of rather than despite the limits to what we can know. 
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 Hammer argues that “the hero of Cavell‟s thought in [his work on ethics and 
politics] is constantly ready for self-transformation through education and reflection: thus 
democracy becomes an ongoing task of repositioning the self in response to others.”249 
For Cavell, skepticism in the extreme (and dogmatic) form destroys the possibility of 
political engagement because the practice of continuously questioning what we can and 
cannot know is profoundly isolating. This does not mean, however, that this process of 
questioning is necessarily isolating. To the contrary, Cavell shows us that engaging in a 
practice of pushing the boundaries of one‟s knowledge, though often unnerving, can offer 
new occasions for collective action and engagement. He does not aim to propose a 
„solution‟ to the problems of democratic life. Rather, Cavell reminds us that we, as 
individuals and as a society, are responsible for either acknowledging or avoiding the 
difficulties of a life lived with others. And in doing so, Cavell provides a more hopeful 
and potentially fruitful model for political criticism (and, in a more specific sense, 
criticism of American political culture) than those offered by cynics such as Diogenes 
and Mencken. Mencken sang the praises of self-reliance and sincerity, and went about 
exposing lies and hypocrisy, but his focus was (generally) on renouncing the rationality 
of American social and political practices rather than reforming them. And exposing lies 
does little when people are committed to preserving or protecting pre-existing beliefs. 
 While cynics throughout the ages have exposed the fragility of truth in society 
and politics, they have offered very little insight as to how we might practically and 
politically work towards mitigating the threats that this fragility can pose. Cavell‟s work 
on skepticism and on Emersonian Perfectionism suggests that we might find ways to 
work together if we, as individuals, are willing to respond to one another and to take the 
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risk of speaking out in order to provoke our fellows into responding to us. Cavell has a 
reputation as an individualist, and he is, I think, an individualist at heart: he does 
ultimately place the responsibility for choosing acknowledgment over avoidance in the 
hands of each of and every one of us. But he does so under the assumption that we are all 
in this together. As members of communities, societies and the world, Cavell asks us to 
consider what we share with others as much as he encourages us to question what we 
know about ourselves. And, he dares us to consider the extent to which we care about 
what we share, about our commitments to one another and to the world, and the 
responsibilities for responding to these commitments this care places upon us.  
Conclusion: Politics, the Public and Perceptions of 
‘America’ 
 
“The misgovernment of the American people is misgovernment by the American 
people.”—Lincoln Steffens, 1904 
 
When it comes to politics today, it is often taken for granted that the American 
people are bitterly divided over just about everything, from the proper size of government 
to the scope of its powers at home and abroad. But is this really the case, and to what 
extent is public polarization to blame for the fact that political stalemate has become the 
status quo in Washington? The infighting in Congress and the open hostility between the 
executive and legislative branches do in part stem from significant ideological differences 
between the Democratic and Republican parties, and these differences do reflect a 
divergence in the political beliefs of the American electorate. Alan I. Abramowitz argue 
that “there is no question that policy differences between Democrats and Republicans 
have increased over the past several decades,” and he goes on to suggest that party 
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polarization reflects the political polarization of the American public and, in particular, 
that of citizens belonging to what he calls the „engaged public‟ (a sector of the public 
comprised of individuals who make an effort to stay informed about and active in 
political affairs).250 While Abramowitz concedes that this polarization does have some 
negative consequences (such as fostering gridlock), he claims that the size of the sector of 
„engaged‟ citizens in America is increasing and that it is incorrect to conceive of 
polarization as purely problematic for the democratic process. To the contrary, 
Abramowitz asserts that an increase in polarization is related to an increase in public 
interest in politics, and that it is indicative of the fact that “more Americans appear to be 
excited and energized by the choice between a consistently liberal Democratic Party and 
a consistently conservative Republican Party.”251 For Abramowitz, “the political attitudes 
of the engaged public resemble those of political elites”; while polarization can result in 
political gridlock, our leaders are ultimately representing the interests and beliefs of their 
constituents.252  
 Yet are we, the people, really showing an increased interest in political affairs? 
Are we passionately divided over to the state and fate of our nation and what should be 
done about it, and is this why Congress cannot seem to get anything done? Delia 
Baldassarri and Andrew Gelman have argued that “there is virtually full agreement 
among scholars that political parties and politicians, in recent decades, have become more 
ideological and more likely to take extreme positions on a broad set of political 
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issues.”253 But there is not a consensus as to whether this is reflective of an increasingly 
divided American public. Indeed, according to Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, 
investigations into the increase of popular polarization have proven largely inconclusive, 
and these authors contend that contemporary literature on the subject of mass polarization 
“provides little evidence that the hypothesized dire consequences of polarized politics (or, 
for that matter, any consequences of polarized politics), are showing up in the American 
public.”254 For Fiorina and Abrams, while politics and the parties are increasingly 
polarized, this is not necessarily a reflection of the political sentiments (or the political 
passion) of the American people as a whole. In sum, Fiorina and Abrams claim that while 
the Democratic and Republican parties (and those who identify strongly with them) have 
become more polarized over the past few decades, we should not assume that the general 
public has followed suit. They are not challenging Abramowitz‟s assessment of the 
relationship between the attitudes of the „engaged public‟ and those of political elites. But 
their work casts doubt on the correlation between the political interests and attitudes of 
„engaged‟ citizens and those of the American public at large (and whether the ranks of 
engaged citizens are growing).  
 Like Fiorina and Abrams, I question the purported rise in popular political interest 
that Abramowitz associates with the increase in polarization. And I do not think, at root, 
that ideological divergences across the populace are the root of the problems at hand. Of 
larger significance, it seems to me, is the problem of popular ignorance. This is not to say 
that ideological differences on issues such as immigration, gay marriage, climate change 
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and the like do not have a powerful effect on politics. But the American electorate does 
not just increasingly disagree about the major political issues of our time; quite often, 
voters do not understand either these issues or the mechanics of the American political 
system and the institutions of government that it sustains. This is significant because it 
points to gaps in the public‟s overall political knowledge, gaps that even Abramowitz‟s 
„engaged‟ citizens may suffer from. Take, for example, the controversy that has 
surrounded the Affordable Care Act since it was signed into law in 2010. As Frank Bruni 
notes in a New York Times column published on May 11, 2013 and entitled “America 
the Clueless,” polls conducted three years after the signing showed that forty percent of 
the American public was still unaware that the ACA was, in fact, a law. This means that 
when a Tea-Party-led backlash against this law forced a government shutdown „in the 
interest of the American people‟ later that same year, a considerable swath of the 
American people, whether Tea-Party sympathizers or otherwise, did not know what was 
being rallied against in their name. That this is unsurprising does not make it 
unremarkable, and it gives us cause to consider the nature of American democracy.  
 In fact, it appears that Americans are ignorant about a lot of things—according to 
a National Science Foundation poll released in February 2014, 26% of respondents did 
not know that the earth revolves around the sun.255 Bruni sums up the importance of the 
ACA findings as follows: 
That we Americans are out to lunch isn‟t news. But every once in a while a 
factoid like the Obamacare ignorance comes along to remind us that we are out to 
breakfast and dinner as well. And it adds an important, infrequently 
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acknowledged bit of perspective to all the commentary, from us journalists and 
political strategists alike, about how voters behave and whom they reward.256  
For Bruni, what is „infrequently acknowledged‟ when it comes to Americans‟ political 
behavior is the irrationality of an electorate easily swayed by misinformation and 
disinformation. And his suggestion prompts further questions about the desire for 
information and the value of knowledge in American political culture. Do voters, by and 
large, reward politicians who tell them what they want to hear, regardless of whether or 
not it is true? Could it be that they are „easily swayed‟ because they refuse to question the 
validity of what they want to believe? Mencken would have answered both of these 
questions with a resounding yes, arguing that politicians peddle fiction rather than facts 
because it is fantasy that yields the highest return in political contests. “The smarter the 
politician,” Mencken claimed, “the more things he believes and the less he believes any 
of them,” but he also insisted that lying politicians are as much a product of American 
democracy as a source of its problems.257 Similarly, Ginsberg argues that those who are 
of “the opinion that politics is driven by an altruistic pursuit of the public good probably 
also believe in the tooth fairy and the Easter bunny and have total confidence in the 
claims of telemarketers.”258 For Mencken and, I think, Ginsberg‟s cynical realist, the very 
concept of a „political truth‟ is oxymoronic in this country. Yet Ginsberg seems to blame 
this on the nature of politics—the reality of politics as a cold and brutish and self-serving 
enterprise—while Mencken suggests that politicians lie because the American people, by 
and large, are afraid to face truths, whether pertaining to their nation, their society, or 
themselves. This fear of the truth, Mencken complained, explains why misinformation 
                                                        
256 Frank Bruni, “America the Clueless,” The New York Times, May 11, 2013. 
257 Mencken, Mencken Chrestomathy, 623. 
258 Ginsberg, American Lie, 2 and 37, respectively. 
   
 
 146 
and disinformation generally triumph over factual information in political battles. And it 
also explains why, as Mencken famously complained, American democracy amounts to 
little more than “a pathetic belief in the collective wisdom of individual ignorance.” 
 Mencken‟s cynical claims are as sweeping as they are severe, and there is no 
doubt that he discounted (or even outright dismissed) the difficulties of drawing 
definitive lines between fact and fiction in a democratic public sphere fraught with 
competitive truth-claims. But Mencken‟s proposal that fantasy is related to fear in 
American politics—and individual fears at that—speaks to Cavell‟s work (and in 
particular his work on Emerson) in significant ways. Emerson, Cavell notes, reminds us 
that the prospect of seeking out and speaking the truths of society and of oneself is 
frightening, and not only because we might find ourselves faced with social or political 
reprisal. We might also discover that we do not really know one another or ourselves, and 
that the beliefs that had buoyed our understanding of ourselves and others and the world 
have been a façade. It is for this reason in particular, Emerson suggests, that we cling to 
„consistency,‟ to something that holds our understanding of ourselves and of our society 
together because it allows us to define others and be defined by them through past acts 
and words. It is our „consistency,‟ he argues, that continues to reinforce these definitions 
and provides us with a sense of security that we know both who, as individuals and as a 
society, we are, as well as who we should be. But Emerson encourages us to shuck this 
habit. “A foolish consistency,” he asserts, “is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by 
statesmen and philosophers and divines”: consistency keeps us from embracing 
change.259 We cannot become who we are (always an ongoing process for Emerson) if 
we insist on falling back on cherished definitions of who we want to believe we are based 
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on who we want to believe we have been. This goes for individuals as well as for 
American society at large, and Emerson‟s points here remain relevant today. Why would 
statesmen adore consistency, as Emerson claims? Because they assume that their success 
depends on their talent for telling people what they want to believe and that what they 
„know‟ is the truth. 
 The consistency that Emerson condemns is, I think, akin to the certainty 
condemned by Diogenes and Mencken, and contemplated and challenged by Cavell. 
Certainty, for the cynics, blinds us from the realities of our lives and of ourselves—this is 
something that, as their critics continually point out, they claim to know is true. But the 
force of pointing out a „performative contradiction‟ is not as strong as these critics 
assume. Neither Diogenes nor Mencken develops or seeks to develop a logically 
consistent or comprehensive theory of knowledge. Instead, they pursue ways to cultivate 
or activate the powers of human reason to separate fact from fiction and the true from the 
false (powers that they did not think many human beings cared to make much use of). 
Diogenes and Mencken saw certainty as an excuse to avoid finding out what human life 
consists of practically, and the concept‟s rigidity was something each challenged in his 
own way. And though the issue of what constitutes reason and knowledge is more 
complicated for Cavell, it is a concern he shares with the cynics. While the cynics simply 
naturalize the human faculty of reason, Cavell asks what it actually means to „reason,‟ a 
question that he ponders in his magnum opus The Claim of Reason. For Cavell, reason 
must be recognized, and it requires recognition of community. But like Diogenes and 
Mencken, Cavell asserts that reasoning is also something we must do. As Laugier argues, 
for Cavell “[r]eason is never merely given; it has to be claimed…[and] the individual‟s 
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demand to speak in the name of others, even if it has no further foundation, is rational, 
and is definitive of something essential to human rationality.”260 Following Wittgenstein, 
Cavell argues that we agree and disagree in language, and that the fact that we sometimes 
cannot come to an agreement is hardly indicative of our individual or collective 
irrationality. It is, rather, a sign that we are part of a community of others who can 
recognize our claims, and who can recognize that we are making a claim, even if they do 
not agree with the claims that we make. Indeed, Cavell is quite sensitive to the fact that 
our agreements may be quite fragile. But he insists that this need not be cause for panic. 
For Cavell, the fact that we are separate beings does not entail that we are separated from 
others, or that we cannot also belong to or be part of a community of others (or 
communities of others).  
 Cavell endeavors to show that human understanding is not a matter of certainty, 
but, rather a matter of either acknowledging or avoiding what we share with others and 
with the world as well as what makes each of us separate and unique. Acknowledgment, 
Cavell demonstrates, constitutes a response (he describes it alternately as a confession, an 
admission or an acceptance) to what we presume to know, and what we understand is 
never static but changes, even if we choose to avoid acknowledging it. For Cavell, 
“acknowledgment „goes beyond‟ knowledge, not in the order, or as a feat, of cognition, 
but in the call upon me to express the knowledge at its core, to recognize what I know, to 
do something in light of it, apart from which this knowledge remains without expression, 
hence perhaps without possession.”261 Human understanding of ourselves and of others 
and the world is something that, as individuals, we must seek, and this requires 
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questioning and overcoming the fear of responding to what we find. As Cavell argues, 
“the anxiety in teaching, in serious communication, is that I myself require education. 
And for grownups this is not natural growth, but change.”262 For Cavell, learning is 
changing. It entails shifting the boundaries between the known and the unknown without 
breaking them completely—there will always be limits to what we can know, and the 
drive to find an unshakable underlying truth for why we and the world are the way we are 
is not only futile but, even more importantly, distracting. It distracts us from living. This 
living implies much more than enjoying one‟s existence; it requires caring for it, which 
means giving serious attention to and concern for what our lives are comprised of. 
Learning to live means learning to cultivate the capacity to care for oneself, for one‟s 
relationships with others, and for the world, and it requires respect for the uncertainty that 
troubles not only our experiences but also our expectations for life. 
 What are the political implications of this? The first concerns the necessity of 
collective action. For Cavell, the only way to understand ourselves and the knowledge 
that we have is to seriously consider what we share. Cavell asks us to find the courage to 
have faith in a world irreducible to one or another vision but open to many, a world in 
which we must accept that honoring and pursuing our ethical responsibilities will bring 
consequences we cannot foresee. And accepting ethical responsibility for others and the 
world can have powerful motivational potential when it comes to political action and 
engagement, because it entails a commitment to acting to preserve, protect and support 
them. In The Avoidance of Love, Cavell states that “Our problem is that society can no 
longer hear its own screams. Our problem, in getting back to beginnings, will not be to 
find the thing we have always cared about, but to discover whether we have it in us to 
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always care about something.”263 He challenges us to acknowledge and accept change, 
both as individuals and a society, even if the road is bumpy and there is no final 
destination. But Cavell is also adamant that learning and change, as „philosophy for 
grown-ups,‟ comes from the self, and this leads me to the second political implication of 
his work on acknowledgment and avoidance. As Norris notes,  
the question of the relation of soul and society is hardly a pre-political 
matter but arguably the central question of politics, as [Plato‟s] The 
Republic reminds us. [And] Cavell stakes himself as a political thinker 
upon his sense that its answer(s) requires both politics and philosophy, and 
neither in isolation from the other. If this makes politics more „idealistic‟ 
than many contemporary theorists would have it, it hardly pushes it in a 
utopian or moralistic direction.264  
 
Cavell is by no means suggesting that all voices count equally in American politics and 
society, but he is, I think, suggesting that we consider what we can do about that, or how 
we, as individuals, might help to widen possibilities for different voices to emerge. What 
Cavell does, then, is dare us to learn to live better by daring us to acknowledge what we 
care about while considering the cares of others and of the world we share. He implores 
us to seek to better understand our selves, others and the world by asking us to consider 
how we come by our knowledge and how this affects how we all live. This is not far from 
the mission of the cynics. 
The promises and problems of publicity 
  
Like Diogenes, Mencken never claimed to hold a monopoly on the truth, even as 
he exercised his natural right to insert his voice into the social and political mix. Rather, 
he used this right to chide the American public for its general lack of interest in 
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investigating the legitimacy of the vast majority of the truth-claims that were advanced. 
Determined to debunk the popular myth that the United States was the land of liberty and 
equality for all, Mencken insisted that the American people merely paid lip service to 
these ideals. The reality, he argued, was that they seldom practiced what they preached 
and were all too willing to kowtow and conform, and to restrict both liberty and equality 
in honor of „virtues‟ such as patriotism, piety, propriety, and the like. This is significant 
because although much of Mencken‟s notoriety sprang from his habit of hounding 
politicians and other prominent public figures for peddling lies to the public, his 
criticism, at root, was aimed at the American people for buying into such lies and for 
selling out on ideals that they claimed to revere. The average American, he declared,  
is a violent nationalist and patriot…[who is] violently jealous of what he 
conceives to be his rights, but brutally disregardful of the other fellow‟s… 
Around every one of his principal delusions—of the sacredness of democracy, of 
the feasibility of sumptuary law, of the incurable sinfulness of all other peoples, 
of the menace of ideas, of the corruption lying in all the arts—there is thrown a 
barrier of taboos, and woe to the anarchist who seeks to break it down.265  
 
Mencken was such an anarchist, though his purpose was not just to tear at the barrier of 
taboos but also, and more pointedly, to break down the fantasies of liberty and equality 
that buoyed American social and political culture. That he did this in defense of these 
ideals and of the truth is, I think, the defining mark of his cynicism. 
 Yet Mencken was also highly critical of the profession of journalism for what he 
considered its contribution to the perpetuation of public ignorance and its disregard for 
the ideals of liberty and equality. “A newspaper,” he claimed, “is a device for making the 
ignorant more ignorant and the crazy crazier.”266 (Incidentally, Franklin Delano 
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Roosevelt notoriously criticized at the White House Correspondents‟ dinner in 1934 
when the President launched into an acid-tongued speech condemning the Washington 
press that was drawn expressly from Mencken‟s own writing on the subject of 
journalism. Roosevelt thus turned Mencken‟s criticism of the press back upon Mencken 
himself, taking a cue from his cynical tactics.) And this brings me to the somewhat 
paradoxical relationship Mencken had with publicity and its impact on politics, which 
echoes Diogenes‟ simultaneous need for and rejection of the Athenian public in his 
commitment to freedom of speech. They both valued publicity as a mode or process of 
increasing public awareness of social and political issues, and they were both dedicated to 
a highly individualistic practice of truth-telling that lent itself to the project of enhancing 
such awareness. Yet Diogenes dismissed the possibility that his parrhesiatic could ever 
lead to significant change, and Mencken castigated not only the American public for 
disliking the truth but also the vast majority of his colleagues in the news industry for 
pandering to the public‟s preference for fiction and fantasy. Why would they do so? Part 
of the reason, Mencken argued, was for personal and political profit, but the other part 
was that they were as shy of the truth (and as stupid and fearful) as the public. “Most of 
the evils that continue to beset American journalism to-day,” he proposed, “in truth, are 
not due to the rascality of owners or even to the Kiwanian bombast of business managers, 
but simply and solely to the stupidity, cowardice and Philistinism of working newspaper 
men. The majority of them, in almost every American city, are still ignoramuses, and 
proud of it.”267 In so doing Mencken described most newsmen in the same terms that he 
described the American public, and this was one of the very descriptions of the press that 
Roosevelt used, much to Mencken‟s chagrin, in his speech at the White House 
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Correspondents‟ Dinner. All in all, however, what it expresses is a frustration with the 
lack of appreciation for truth in American political culture, and with the tendency of 
politicians and the news media to cater to (and profit from) the public‟s desire to avoid 
hearing it.  
 Nevertheless, Mencken clearly did not give up on publicity, given his own 
dedication to truth seeking and speaking, and actually his understanding of the possibility 
and problems of publicity is much closer to that of his contemporary John Dewey than he 
would have liked to admit. Dewey, Mencken claimed, wrote in „muffled sonorities,‟ and 
his advocacy of the democratic process hardly endeared itself to Mencken‟s thinking and 
writing.268 But in his 1927 book The Public and its Problems, Dewey laments what he 
suggests is the “present meaning” (and misuse) of publicity, which he describes as 
“advertising, propaganda, misuse of private life, the „featuring‟ of passing incidents in a 
way which violates all the moving logic of continuity, and which leaves us with those 
isolated intrusions and shocks which are the essence of sensations.”269 For Dewey, 
publicity had become a means of manipulation by political insiders (and the press), a 
means of directing public opinion by distorting the truth. But Dewey argues that this state 
of affairs can be challenged, and that the American public needs to embrace freedom of 
inquiry and expression in order to restore democracy‟s promise of participatory politics. 
“The prime condition of a democratically organized public,” Dewey asserts, “is a kind of 
knowledge and insight which does not yet exist…[And] there can be no public without 
full publicity in respects to all consequences which concern it.”270 Unlike advertising, 
propaganda, and the like, „proper‟ publicity, for Dewey, entails freedom of expression, 
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including individual, social and political inquiry and a public discussion of one‟s 
conclusions; it entails communication, which he contends is key to the establishment of a 
„Great Society,‟ or „Great Community,‟ which is indeed the establishment of a „public‟ 
itself.‟271 According to Dewey, one of the factors that hampers Americans‟ political 
interest, and hence „proper‟ publicity, is an excess of extraneous entertainment sources 
and distractions in addition to work. Such interests, he notes, compete with political 
interests and concerns and make for a weakened democratic life, but Dewey is hopeful 
that a resurgence of political interest and appreciation for the merits of publicity can turn 
American democracy around. 
 Mencken was decidedly less hopeful about such prospects for democracy as a 
theory of government, but he did share Dewey‟s sentiments about publicity, and about 
the need for (and avoidance of) political concern and discussion in American political 
culture. They both argued that politicians and the news had abused publicity—roughly 
construed as a move to increase public awareness. But according to Mencken, this was 
above all because the American people do not want to know the truth, and politicians not 
only pandered for their own profit but also (and like the majority of newsmen) were 
„ignoramuses‟ themselves. In sum, Mencken argues that because they fear the truth, the 
majority of Americans would prefer to fall back on the comforts of belief than purport to 
really know, or care for, what happens across their society or the politics that affect it. 
And it is my contention that his views on this were, and still are, quite relevant, and that 
this issue is compounded today by the technological changes that have facilitated the 
proliferation of information (as well as misinformation and disinformation) driven above 
all by the advent of the Internet. The Internet opens a wealth of possibilities for learning, 
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communication, and publicity in the sense of expanding public awareness, but it also 
offers a seemingly infinite number of possibilities for self-selecting one‟s news according 
to particular political proclivities (not to mention a whole new host of „distractions‟ from 
political interest that it is safe to assume would frustrate Dewey). There is also scant 
evidence to show that the Internet has made the American public more inclined to search 
for truths and information about what is actually happening in politics and government. 
And while it may allow members of the public to search for information freely, these 
same members of the public will also be exposed to the kinds of pernicious „publicity‟ 
stunts that Dewey mentions (advertising, propaganda, etc.), tools used by politicians as 
well as the press to distort their understanding of policy, the political process and 
government.  
 My aim here is not to condemn the Internet. Rather, I mean to suggest that its 
value as a tool searching for and finding out what is happening in American politics, 
society, and indeed, the world, depends on a level of critical curiosity and care that the 
American public, taken as a whole, does not seem to have. I think this is in line with 
Mencken‟s thinking on the fear of truth and the preference for fantasy in American 
political culture, and it is also in line with Cavell‟s concerns for how the news functions 
in American society, albeit in a different tone. Cavell laments 
The newspaper tells me everything is relevant, but I cannot really accept 
that because it would mean that I do not have one life, to which some 
things are relevant and some not. I cannot really deny it either because I 
do not know why things happen as they do and why I am responsible for 
any and all of it. And so to the extent that I still have feeling to contend 
with, it is a generalized guilt, which only confirms my paralysis; or else I 
convert the disasters and sensations reported to me into topics of 
conversation, for mutual entertainment, which in turn irritates the guilt.272 
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For Cavell, the glut of information available today can enhance one‟s chance to choose 
avoidance over acknowledgment when it comes to one‟s concerns for others and the 
world. So publicity, in this sense, has not enhanced the extent to which awareness 
transforms into an enhancement in one‟s cares for the relations between the self, others 
and the world. 
Politics, responsibility and speaking the rude truth 
 
One of the underlying themes connecting the thinkers I have discussed—
Diogenes, Mencken, Cavell, and Emerson—is responsibility. I use the term loosely here, 
but what I would like to focus on is that each thinker is concerned with the capacity of 
individual human beings to account for their experiences and to take action and respond 
with consideration and intelligence when provoked by something that they find 
unsettling. Sometimes this entails speaking the „rude‟ truth as Diogenes, Mencken and 
Emerson demonstrated, not out of malice but out of a sense of care for the truth itself. 
And this is what Thoreau is getting at when he likens his mission in writing Walden to 
that of chanticleer, which is namely „to wake his neighbors up.‟273 Accounting for our 
experiences does entail speaking about them, and sometimes it entails provoking one 
another into recognizing what we are saying. But it also, I think, entails listening to 
others, and questioning what we know, before settling on a response to an individual, 
social and political condition. The thinkers I have listed here all ask us to do both—speak 
and listen—in order to better understand our selves, others and the world. 
 Following Cavell, Budick argues that “responsibility is the powerful response 
human beings can make to the „ineluctable fact that we cannot know.‟ This responsibility 
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extends to words as well as to deeds; and it results in a relationship to the world defined, 
not by knowing, but rather by what Cavell calls „acknowledgment.‟”274 This requires 
taking an interest in one‟s world as much as in oneself, and questioning one‟s 
understanding of the self and society and the world instead of taking what one „knows‟ 
for granted. And politically, it entails questioning one‟s leaders but also one‟s sources of 
political knowledge and information. There is no doubt that this is easier said than done, 
but that does not mean that it cannot be done. And while Diogenes and Mencken scoffed 
at the notion that there could be such a thing as honesty in politics, they served as dutiful 
examples that honesty did have a place in society (even if it is generally unwelcome). 
Similarly, Cavell does not shy away from the subject of honesty, political or otherwise, 
and his concern with the „concept‟ of America and the notion of its discovery helps 
illuminate this. As James Conant notes,  
for Cavell, following Thoreau, the monstrous illusion that threatens America is 
the illusion of an already discovered America—a state of affairs in which every 
American citizen imagines that the sole obstacle to reaping the benefits of the 
American dream are of a local and logistical variety…The discovery and 
constitution of America are taken to be accomplished facts, rather than ongoing 
projects whose vitality measures the pulse of America‟s heartbeat.275  
 
For Cavell, we, as individuals and as a society, are responsible for re-thinking the concept 
of America. This is not to say we should simply write it off as mere fantasy. Though the 
American dream is quite rightly in question these days, the concept has yet to die away 
and it is still something that we can (and, I think, do) look to with varying degrees of 
frustration and hope. As citizens, we must ask ourselves what this „dream‟ means to us, 
but in order to do so we must first endeavor to understand what the concept even means. 
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  What is the American Dream? Cyril Ghosh argues that exactly when and by 
whom the term „the American dream‟ was coined is debatable, but it is largely believed 
to have emerged from the Gilded Age and at that time encompassed the themes that 
Horatio Alger celebrated in his popular Ragged Dick „rags-to riches‟ stories: “enterprise, 
drive, luck, intelligence, talent, and above all, initiative.”276 Ghosh argues that the central 
tenets of the term can be whittled down to individualism, equal opportunity and success. 
And while many Americans consider the dream a myth, the concept still resonates in 
political and public discourse frequently enough that its influence deserves 
consideration.277 These are ideals that may be invoked in myriad ways, and that have 
been and continue to be used to justify diverse political, social and personal issues and 
causes. As Ghosh points out, “although not all people believe in its promises, most 
people continue to think that the Dream is either achievable or ought to be achievable. 
Belief in the tenets of the Dream, it appears, has remained fairly stable over the last 
several decades.”278 The „ought‟ in that statement is critical. While some of us may have 
lost faith in the validity of the „Dream,‟ that does not necessarily mean that we have lost 
faith in the principles that compose it. And how we, as individuals and as a larger society 
and nation, appeal to these principles of individualism, equality of opportunity, and 
success, very broadly defined, has serious social and political import. Should we sacrifice 
some individualism in order to ensure greater equal opportunity, and perhaps garner 
greater success for all of us? Or should we endeavor to „level the playing field‟ and let 
the best man or woman win? Could this theoretical playing field ever be leveled when the 
forces facing us as individuals and as a society are not only economic, historical and 
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cultural but also environmental? These are big questions with no definitive answers, but 
the larger issue I mean to highlight in asking them is how the principles of individualism 
and equality of opportunity, in particular, are imbricated in American political culture.  
 What Cavell is getting at in his discussion of keeping the idea of „America‟ open 
is not that we ought to seek a way to conclusively define „America‟ or what is meant by 
individualism, equal opportunity and success, but rather that we, as citizens, need to 
acknowledge the extent to which what they mean in a given context shifts and sways with 
us, as individuals and as a society. We can and do have a say in the direction, and 
intention, of these shifts, which is not to suggest that we can control them. There is little 
to fault in the idea of equality and opportunity for all, but there is a good deal to fault in 
the ways that these ideas have been applied in practice and in political policy throughout 
American history. Still, although some (or even many) of us may have lost faith in their 
practical purpose, this does not necessarily entail that we have lost faith in their appeal. 
And instead of turning away from these ideals, perhaps we can try to acknowledge what 
they mean to us, and how this meaning has changed (and will continue to change) over 
the course of the nation‟s history. Doing so requires serious individual and social 
reflection and a response to what such an inquiry uncovers. Mencken did not harbor 
much hope that the American public was willing or even capable of such a practice of 
thinking and questioning, but maybe he missed the mark on this. And maybe there is 
something to be said for keeping the possibility that he missed the mark open rather than 
trying to affirm or deny it.  
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Cynicism and America 
  
Is the tendency to eschew facts in favor of fictions a defining characteristic of the 
American political scenery? Is it an inherent feature of our democracy? Lincoln Steffens 
was on to something when, at the turn of the twentieth century, he blamed the American 
people for their own governmental mismanagement (he may be most famous for his 
communist sympathies, but he also, and perhaps because of said sympathies, held the 
American people accountable for government corruption and abuses of power). It is my 
contention that the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation in political rhetoric 
is not so much the cause as the consequence of American ignorance, itself a by-product 
of the public‟s refusal to acknowledge the realities of life in the so-called „land of 
opportunity.‟ Citing Brendan Nyhan, Paul Krugman has commented on what he calls “a 
troubling aspect of the current American scene—the stark partisan divide over issues that 
should be simply factual, like whether the planet is warming or evolution happened.”279 
He argues that this problem has nothing to do with the accessibility of information. The 
problem, he says, is not ignorance but “wishful thinking.”280 I think that it is a bit of an 
exaggeration to state that it has nothing to do with accessibility of information, or at least 
of access to an education that fosters one‟s faculties of interpreting information. But I do 
agree that it is also a problem of avoidance, of willful ignorance. Many of us sit back and 
blame our leaders for screwing up, for being corrupt, and for lying, and there is little 
doubt that some or even many of them do all of these things. But in blaming our leaders 
we also shirk our own responsibilities; we fail to get involved in the discussion of the 
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issues on the table. And this starts with actually thinking about social and political issues. 
Diogenes, Mencken and Emerson all remind us of this in different ways, as does Cavell. 
And they have all aimed to provoke us into responding to their criticism as a means of 
provoking us to consider the state of our own lives as well as our society, and to take 
stock of what they are comprised of.  
 Ginsberg‟s theory of cynical realism suggests that the best response to the fact of 
political mendacity is to practice what he calls „defensive politics,‟ a practice which in 
many ways involves rejecting aspects of the traditional models of political 
participation—such as voting—and maintaining a measure of critical distance from the 
political process and the government.281 He argues, however, that this does not entail 
staying „quiet‟ about politics, or avoiding political discussion. To the contrary, he 
contends that “even if [politicians and the state] cannot be defeated, the political class can 
and should continually be subjected to embarrassment, ridicule and harassment. Not only 
does constant pressure keep the politicians and officials uncertain and off-balance, but the 
exercise reminds the citizenry of the clay feet of their erstwhile idols.”282 Ginsberg urges 
us to aim for political action over participation, noting that demonstrations, protests, and 
other forms of criticism and resistance can be more powerful than voting, which (unless 
one is actively working to remove a candidate from office) simply re-enforces the 
corruption of the political system. I do not disagree with Ginsberg on this. But I also 
think that consideration of the kind of Perfectionist tactics Cavell endorses might help us 
find a more hopeful vision of our political future, because these focus less on the faults of 
our leaders and political system and more on the ways in which we, as individuals and as 
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a society, are a part of and contribute to this system. And if we can acknowledge and 
accept our own capacity to change maybe we can find a way to change our perceptions of 
politics and of what we value in American political culture. 
 Critics such as Diogenes, Mencken, Emerson and Cavell all, in different ways, 
push us to engage with their work. And I think that they can teach us to value political 
criticism and to covet its ability to press us to re-consider our political beliefs as well as 
our understanding of our society and of ourselves. The cynics‟ outrageous outspokenness 
demands attention, and what we can learn from Cavell is what is at stake in how and why 
we might respond to them. But are there any cynics in our midst today? There are 
certainly some widely known political satirists, some of whom have even endorsed 
cynicism (unlike Stewart and Colbert). Bill Maher, for example, did a comedy show in 
2000 entitled Be More Cynical, in which he addresses the value of cynicism‟s critical 
capacities and discusses it in light of an array of topics including politics and religion. 
Maher argues that Americans need to be more cynical because we need to question what 
we read and what we hear, a point that Mencken (and, I think, Cavell) would agree upon. 
And like Mencken, Maher‟s controversial comments have landed him in hot water 
publicly and professionally. His comments following the 9/11 terrorist attacks serve as a 
case in point. On the September 17, 2001 episode of his show Politically Incorrect, 
Maher took issue with then President George W. Bush‟s labeling of the 9/11 terrorists as 
cowards, saying the following: “we have been the cowards, lobbying cruise missiles from 
2,000 miles away. That‟s cowardly. Staying in the airplane when it hits the building, say 
what you want about it, but it‟s not cowardly.” This sparked an outcry, cost him 
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sponsorships for his show, and, it seems, led to the show‟s cancellation the following 
year. 
 Maher publicly apologized for the comment, something that Mencken would not 
likely have done (he was willing to admit he was wrong, but not to take back statements 
deemed offensive or crude). But Maher does harbor cynical elements in his criticism of 
American political culture, and its fair to say that Mencken would approve of his satirical 
practices and mode of political speech. And I think that Cavell would too, even if 
Maher‟s style is far from his own. The terrorist controversy certainly created a debate 
about the legitimacy of America‟s status as the world super-power, with politicians, 
pundits and even intellectuals such as Susan Sontag weighing in. And, if not for the first 
time, it provoked the following questions: who are we as Americans, how do we want to 
be known, and what kinds of assertions and actions are we willing to allow our political 
leaders to put forth to define us as a nation? These are important questions that are better 
left open than closed. Mencken asserted that “every decent man is ashamed of the 
government he lives under,” and like Diogenes he contended that decent men were very 
far and few between.283 What Cavell asks us is to consider questions such as these, and to 
consider whether we, as individuals and as a society, have the strength to care about how 
we might answer them. Maher also asks the American public to do this, albeit in a style 
that, like that of Diogenes and Mencken, is decidedly impolite. 
 I think that, even more so than Maher, it is worth considering the actor, writer, 
producer and activist Seth MacFarlane as an example of contemporary cynicism. 
MacFarlane‟s satire on shows such as The Family Guy certainly pushes the line when it 
comes to offensiveness, but when it comes to making a point with an inappropriate joke 
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he excels at getting attention. He calls himself an „equal-opportunity offender,‟ and has 
infuriated a diverse array of individuals and groups including but hardly limited to Sarah 
Palin, the Parents Television Council, and The Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against 
Defamation (incidentally, he has been a very public supporter LGBT issues and of equal 
marriage rights). But it is MacFarlane‟s work as host of the 2013 Oscar ceremony that I 
think makes the best case for his cynicism. His „We Saw Your Boobs‟ song generated a 
storm of (mostly negative) reactions, and women‟s advocacy groups as well as the 
actresses Jane Fonda, Jaime Lee Curtis and Geena Davis all roundly criticized 
MacFarlane and accused him of perpetuating the pervasive problem of sexualizing the 
female body in Hollywood. Yet what his song did, above all else, was bring attention to 
and generate debate about the portrayal of women in movies. Despite her criticism, 
Geena Davis inadvertently acknowledges this. In a speech about female empowerment 
delivered in front of the California State Assembly on March 5, 2013, she stated that “it‟s 
a shame that triumph was enveloped in an awards ceremony containing disrespect for 
women. But it helps illustrate how tone-deaf we can still be regarding the status of 
women.” Davis admits then, that MacFarlane provoked conversation about the status of 
women in Hollywood and elsewhere. Whether or not his song was tasteless or funny is, 
or course, a matter of personal opinion, but it did get people talking, writing, and 
therefore responding to the issues. Was this his intention? One need only watch The 
Family Guy to see that he is well versed in offensive rhetoric, and I think it is fair to say 
that he knew his song would be controversial.  
 Like Diogenes, Mencken, and (albeit with a different tone) Cavell, both Maher 
and MacFarlane are provocative figures who demand that we, as Americans and as 
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members of their audiences (or those who disdain from counting themselves as such), 
think about the state of our selves, our society and our nation. Their work obviously does 
not capture those in the middle—those who do not know about or watch or chime in their 
antics. But they still raise questions regarding the relationship between publicity and 
public responsibility, and they push us to take an interest in the social and political 
intricacies of our time. Like Diogenes and Mencken, Maher and MacFarlane demonstrate 
what I argue is a healthy cynical mood towards politics and society. Are we willing to 
acknowledge what they have to say, and respond to it? Or are we too afraid to face the 
realities of our circumstances, and when it comes to politics choose instead to embrace 
sentiments of anger, disillusionment, apathy and the like? Cynicism, at the end of the day, 
is not about creating or succumbing to fear but rather about confronting it. It a practice of 
speaking the rude truth, of „telling the whole truth and nothing but,‟ and it requires 
courage because the truth is something that is often feared—because it is so often 
stressful and unsettling.  
 On this point, despite his criticism of cynicism, Cavell agrees. “Philosophy,” he 
asserts, “begins in loss, in finding yourself at a loss,” at the moment when we question 
who or what we are, or what we can be, because we don‟t understand our selves or others 
or the world. 284 Cynicism is valuable precisely because it can push us to ask these 
questions, to engage in philosophical and political questions. For Cavell, one of the 
integral aspects of the vision of Emersonian Perfectionism that he endorses is that it can 
come from anywhere, and that we can be struck at any moment to think about, reflect on, 
and respond to what we have seen and experienced. And this notion of being „struck‟ is 
integral to his understanding of the concept. For Cavell, “to feel small for the moment, 
                                                        
284 Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable, 114. 
   
 
 166 
wordless, abashed, say crushed, before a piece of writing seems to me a sign of reading 
its claim correctly.”285 It is a humbling moment, one which teaches us that we cannot 
approach the world alone, even though we are separate individuals. But it is also a 
moment that calls for strength and asks us to respond to the feeling of being small and 
crushed. This can have myriad political implications, yet I think Cavell‟s point is that we 
need to think about the feeling of being crushed and consider it alongside our 
understanding of social and political relations. We need to learn from the experience, and 
to care for the insight into life and all of its complexities that it gives us. 
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